EU External Border Control and Securitisation of Immigration:
The Finnish–Russian Border
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Abstract

Immigration is a sensitive issue in the European Union (EU) and often associated with negative connotations such as welfare abuse, unemployment, and security threats. The 1985 Schengen agreement removed internal border controls within their member states and therefore, external border protection is a major concern of the EU and heads of states. European external border control tightened up with the changing European discourse towards immigration, especially since the terror attacks in the first decade of the 21st century. Therefore, the research question that will be answered is how does the EU external border policy influence Finnish border management towards Russia? This thesis follows the Copenhagen school of security that proposed the tool of a discourse analysis in order to find out the differences between the Finnish and European policy approaches. In addition, policy practices were analysed as suggested by the Paris school of security. Another question to be answered within this work refers to the consequences that such restrictive border policies can inflict in the Finnish-Russian border situation in particular. The choice for the Finnish-Russian border is justified for being the longest external border within the EU and it divides two different socio-economic zones. My research has found out that the Finnish policy approach focuses on regional development in order to achieve economic balance in the border regions. In other words, Finnish external border policy follows the principle that economic cooperation is prominent especially in the border region areas and that severe external border controls impede financial interaction. This strategy is supposed to increase security by economics rather than by military means. However, the European Commission increasingly communicates proposals that focus on military and security aspects, such as the collection of biometric data. The Finnish approach of regional development to increase security within their own country is undermined by the European policy and it creates an instability between the two goals, economic cooperation and internal security.
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1. **Introduction**

“The management of migration flows, including the fight against illegal immigration should be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism”.

(European Council 2004).

The statement given by the European Council above summarises the problematic situation in the European Union (EU) and the connection between immigration and security concerns.

Immigration is a sensitive European policy domain that is increasingly connected to other policy areas, such as internal security and border management (Neal 2009: 352–53). The current discourse on immigration includes concepts referring to societal threats, terrorism, and Islamic fundamentalism that link the issue of immigration with risk and security. Several scholars (Huysmans 2000; Neal 2009; Bigo 2009) argue that a *securitisation* of migration emerged in Western Europe during the last thirty years and has gained greater attention since the terror attacks in New York (2001), Madrid (2004), and London (2005). Although the EU tries to increase integration in migration policies, the process is significantly impeded because of the member states’ reluctance to give up sovereignty in this area; especially since it is gradually intertwined with security and border protection (Léonard 2010a).

Jaworsky (2011: 43) explains that immigration is often associated with terrorism since the terror attacks in the USA (9/2001). The portrayal of unauthorized immigrants as potential terrorists gives governments the ability to introduce stricter immigration policies (ibid). The later often refer explicitly to terrorism as an important issue that is addressed in EU policy proposals. Martin and Martin (2004: 344) state that reforms on immigration laws cannot prevent but still combat terrorism. As Wunderlich (2012: 3) points out, the social construction of migration as a threat to internal security leads to anxiety among the local population. As an example, he presents that securitizing practices automatically shift from policy makers to security actors, for
example border authorities, who implement new border control measurements by using new technologies and expanding cooperation networks (ibid: 4).

Since 2001, the EU pushes certain policy domains, such as migration, into the area of security and defence. The EU security framework has enormously changed in the last two decades and it is characterised by European integration, particularly in the area of border management and protection. One major milestone was the 1985 Schengen agreement that abolished EU’s internal border controls. This process has led to a stronger focus on the European Union’s external borders and their surveillance. Border policies of those member states that have direct external borders have gained greater importance and attention in the EU. Integration and cooperation in border management have acquired a prominent role in the European agenda, eventually resulting in the establishment of the European external border agency Frontex in 2004. Neal (2009: 335) argues that Frontex represents the institutionalization of security and migration policy combined. Geographically speaking, Finland shares the longest external border – approximately 1340 km – with Russia and as a result, Finland becomes an important actor in the European security framework.

For this reason, this thesis focuses on understanding the meaning of European external borders by using the Finnish-Russian border as a case study. This work examines the factors influencing border management based on the concept of Europeanisation. In addition, the theory of securitisation is being applied in order to show how the policy domain of migration was shifted into the field of security. Huysmans (2000: 751) argues that securitisation of migration is a process that can be traced back since the 1980’s when the political construction of the migration discourse was concentrated on the destabilizing effects it might have on certain economic and political areas; such as employment, the social welfare system and crime prevention.

Although the theory of securitisation mainly focuses on military border surveillance techniques, this research presents the hypothesis that, in the case of Finland, border management is less influenced by military issues but rather by economic factors that are necessary for future regional development. On the other hand, EU policies contradict this process. The Finnish-Russian border is often compared to the Mexican-American border since it divides countries of

highly unequal socio-economic patterns (Laine 2012: 51). Laine (2012) shows in his comparative analysis that people move from the underdeveloped Russian areas to Finland in order to find higher paid work and to enjoy a higher living standard. Therefore, Finland concentrates its efforts on development in the neighbouring regions to trigger the beneficial exchange of goods, people, and capital for both countries. For example, Russian tourists are very important for the Finnish tourist sector. Besides, trading among these countries has been again gradually increasing since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additional border crossing points and traffic connections are entitled to support this process (Laine 2007: 53). However, Grabbe (2000: 534–535) argues that the EU undermines the goals of regional integration and good-neighbourly relations between EU members and non-members with their border policy strategies. She points out that it is necessary to boost EU programmes that support border regions; especially after the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 (ibid: 535). Furthermore, she emphasises that “EU border policies are raising new barriers to the free movement of people and goods that inhibit trade and investment” (ibid). Therefore, one can recognise that border management is also an economical issue because the movement of people also means economic exchange.

Problems arise out of the Europeanisation process of border management and the influence of European public discourse on national legislations. Finland’s approach, concentrating on economic development and equality in the border regions, might be undermined by EU border policies. Stricter external border controls are the result of scepticism towards immigration among the European citizens that is for example reflected in national elections in which right-wing parties become more successful, as in France, the Netherlands, and Finland itself. The European integration process is therefore influenced by such Euroscepticism, which shows no signs of fading. Because of this long-term development, it is necessary to scrutinise the impact of the European discourse on national legislations.

1.1. Relevance and Research Question

The contribution brought by this work is to raise the discussion that analyses securitising practices in the policy domain of immigration. It takes into account the original theory developed by the Copenhagen school of thought but also addresses an alternative approach applied by the
Paris school. Furthermore, this thesis does not only examine the existence of a securitisation of immigration in Finland but rather analyses its influence on border controls that increasingly affects the European wide discourse and its evident hostility towards immigration. This development has an impact on the domestic policy making and it is necessary to scrutinise the influence of European politics on the member state’s approach towards border management and protection.

From a social perspective, this thesis clarifies the mechanisms that influence border surveillance and cross-border cooperation (CBC) in terms of economics including the movement of labour and capital. However, this research also shows that especially prospective asylum seekers face increasing difficulties to enter European territory. Considering the circumstance that the EU member states are bound to the UNHCR Geneva convention and its regulations, third country nationals have right for asylum. Nevertheless, future development of European politics might undermine international rules by tightening European external borders.

The research question that will be answered by also attaining two other specific questions:
How does the EU external border policy influence Finnish border management with Russia?
  o What is the Finnish external border management approach?
  o What is the link between national and EU policies with regard to border protection?

1.2. Research Methodology

In order to analyse the impacts caused by strict external border controls on the Finnish-Russian case, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of the Europeanisation process on border management. Moreover, it is crucial to explore the factors that influence European and Finnish policies. This thesis uses a descriptive qualitative research design by applying two different techniques, a discourse analysis and an analysis of policy practices. Security concerns influencing EU external border policies are analysed on the basis of the securitisation theory. The thesis applies two different strands of the securitisation theory, the Copenhagen and the Paris school approach. The Copenhagen school suggests that discourse analyses are an appropriate tool to discover securitising languages in, for example, policy documents. The Paris
school demands the additional investigation of policy practices because not all policy proposals come into force.

The time frame of the analysis comprises the year range of 1990–2013, a period when Finland became to be envisaged as an interesting political spot. The first sign which reveals that Finland was about to lose its characteristic neutral position in the EU was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Afterwards, its accession to the Schengen area turned Finland’s role into one of the main guardians of the external border. Therefore, policy documents are divided into the period before and after 2001. First, a general overview addressing Finnish border management within the two time frames setting 2001 as the turning point is presented. In the following, a discourse analysis compares the European and Finnish policy approaches in order to identify the main differences. Policy documents, in particular dealing with security and border management form the core of the analysis. Units of analysis include official EU Commission documents that propose common border management and in addition European Council conclusions, for instance from the Laeken Council. The chosen documents represent the European border management approach before and after 2001 as a result of the pronounced changes imparted by the terror attack in New York on the European migration discourse. Analysed Finnish policies include the Finnish counter terrorism strategies of 2001 and 2004, published by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an immediate response to the terror attacks in New York and Madrid.

Furthermore, Finnish and European border guarding practices are investigated according to the Paris school of security. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate measurements applied by the Finnish border guard (FBG). Because of its close cooperation with Frontex, it is crucial to analyse Finnish border guarding strategies in light of EU legislations. Technological advancements and its application regarding the prevention of irregular border crossing demonstrate the link between security and immigration. It is important to mention that the Finnish border guard strategy has been kept secret until the middle of the 1990s and only from 1995 onwards, incidents and strategies are accessible to the public. Moreover, it was not possible to gain hands-on experience with a staff member of the Finnish border guard because it was not allowed to reproduce any information that has been given informally. However, the Finnish border guard publishes a regular bulletin that informs about border incidents and their management.
Another material that this thesis can benefit from are interviews conducted by me during my internship at the Institute of Migration (Turku, Finland) with official experts working in the Ministry of Employment and the Economy and in the Ministry of the Interior in Helsinki. The interviews have consisted of open-ended questions that have been divided into subthemes. Each interview lasted around sixty minutes and the interviewer has taken written notes. The acquired information has helped build an overview about the Finnish situation and the country’s role in the European Union. The interviews have given additional insights to understand the development of Finnish external border protection and the mechanisms that influence its management. They also had assisted in the evaluation of Finnish border management and to what extent it is influenced by securitisation of immigration.

This thesis is divided as: (i) The theoretical framework based on Europeanisation and securitisation is introduced and the factors that influence European external border management are examined. The hypothesis that Finnish border management is rather influenced by economic than by military means; (ii) Finnish border management practices are presented in the period of 1990 – 2013 which encloses stages before and after the Finnish accession to the Schengen area in 2001; (iii) The Copenhagen school approach is applied through discourse analyses of relevant European and Finnish policy documents in order to compare the different policies; (iv) An analysis according to the Paris security school is presented describing the practices used at the external borders and the diverse goals that the Finnish and the European perspectives embrace towards the Finnish-Russian border; (v) The shortcoming of the securitisation theory is shown in detail by giving examples of the Finnish regional development approach and its dominating influence on Finnish border management approaches. The conclusion states that national goals towards a specific matter, such as external border management, might be undermined by the Europeanisation process. The EU needs to find a policy that recognises the different regions by respecting their particular characteristics and interests.
2. **Factors Influencing Border Management**

The theoretical and conceptional frameworks for this research are divided into sections that explain the process of Europeanisation and securitisation with regard to border management. The first section introduces the theory of Europeanisation of European external border protection in the specific context of immigration. In the second section the theory of securitisation is used in particular the approach applied by the Copenhagen and Paris schools. A conclusive section was created to connect and to show the relevance of both; the securitisation of immigration and European border management.

2.1. **Europeanisation**

Europeanisation refers to the interaction between member states or third countries to deepen integration on the supranational level. According to Börzel and Panke (2010: 406), it is an important concept to study European integration and its mechanisms. Europeanisation can be portrayed in three different forms: bottom-up, top-down, and a mixed approach attempting to combine both previous forms. The first analyses how member states and other domestic actors on the regional or communal level can influence EU policies (ibid). The bottom-up approach is successful in those areas in which the European Parliament (EP) has a significant amount of power that is valid for policy domains that fall under shared competency. The top-down approach analyses the way how the EU shapes institutions and policies of the member states including the implementation procedure of EU legislations (ibid). It is important to notice that the member states are not passively complying with the rules set out by the EU but they rather affect EU policies by shaping EU decisions and the following process of downloading (ibid: 407). The third approach tries to combine both forms, bottom-up and top-down Europeanisation. Börzel and Panke (2010) explain that member states have less problems to adopt European legislations and policies when they manage to upload their preferences to the EU level beforehand. Some member states do not have the institutional capacity to adopt and to shape European legislations and therefore, the “misfit” leads to higher implementation costs (ibid: 415). In addition, the bigger the misfit between European and domestic policies, the higher the possibility of domestic opposition.
2.1.1. Europeanisation of External Border Control in the Context of Immigration

The establishment of the Schengen area that removed internal border control within the EU led to an increased discussion of external border control policies following the 1980s. People crossing the European external borders are allowed to move freely from one member state to another. However, problems and questions concerning internal security and border management appeared on the national agendas and one of the first politicians addressing this issue was Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1979 – 1990), in her speech in 1988. She drew links between borders and security and emphasised that the matter is national responsibility and will always be. Although the European borders were seen as the boundary from one state to another, the European political approach moved towards the abolishment of internal border control that allowed the free movement of people within a clearly defined space.

Contrary to Thatcher’s vision, European internal borders became an important topic on the EU agenda and the goal was to enhance further integration. However, the agreement of Schengen brought up additional problems, the main point of discussion was to clarify who is in charge of the external borders. Should only governments concerned be responsible for its management? Or should all member states of the Community be involved? The matter of external border control touched deeply the state’s sovereignty; the political management of borders that are crucial for internal security. Zaiotti (2011: 3) suggests that “the solution envisaged in the Schengen regime is a hybrid system of governance consisting of a mix of supranational and intergovernmental features”. External border management lies within the competence of the member states but the European Union tries to gain decision-making power. The establishment of Frontex was an important step towards further cooperation between the national border guards and clearly in line with the EU policy agenda.

The latest enlargement rounds of the EU (2004/2007) revived the academic discussion about the European external borders that shifted into the East and created new European neighbours. The common opinion concentrates on the assumption that the new member states do not have sufficient experiences to cope with the upcoming challenges as an external border protector of the EU. Therefore, according to Berg and Ehin (2006), the deepening level of integration has shifted the responsibility for border management gradually to the European level. The authors argue that the abolishment of internal border control has led to a tighter control at the external borders (ibid: 61). Nevertheless, although the EU tries to gain more decision-making power in
the area of external border protection, the European agency Frontex cannot act on its own. Missions are only possible on demand of the member states and also the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) consist of the different national border guard units and their equipment (Frontex 2012c). As discussed in more depth below, Léonard (2010a: 239) argues that a securitisation of immigration becomes obvious because some features of Frontex seem to give the EU greater competence than laid down in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, European institutions had no right to adopt regulations or directives in the area of freedom, security and justice (Europa 2010). However, after the ratification, the EU can propose and adopt measurements that are “establishing common management of the EU’s external borders; in particular through strengthening the role of Frontex” (ibid).

The European Union introduced different instruments and legislations that aim to support border management that recognises the EU human rights charter and treats people with respect and dignity. Despite the human rights, Prokkola (2012: 14) argues that the Schengen borders code, which is supposed to ensure the human treatment of immigrants, “hardly ever comes true in actual border and visa policy” (ibid). She rather emphasizes that the introduction of new border security measures led to a hierarchy of citizenship and increases the segregation of the population within the EU. The meaning of borders shifted from “guarding the border” towards a security border, including the societal protection of the population within the EU by focusing on crime prevention and reducing irregular immigration (ibid).

2.2. Theories of Securitisation

The Copenhagen School Approach

The theory of securitisation emerged during the early 1980s and was explicitly mentioned in the late 1990s by the scholars Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). They define “security” as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (ibid). The meaning of securitisation can be derived from this definition as a more extreme version of politicization. According to the authors, an issue can develop from being non-politicised through politicised
and ends up being securitised (non-politicised → politicised → securitised). This means that the matter is presented as an existential threat, requiring immediate action (ibid: 23–24).

Securitisation is defined as *speech act*; therefore it can be argued that it is a socially constructed process (Balzacq 2011: 1). Buzan et al. (1998: 26) state that “the security act is negotiated between the *securitiser* and the audience […] the securitising agent can obtain permission to override such rules, because by depicting a threat the securitising agent often says something cannot be dealt with in the normal way”. A securitising speech act takes a certain issue, as migration, out of the realm of normal politics and shifts it into the area of security. This gives the speaker the authority and permission to implement measurements that would otherwise be restricted by their institutional position. According to Buzan et al. (1998: 25) the common way to study securitisation is with the support of a discourse analysis and of political constellations. It is necessary to find out at what point a particular policy is publicly accepted although political actions are violating rules and international standards. In those cases, securitisation can be witnessed (ibid). It is mentioned that securitisation either appears on an *ad hoc* basis or it is becoming institutionalised (ibid: 27; cf. Léonard 2010). In liberal democracies, it is necessary for officials to inform the public about the reasons why a particular matter demands for security and can therefore be handled differently.

The authors underline that an issue becomes a security problem through the discursive politics of security (ibid: 26). The changing discourse of an issue is taken up by politicians or security agents, which is then pushed into the area of security by its “specific rhetorical structure” (ibid). Moreover, securitisation can only occur when there is a specific relationship between the speaker and the audience (ibid). First, the actor needs sufficient institutional and political authority to shape policy outcomes (Neal 2009: 335). Second, the audience must be receptive and allow the speaker to legitimize measurements against the immediate or socially constructed threat and enable security politics to deal with the matter. McDonald (2008: 567) formulates it as the “suspension of normal politics in dealing with that issue”.

Buzan et al. (1998: 119) apply the theory of securitisation to different areas, such as the societal sector that is representing the research topic of this study because often it is argued that immigrants are a threat to the society in the host country. The most important concept for society is identity. According to the authors, a societal threat exists when a “community defines a development as a threat to their survival as a community” (ibid). First, Buzan et al. (1998) define
migration as a problematic issue because the community fears that they are intruded by foreign people who are not sharing the same identity. Second, the authors refer to “horizontal competition” as the fear that the community changes its values and its identity and adjust to the culture of the immigrants by adapting to its linguistic and cultural differences. The third issue is vertical competition, meaning that people will lose their identity due to integration projects and the scope of the community is either growing or narrowing down (ibid: 121).

Alternative Approach – Paris School of Security

The theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School generated a broad debate about its applicability (Leónard 2010a: 235). Léonard (2010a) refers to the work of Didier Bigo, a member of the Paris school, who developed a different approach to identify securitisation acts. He argues that it is possible to securitise policy areas without speech acts (ibid). Huysmans (2004: 307) explains that the political security discourses are interlinked with the practices, such as technological devices used for border management (ibid). Léonard (2010a: 235) points out that it is important to analyse securitisation not only on the basis of speech acts but also on policy practices and the implementation of particular measurements. Bigo claims that the securitisation of immigration appears through successful speech acts and the following mobilisation against particular groups but also through administrative practices as population profiling, risk assessment, and category creation (ibid). Léonard (2010a: 236) furthermore criticises that Bigo’s theory lacks a precise approach for analysis. While the Copenhagen school concentrates on speech acts as the unit of analysis, Bigo focuses on the role of security actors and their practices. However, he does address the issue that would explain how to analyse policy practices in particular.

2.2.1. Securitisation of Migration as a Cause of European External Border Controls

One important question to answer is why and when securitising theories became popular. Several scholars (Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 2000) wrote about securitisation in general and securitisation of migration in particular without explicitly referring to the rising threat of
terrorism. Huysmans (2000: 751) shows in his article that securitisation of migration is a process that builds on the destabilizing effects of migration on certain economic and political areas, such as employment, the social welfare system and crime prevention. He explains that the establishment of the European Single Market, which defines the free movement of goods, people, and capital within the European Union by removing internal border controls, has led to the increased focus of security agents on its external borders (ibid: 759). The advent of Keynesian economic politics and the rise of the neoliberal economic framework under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, former President of the United States (1981–1989), increased social insecurity on a global level.

Immigration is caused by different factors and many of them can be explained by the rational choice theory that identifies push and pull factors based on economic opportunities. Moreover, environmental disasters and social and political pressures (ethnic minorities) force people to leave their home countries (Waever et al. 1998: 121). However, it can also occur “in part of a political program to homogenize the population of the state” as happened within the Russification of Central Asia and the Baltic States after the Cold War (ibid). Integration projects that aim to shape a common culture target to control the system of cultural reproduction by influencing schools, churches, the language, political and human rights (ibid: 122). Societies can react to those threats in a twofold way. Either they are taking actions that are carried out by the community or they are delegating this task to the political or military level. The state has many possibilities to restrict immigration by legislations and border controls. There are different angles within the academic securitisation debate.

Boswell (2007: 590) rejects the securitisation of migration. She rather claims the opposite; that law enforcement agencies at national and EU levels have tried to use migration control as counter-terrorism activities. She provides the example of data gathering and monitoring of migrant movements. These instruments are increasingly included into the counter-terrorism strategy on the national and supranational level. The author argues that “there is remarkably little evidence of attempts to securitize migration in Europe through explicitly linking irregular migrants and new entrants to terrorism”. Overall, the author disagrees with the prediction of the security school and rather states that the public discussion about European migration control remained unaffected by the anti-terrorism agenda (ibid).
Other scholars (Huysmans 2000; Bigo 2009; Léonard 2010a) argue for a securitisation of migration that can be for example analysed by examining the role of Frontex as the institutionalisation of external border control. Neal (2009: 334) explains that, according to the Copenhagen school, securitization of a certain issue is initiated by the immediate response of policy makers and their argumentation that a particular area needs “urgent” action. However, according to Bigo (2002: 73) the authors of the Copenhagen school “have little sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice”. He claims that securitisation of immigration is the result but not the cause of the modern technologies that aim to control and protect the borders (ibid). The academic debate is characterised by a disagreement on how to identify securitisation; however, securitisation of immigration can be analysed by a combination of both approaches, discourse analysis and examining practices. In Huysmans (2006) book, *The Politics of Insecurity*, the author discusses the matter of securitisation not from a linguistic but rather from a technical view. He builds a Foucoultian framework in which the rationality of security needs to be adapted. It is worth to cite his hypothesis:

“First, it shows that studies of security should not just focus on the politics of threat definition but, rather, on the modulations of security”, that is, the political, and social process in which threat definitions are embedded” (Van Munster 2007: 239).

Therefore, in case of the securitisation of immigration, Huysmans argues that securitising policy actions are direct consequences of an excess that is perceived to be “dangerous” such as immigrants, asylum seekers, and organised crime (ibid). Flows of immigrants are regulated and controlled by “technologies of exclusion”, including border control, finger printing, profiling, and monitoring (ibid). These technologies create an “institutionalisation of fear and hostility as the ordering principle within Europe” (ibid). Therefore, this thesis argues that the European agency Frontex is a result of the securitisation of immigration that emerged during the 1980s.

This thesis analyses Finnish-Russian border protection over the course of twenty years, from 1990 until 2013. Several events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terror attacks of 2001 have a great influence on the development of Finnish border protection as illustrated in the following sections.

3.1. 1990 – 2001

The discourse towards border protection changes constantly (Paasi 1999: 671). This is also the case for the Finnish-Russian border that has a unique history in comparison with other European nation-states and their neighbouring countries. Before gaining independence in 1917, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia since 1809 and borders were open (ibid). Cross-border activity between Russia and Finland was very high until Finnish independence. However, after being recognized as an independent state, Finland had a great interest in securing its borders and to mark its territory by clear boundaries. As Paasi (1999: 671) explains, the establishment of borders was crucial within Finland’s nation-state building and to create an individual identity, independent from Russian influence. Although the territory was clearly defined after 1917, Finland lost great parts of its land during the 2nd World War to Russia. The Paris Treaty of 1947 reconfirmed the Finnish-Russian border that resulted in large territorial losses for Finland. Most of the East-Karelian region fell under Russian sovereignty.

During the years of the Cold War, Finland’s foreign policy was dominated by a neutral approach because it was surrounded by two large emerging powers, the European Community and the Soviet Union. Both were economically important for Finnish trade and the communist threat of the Soviet Union forced Finland’s policy makers to keep a stable foreign policy with both powers. In the period from 1985–1986, 20% of Finnish exports went into the Soviet Union. However, this number declined drastically down to 13% in 1990 and decreased further to 3% in 1992. Only after the Finnish recession that was closely related to the downturn of the Soviet Union, exports to Russia increased again to 6% in 1997. Russia was ranked as the fifth important trade partner for Finland in both exports and imports at the end of the 1990s (ibid: 673). The border was closed during the decades of the Cold War and only the collapse of the Soviet Union
started to shift the discourse and meaning of the Finnish-Russian border into political discussion on the EU level (ibid: 671).

According to Paasi (1999), the downturn of the Soviet Union gave Finland the possibility to accede to the EU in 1995. Within this development, Finland applied for Schengen membership in 1996 that was granted in 2001 (Prokkola 2012: 7). Although Finland focused its foreign policy towards Europe and further integration into the European Union, it also continued to keep up a diplomatic relationship with Russia. Several agreements, the first in 1992 named the “neighbouring area cooperation” aimed to promote peaceful cooperation on different matters, such as development, economic relations, and environmental issues. However, border matters were not discussed and a survey in 1992 among the Finnish and Russian population showed that negotiations on the existing borders should not be reinforced (Paasi 1999: 672).

A proposal from the Russian president Yeltzin in 1997 for increased border cooperation was refused by the Finnish president Ahtisaari with the words “sovereign states always take care of border control independently” (ibid). During the 1990s, Finland became a very important actor within the security framework of the European Union because of its external border. Finnish national border protection gained importance for all member states of the EU. Technological advancements were increasingly used for border surveillance. Throughout the 1990s, cameras and electronic monitoring systems were installed to decrease the visibility of border protection and to increase its efficiency (ibid). Although the Finnish climate towards cooperation in 1997 was rather restrictive, there has been an increasing cooperation between Russian and Finnish national border guards in terms of information exchange; especially on criminal activities. The strict Finnish border policy can be identified when looking at the statistics of border crossings from asylum seekers in the period of 1994 – 1997. According to Paasi (1999: 673), the number of accepted asylum seekers varied from seven to 45 annually, while more than 800 people have been refused and sent back in 1997.

Although the Finnish-Russian border can be specified as a “security border” as explained by Laitinen (2002: 22), movements from Russia to Finland were increasing throughout the 1990s. According to official tourism statistics, 85000 Russian cars crossed the border in 1991. This number increased to 170000 in 1996 (Suomen Virallinen Tilasto 1997). Moreover, the total number of Russians entering Finland at the 26 border crossing points (in 1999) rose to two million in 1997 (Paasi, 1999: 673). The increased traffic led to undesirable assumptions among
the Finns towards the Russian tourists and immigrants. The Finnish media created an overall picture that connected the entry of Russians with smuggling, organised crime and the control of alcohol flows (ibid). Finns became less interested in crossing the border to Russia while the number of Russian tourists continued to rise. This led to a new insecurity among the Finns because it was not possible to traffic the movement of the Russians within the country. The introduction of electronic devices, at the end of the 1990s, for monitoring the movements of Russians crossing the EU border was supposed to increase internal security among the Finnish population.

Finland’s role as the guardian of one of the external borders of the EU was increasingly carved out during the 1990s. In fact, two problems emerged that defined Finnish politics towards the Finnish-Russian border. A relatively opened border is favoured by a liberal state in terms of market accession, competition, and trade. However, this can also lead to unwanted immigration, especially the increased entry of asylum seekers as explained by Joppke (1998). As Paasi (1999: 674) argues, the Finnish-Russian “border continues to run between two completely different societies, and the gap between the standards of living on the two sides is among the largest in the world”. Public opinion polls in 1994 showed that one third of the Finns were sceptical about the gradual opening of the border and Finns explained their hesitation with prejudices, reflecting the economic division (ibid). The construction of new routes between Russia and Finland was also viewed in a sceptical way by military elites because they needed to develop additional border guarding strategies that cover all border crossing points. They were mainly concerned with any possible strategic changes; however the Finnish government acknowledged the fact that additional border crossing points were necessary for cross-border activity.

To sum up, although all the sceptical views and military concerns, the Finnish government chose a liberal open policy towards the Finnish-Russian border in the 1990s. Cross-border movement was high in the first half of the 1990s but an imbalance emerged quickly in response to the high number of Russians entering the European country. To understand this changing of behaviour, it is necessary to analyse the impact of Finland’s accession to the EU and how it influenced Finnish border policy and the attitude towards immigration.
3.2. 2001 – 2013

Historically, the Russian-European border was strongly integrated into the EU security framework because it divided a capitalist from a communist society. However, Laitinen (2002: 22) argues that, although the Cold War ended, the Finnish-Russian border can still be characterised as a “security border”. He defines a security border as “the border between two (or several) political units containing the dimension of security in a traditional sense”. He draws the distinction between the Finnish-Russian and Finnish-Swedish border by arguing that the Finnish-Russian border is still underlying very heavy security concerns that are related to irregular immigration and crimes such as human trafficking (ibid).

Finland’s accession to the European Union in 1995 was followed by the application for Schengen membership in 1996. The Schengen agreement was implemented in 2001 and Finland adopted its rules into their own domestic legal framework. One main requirement was the abolishment of internal border controls to other European member states and the harmonisation of border controls with the EU and Schengen border control system (Prokkola 2012: 7). Due to the fact that controls between the Nordic countries were already abolished in 1957, Finland had no problems to meet this particular requirement (ibid). Furthermore, whereas in 1989 125 controlling stations existed along the Finnish border area, there are today 31 border guard stations and 26 coast guard stations. Due to economic reasons that aim to enhance efficiency, further closures are planned together with the increased use of further mobile border units. They were introduced for the first time in 2005 by a legal reform, “which expanded the authority of the Finnish border guards (FBG) to the entire state territory including the sea area and the economic zone of Finland” (ibid). Prokkola (2012) states in her article that Finnish border management was increasingly operating under a neoliberal aspect resulting thus in a cost-benefit analysis. The goal of the government was to cut costs by shutting down smaller border stations and to increase the size of the remaining units.

After 2005, the competency of the Finnish border guard was increased. The introduction of mobile units increased the effectiveness of border surveillance and recognised as an approach “to tackle new challenges and strategic requirements” (Prokkola: 8). According to the author, mobile
border guarding units and the introduction of new border and immigration policies are presented by authorities as economically necessary. They are detaching the new measurements from political motives (ibid: 8). According to Andrijasevic and Walters (2010: 995), politics of inclusion and exclusion are disguised by the ‘economic-technocratic jargon’ used by border management authorities.

Finland has chosen a particular approach to tackle cross border crimes. The cooperation between the police, customs, and border guards (PCB) was implemented in 2010 (Hannola & Myller 2012). Intelligence systems are established to monitor border activities and focus on cross border crimes. The Finnish border guard states that “PCB cooperation aims at promoting cooperation between the authorities so that duties related to internal safety and security can be performed efficiently and flexible” (Finnish Border Guard 2013a). The Finnish government enhanced the authority of the Finnish border guard management with the reforms taken place in 2005. Tasks which were formerly only inherited by the Finnish police shift to the FBG, for example “the authority to take first action and make preliminary studies in the prevention of cross-border crime” (Prokkola 2012: 8). Furthermore, Prokkola (2012: 8) argues that the enhanced competencies of the FBG “indicate the increasing of criminalisation in irregular border crossings”.

Moreover, the Finnish border guard strategy states that “the Finnish border guard makes a strong contribution to the EU border management security and joint European responsibility (Prokkola 2012: 8). During the last decade, cooperation on border management with the EU increased, in particular with the establishment of the European agency Frontex. The Finnish border guard states that international cooperation is necessary to become an effective and important security player within the EU (Finnish Border Guard 2013b). The focus is concentrated mainly on the Finnish-Russian border since it is the only neighbouring country that is neither an EU member nor participating in the Schengen agreement. The main task of the border guards at the Finnish-Russian border is to prevent unauthorised border crossing using technical surveillance systems including cameras (ibid). Since the EU external border is in the focus of the FBG, the border guard points out the role of Frontex and its cooperation with EU civilian crisis management operations which number increased during the last years. The civilian crisis management has a particular role in “policing, including border and customs control,
strengthening the rule of law and civilian administration, civil protection and monitoring duties” (Finnish Border Guard 2013b).

3.3. Securitisation of Migration and its Connection with Europeanised Border Security in Finland

The Finnish border guard, as the internal security agency, operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior (The Finnish Border Guard 2012). Prokkola (2012: 14) explains that the discourse on border enforcement and securitisation in Finland needs to be analysed based on three different factors; geopolitical changes, technological innovations, and the neoliberal reform that took place in the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, roots of securitisation of immigration and its direct link with border protection need to be analysed under those three aspects. As explained in the previous section, Finland experienced important geopolitical changes in the beginning of the 1990s that changed its political security framework within the EU. Moreover, border surveillance strategies are increasingly a subject of cost-benefit calculations. The goal is to increase efficiency while keeping the costs low. Technological innovations, for example automated passport controls, are installed to accelerate and simplify the process of border crossing. Therefore, it is necessary for this thesis to take into account factors that go beyond security concerns. Particularly Finnish-Russian border politics is dominated by economic factors and does not only refer to the security issues addressed by the EU.

According to Smolander (2009: 16), Finland took an important part in establishing Frontex that is headed by the Finnish border guard General Ilkka Laitinen. Smolander (2009: 16) states that “[risk analysis] was developed by the Finnish Border Guard, has been used by Finnish authorities for decades. Now it is in use throughout the EU”. The Europeanisation process of border management in Finland represents the bottom-up and top-down approaches. Different elements that form the core tasks of Frontex were adopted from the Finnish border guard model, such as risk analysis. Nevertheless, Finland needed to adopt European legislations and comply with the new external border protection standards such as the collection of biometric data at the external borders within the Schengen information system (SIS II) (European Commission 2013c).
Neal (2009: 334) picks up Boswells’ argumentation by analysing the role of Frontex and its establishment in the context of securitisation. He clearly states that the terror attacks of 2001 provided “an opportunity for the securitisation of migration” but Frontex is not the consequence of this securitisation but “rather of its failure” (ibid). Neal argues that the EU did not use an obvious securitizing language in the respective policy documents prior the establishment of the external border agency. In his conclusion, he emphasizes that the establishment of Frontex was not an act of securitisation because the topic of border protection was never explicitly pushed into the area of security. However, the author states that Frontex is rather the demonstration of a European policy which combines particular policy areas: external border control, immigration, and terrorism. This way of practice is gradually being normalized and Neal sees the threat that this normalization is not “quite spectacular or controversial enough to draw attention to itself” (ibid: 352 – 53). Following another venue, Léonard (2010a) provides a different argumentation. Although Neal represents the opinion that Frontex is not a result of the securitisation of migration, Léonard clearly shows securitising elements while analysing the tasks and practices of Frontex. This thesis engages in the specific discussion about securitising factors within the European Union which are analysed in the next section. For organization purposes, the securitisation process in the member states is examined first and if discourses and practices followed by Frontex show the same patterns as the EU.
4. Securitization of Immigration and Border Control in the EU and Finland: A Discursive Analysis – The Copenhagen School Approach

In the following section, several official EU and Finnish policy documents are discursively analysed in order to identify how the issue of immigration is rhetorically presented before and after 2001. It is important to acknowledge both periods because the European discourse on immigration changed after 2001 by associating the concept with “Islamic threat” and “the Other” (Bigo 2009: 588). In order to scrutinise if Finnish immigration policy became securitised after 9/11, documents about Finnish immigration and border control policies are included in the analysis.

4.1. Securitisation of Immigration after 9/11 through Common External Border Controls – European Discourse

Frontex was established in October 2004 and its official purpose was defined as the “Coordination of intelligence driven operational co-operation at EU level to strengthen security at the external border” (Neal 2009: 333). Since Frontex is acknowledged as the institutionalisation of external border control, it is important to analyse if the creation of Frontex represent also the process of securitisation of migration (ibid: 334; cf. Léonard 2010). As explained before, Neal argues that Frontex was not the result of a securitisation of migration; however, this thesis assumes that Frontex is an important tool for the EU to gain additional competency at the external borders in order to control the movement of people at the Schengen borders.

During the Finnish Presidency in 1999, the EU held a Council meeting in city of Tampere, Finland, which discussed the creation of an area of freedom, security, and justice (European Parliament 1999). For the first time during a presidential meeting, the heads of states negotiated on a common asylum and immigration policy and also explicitly considered the cooperation
among the member states towards cross-border crimes (ibid). The European Council concluded that it is crucial to establish a cooperative network to prevent irregular immigration by increasing the efficiency of the national border control services (ibid). The conclusions reached in Tampere can be acknowledged as the initiative to start intergovernmental negotiations on a combination of forces to protect the external border of the EU. A particular emphasis was put on the maritime borders and the member states Italy and Greece that share the highest portion of irregular border crossings into the Schengen area. However, the Council also focused on the eastern European member states that acceded to the Union in 2004:

“As a consequence of the integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union, the candidate countries must accept in full that acquis and further measures building upon it. The European Council stresses the importance of the effective control of the Union’s future external borders by specialised trained professionals.” (ibid).

The matter to strengthen European external border control thus came up before the terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid. The concern was directed at the EU enlargement in 2004 and solutions to manage potential migration flows from East to West. Moreover, member states discussed and analysed if the acceding countries would be able to cope with the role as external border guardians. The heads of states also discussed the creation of a common migration and asylum policy that is in line with the Geneva Convention and makes sure that no individual is being sent back to potential prosecution2 (Neal 2009: 339). Therefore, the goal was to establish a European Union that is accessible for asylum seekers and immigrants entering legally into the Schengen area. Despite possible large immigration flows from the eastern European countries, the Commission proposed that it should be possible for labour immigrants to enter the Union without facing large bureaucratic hurdles. The Commission argues that “migrants can make a positive contribution to the labour market, to economic growth and to the sustainability of social protection systems” (ibid).

Nevertheless, the Commission changed its approach drastically after the events of 9/11. In November 2001, it issued a working paper that explicitly asked for additional border control measurements (European Commission 2001). The EU suggests that pre-entry screening, a strict

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2 Principle of non-refoulement: “It provides that no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom.” (UNHCR 2010: 3).
visa policy, and the use of biometrical data are useful tools to identify persons that are involved in terrorist activities (ibid: 3). Enhanced cooperation between border guards, intelligence services, and immigration and asylum authorities are necessary to ensure internal security of the European member states. The Commission proposed a common policy on irregular immigration that emphasises on border controls that are capable to dissolve criminal networks and decrease terrorist risks (Neal 2009: 339). As analysed by Neal (2009:339) the Commission proposal shows that “sources of insecurity come from outside and that immigration to the EU are a major source of insecurity”.

During the presidential meeting in Laeken, Belgium, in December 2001, the heads of states responded to the suggestions of the Commission by working out policy proposals that intend to amplify immigration and border controls. Within the presidential conclusions, one section refers to the actions taken up by the Union after the attacks in the US (European Council: 2001a). It states that:

“The European Union reaffirms its total solidarity with the American people and the international community in combating terrorism with full regard for individual rights and Freedoms.”

(European Council 2001a: 5).

Due to international agreements and contracts, the EU has the task to support the US in the fight against terrorism and to implement security and prevention measurements that help to prevent terror attacks. An action plan was implemented eleven days after the terror attacks that aimed to take immediate action on the matter. According to the theorists of the Copenhagen School, securitisation is identified when a matter is taken out of the normal realm of politics and pushed into the domain of security. Furthermore, securitisation of a particular matter occurs when it asks for immediate response and actions. The informal meeting of the European Council in September 2001 entirely focused on the terror attacks in New York (European Council 2001b: 1). The Council states that the Council on Justice and Home Affairs should as quickly as possible implement the measures laid down in the Tampere conclusions in 1999; among others the enhanced cooperation on external border control. The wording used in the conclusions reflects the urgency by stating that “[...] the European Council instructs the Justice and Home Affairs Council to implement as quickly as possible [measurements decided upon during the Tampere Council meeting...]” (ibid: 2). Furthermore, the Council declares that member states will
cooperate with Europol and deliver all useful information they have on terrorists “without delay” (ibid). Several policy domains, falling under the jurisdiction of Justice and Home affairs, are transferred to the area of security, such as border surveillance.

The Laeken presidential conclusions point towards enhanced cooperation on the external border to prevent irregular immigration (European Council 2001a: 12). In addition, one section addresses the external border with Russia by referring to the guidelines that has led to a strategic partnership. The Council decided that a structural agreement should also be implemented that addresses the combat of “organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration” (ibid: 14). According to Levy (2005: 31), the events of 9/11 increased the tension regarding the asylum system of the European Union. This development can be recognised with the statement of the European Council that asked “the Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and the compliance with international protection obligations and instruments” (ibid: 35; Neal 2009: 338). Neal (2009: 339) argues that the conclusions of the European Council interlinked asylum and migration with security by questioning the demands of internal security and the obligation to comply with international agreements. Although the European discourse towards immigration and border management became increasingly interlinked after 9/11, Neal (2009: 345) continues to explain that the following terror attacks of 2004 in Madrid did not show the same securitising effects of immigration.

The EU used furthermore a securitising language although it did not raise the need for new institutions or extraordinary measures. The Commission rather proposes to use the networks and institutions that already exist and to expand their competencies, for example the use of fingerprints and their digital storage in Eurodac3 (ibid). Although Neal argues that Frontex was not the outcome of the securitisation of immigration policy discourse, he claims that the analysis to explain the background of the establishment of Frontex is complicated because the agency is not simply a policy outcome but rather “now a tool or even an agent that may be able to act on its own right” (ibid: 346).

Carrera (2007: 8) emphasises that Frontex is the opposite of securitisation because it tries to harmonise border management across all European countries. He concludes that Frontex aims at

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3 Biometric database for comparing fingerprints to verify whether an asylum applicant has previously claimed asylum in another EU state or if an immigrant entered EU/Schengen territory unlawfully before (European Commission 2013a).
regulating the European external border surveillance in order to prevent any erosion or arbitrariness of border and migration policies that are associated with national sovereignty. In fact, Neal (2009: 438) cites the statement of Guild who states that “a new border code comes into force which must be applied by both Frontex and the Member States”. In light of this policy demands, the European Commission issued a policy proposal in 2008, preparing the next steps in border management. The authors Guild, Carerra and Geyer evaluated this “Border Package” shortly after its publication by referring to the development towards a “cyber-fortress Europe” (Guild et al. 2008: 1). This proposal especially suggests an entry/exit system for tracking third-country nationals once they enter Schengen territory. The Commission suggests the introduction of:

“the automatic registration of the time and place of entry and exit of third country nationals, both those that require a visa and those that do not, to identify overstayers, could be introduced at the borders” (European Commission 2008: 7)

Guild et al. (2008: 4) criticise that immigrants who overstay their visas in the Schengen area might not be detected because it will not be possible to track them. They might have left the Schengen area via a different country or might have travelled to another Schengen country.

In February 2013, the European Commission issued a regulation proposal to the European Council and to the European Parliament to establish the entry/exit system for third country nationals crossing the external borders. According to the Commission, only a regulation can be chosen as a necessary instrument to implement the same policies in all European member states (European Commission 2013: 7). A regulation gives member states no alternatives in the implementation process and Finland is obliged to adopt the legislation into its own legal framework. However, as shown above, Finland chooses a less restrictive approach in border management because Finnish-Russian border management is not only influenced by security but also economic means. Guild et al. (2008) recommend that all actors should examine whether the measures impede the development of an EU that respects liberty and international human rights. Moreover, they suggest testing border control technologies in beforehand to ensure their ethical usage.

The immediate response to the terror attacks in New York was a securitisation of immigration through speech acts. The European Union used a rhetoric that clearly shows how migration
policies are associated with terror prevention; particularly regarding irregular immigrants. Although the speech acts lacked the same urgency a few years after the terror attacks in New York and Madrid, the EU clearly supports a tightening of the external borders. Having shown the overall European trend in the following years after September 2001, it is now necessary to examine the language used in Finnish policy documents that followed 9/11 events.

4.2. Finnish Policy Response to the Terror Attacks in New York and Madrid

Although the Commission already faced the member states’ demand to restrict refugee and asylum flows during the 1990s, one suggested that the official stop on labour immigration from 1973 needed to be reviewed. An aging population in the industrialised countries lead to demographic changes that will have fatal consequences for the economies of the western European countries (Levy 2005: 32). Member states have responded to this development by sanctioning the recruitment of foreign workers. Finland became only a country of immigration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Neal (2009) suggests that the Nordic states have not the same experience concerning immigration as the Mediterranean and Continental European countries and they have a different notion of threat and insecurity. In autumn 2001, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs published its first report on terrorism (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001). The rhetoric used in this document differs from the content of the European Council conclusions in 2001. The report states that Finland is not the main target for terrorists but it took several actions to support the EU in combating terrorism. Border controls have been temporarily tightened, especially right after the terror attacks in New York. However, already after the 20th of September, the level of border controls was diminished. Only after the first air strikes of the US army against Afghanistan, Finnish external border controls were tightened again (ibid). Contrary to the wording chosen by the European Commission and European Council, the Finnish government did not recognise the need for urgent amendments in the legislation regarding border surveillance:

“The normal level of preparedness was reassumed by the Frontier Guard on 20 September 2001, after a period of intensified border control. Since the first air strikes by the United States against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, border control has again been intensified.”

(Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001)
Moreover, the country expects to receive more asylum applications, especially from people in Afghanistan. Finland prepared to accept more refugees however they support to accommodate them in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan in order to facilitate their later return (ibid). Within the report, there is no obvious sign of securitisation of immigration because it does not mention migration related problems. Unlike the European Union, the Foreign Ministry does not relate terrorism with immigration in 2001. They rather try to take preventive measures to protect Muslims within the own country from any harassment (ibid).

After the terror attacks in Madrid, the Finnish Foreign Ministry published another report on Terrorism in December 2004. The report reacts to the bombings in Madrid by addressing the threat of terrorism that also arises in Russia due to the unresolved situation in Chechnya (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004: 1). In addition, the report shows that terror threats increase in those countries that are economically underdeveloped, a matter that is not addressed in the European documents (ibid: 15). Tiina Heiskanen argues that regional development therefore plays an important role within the Finnish foreign policy framework⁴. Inequality in terms of GDP per capita and income is considerably high between the two countries and especially in the northern and eastern border regions. Finland’s goal is to strengthen cross-border economic co-operation with Russia to promote cross-border trade and to improve the overall quality of life, for example providing employment through investments (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2009).

The Finnish anti-terrorism strategy states that “in order to prevent terrorism [...] measures to eradicate poverty and to enhance good governance and respect for democracy and human rights are necessary” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004: 15). It can be argued that economic development diminishes security threats but also the pull-factors for migration. Most immigrants in Finland are from Russia and other former Soviet Union countries such as Estonia and the most important pull factors are better living standards and a higher income level in Finland (Olli

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⁴ Tiina Heiskanen, Personal Communication, April 17, 2013, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Helsinki, Finland.
Sorainen⁵; Heikkilä, 2006: 55). The Finnish Foreign Ministry argues that a close cooperation with Russia remains very important and Finland wants to influence development policies in Russia (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2010). The economic interest of Finland in Russia can be attributed to the historical connection between the two countries. During the Cold War, Finland was interested in keeping a stable relationship with the big neighbour, the Soviet Union. After the collapse, a good economic relationship was furthermore pursued because Russia is one main trading partner of the Nordic countries. By acknowledging the economic gap within the border regions, Finland wants to ensure internal security within her own country but also prevent and decrease cross-border crimes in the Schengen area.

Finnish policy makers focus on regional development and border management to prevent terror activities on Finnish territory. The rhetoric used in the policy documents does not relate immigration directly with terrorism. Sivula⁶ (2013) agrees that Finnish policy makers did not concentrate their efforts on stricter immigration controls after 2001. The external border became more important but Finnish border management was always “very well developed and made use of the latest technologies”. Moreover, Prokkola (2013: 87) points out that the Finnish border guard publishes plenty of bulletins on border incidents since 2008. The Finnish-Russian border is in the focus in those reports but in general “the border security situation has remained stable at our national borders and border crossing points”. Temporarily and extraordinarily tightened external border controls were introduced to meet the demands of the EU that asked for a stronger external border protection. Finland’s strategy rather aims at: (i) enhancing cooperation among the member states; (ii) investing at regional development to increase living conditions in the European neighbouring countries; and (iii) decreasing the risk of terror cells formatted in Russia as explained by Tiina Heiskanen during the interview.

4.3. **Comparison between the European and Finnish Policy Discourse**

The Second World War left its marks on Finland that was obliged to pay reparations to the Soviet Union until the 1950s. Since then, Finland was able to develop into one of the most important industrial nations by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation (Korkiasaari & Söderling,

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⁵ Olli Sorainen, Personal Communication, April 17, 2013, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Helsinki, Finland.
2003: 2). According to the authors Korkiasaari and Söderling (2003: 7), Finland was not an immigration country until the beginning of the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The civil war in former Yugoslavia and the conflicts in Africa and Asia have caused a higher inflow of refugees into the country. As can be seen on Figure 1, most foreigners in 2011 originated from the Former Soviet Union and Russia. However, from 2001 onwards, many refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia sought asylum in Finland (Statistics Finland 2011).

![Foreign Population in Finland, 2011](image)

Figure 1. Foreign population in Finland at the end of 2011
Data Source: Statistics Finland 2011.

The Figure shows immigration to Finland in the period 1990 – 2010. It is important to notice that only permanent immigration is reflected in the statistical data and not for example, temporary labour immigrants. It clearly shows that after the Finnish recession at the end 1990s, immigration increased steadily and reached its initial peak in 2009. According to the statistics, the terror attack of 2001 did not have an impact on immigration numbers in Finland. A stagnation and slight decrease can be observed in the years from 2001 until 2004 but afterwards immigration numbers drastically increased again.
The numbers reflect the Finnish policy approach towards immigration. According to Harri Sivula (2013), who works as an expert on Finnish immigration in the Ministry of the Interior, states that the recession at the beginning of the 1990s puts a halt to immigration but shortly afterwards immigration continued to increase. This is in accordance with the graph shown above on Figure 2. Sivula (2013) states that Finnish policy makers did not react to the terror attacks in New York or Madrid by restricting immigration policies. He argued that in a comparative perspective, Finland has a relatively liberal immigration policy and the Ministry of the Interior developed plans to facilitate the process of labour immigration.

Nonetheless the Finnish public discourse started to change and became more radical towards immigrants. For instance, during the Finnish presidential elections in January 2012, the extreme right-wing party “True Finns” was ranked in the 4th place. In 2006, the right-wing party gained 3.4% of all votes in the first round. In 2012, they already gained 9.4% during the first round (Ministry of Justice Finland 2012). Therefore, the European discourse that is influenced also by
the political landscape affects Finnish policies; however, this is not reflected in policy documents regarding border management that do not show signs of securitisation of immigration according to the analysis in the previous section. There are several reasons for this lack of securitization. First, Finland is a relatively newcomer among the countries who face immigration. The number of immigrants is comparatively low with other continental European countries. It is worth though to follow its future development because the number of immigrants is rising. Second, although Finland has the longest external land border among all European countries, the number of irregular immigrants does not reach the same quantity as for example in Greece or Italy that are “immigration hotspots”. Therefore, although the Finnish public discourse expressed concerns over Russian immigrants, it did not reach the same emergency situation as in the Mediterranean countries that confront large amounts of irregular immigrants crossing their borders every year. Therefore, the theory of securitisation might not be applicable on a general European scale. It is necessary to at least consider the different country related backgrounds. For instance, an efficient strategy could be to build country clusters, organizing them into different external border regions and their characteristics in order to give a reliable picture of the European wide situation.

However, the securitisation theory is successful in explaining general trends that are valid for all European countries at this stage of analysis. For instance, in the interview with Sivula (2013), he explained that Finnish labour unions play an important role when it comes to liberal immigration policies and they are strong lobbyists that seek to influence policy makers in their favour. However, due to the success of the right-wing party, the other parties as the Social Democrats act more restrained when it comes to further liberalisation of immigration policies (ibid). Initially, the Ministry of the Interior pleaded for a simplification of immigration processes but the increasingly hostile public opinion impeded this development (ibid). The theory of securitisation is acknowledged by authors to explain the shifts of public opinions that influence also policy makers. Nevertheless, Finland became a country of immigration only in the beginning of the 1990s and during the last two decades the Finnish Ministry of Labour pursued a multicultural immigration framework (Ristikari 2012: 25). According to the author, the multicultural model can be found in the Netherlands and Sweden and it “accepts immigrants as full members of the society and allows them to maintain their cultural differences” (ibid). However, the Finnish discourse might be increasingly influenced by the European discourse, particularly acknowledging the constant increasing number of immigrants (in particular under
the aspect of asylum and family reunification) and growing experience as a country of immigration.

5. **Securitisation of Immigration through Practices – the Paris School Approach**

According to Léonard (2010a), Bigo (2002) does not explain how to analyse policy practices and to identify them as securitising measurements. In this sense, she gives in her paper some suggestions on how to deal with the Paris school approach. Prokkola (2012) states that Finnish-Russian border management is dominated by neo-liberal aspects that aim to decrease costs and to enhance efficiency at the same time. According to Bigo (2002), policy actions are an important indicator to scrutinise securitisation of migration. This section focuses on the Finnish border guarding strategies, carried out by the Finnish Border Guard, that were subjected to major transformations during the last two decades as explained by Prokkola (2012: 78). She argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to major political and economic changes in Finland (ibid: 83). During the Cold War period, the border management strategy was kept secret by the border guard but in particular the accessions to the EU and Schengen area led to a new era of international cooperation also in border matters for Finland (ibid). During the Cold War period, border guard stations were evenly distributed along the Finnish-Russian border but since the beginning of the 1990s, “patrols are nowadays focused on geographically strategic locations and border surveillance is becoming more and more automated” (Prokkola 2012: 83). One example is the automated border control introduced at Helsinki-Vantaa airport for EU/EEA travellers who hold a biometric passport. The future goal is to increase the speed and convenience of border crossing also for third-country nationals that are not Schengen members (Helsinki Airport, 2012).

As Harri Sivula (2013) points out, the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, and Norway) abolished border controls among themselves during the 1950s because border management was always characterised by good cooperation. Therefore, “the Finnish border guard used the most recent technologies at the borders and the terror attacks did not had any particular influence on the border guard management” (Sivula 2013). Still, the Finnish approach on border management and surveillance changed during the last decade due to the Europeanisation process as explained before. The establishment of Frontex introduced several practices that, according to Léonard
(2010a) prove the increasing of securitisation of immigration in the European Union and its influence also on Finnish border guarding practices.

Léonard (2010a: 239) argues that the cooperation of border management at the external borders between the member states has attracted the attention mainly of pro-migrant NGO’s and the media. The cooperation of actions along the borders combines the experience and equipment from the member states and Schengen associated countries that is supposed to increase the efficiency of external border management (ibid; Frontex: 2012b). Although Frontex has no decision making power, scholars such as Baldacchini (2010) state that the agency is responsible for what is happening at the borders at least to a certain degree. Discussions about Frontex competencies come up especially in cases where immigrants have drowned at sea during the deployment of joint operations (Léonard 2010a: 239). These joint operations are securitising practices because of two reasons. First, some actors in these joint operations traditionally deal with threats that need military action, such as military attacks from a third state, drug trafficking, or piracy. Now these actors also get involved with immigration issues (ibid: 240). Second, the joint operations have been tackled because some scholars assume that they violate international laws concerning the non-refoulement principle. Vessels, picked up by European external border guards, are forced to return to their country of origin where people might be threatened with torture and prosecution (ibid). All the people that are forced to return are treated as irregular immigrants and therefore, it is most likely that European member states do not act according to their legal obligation and rather accept Frontex as a barrier to the inflow of immigrants and asylum seekers.

Another factor that proves securitisation of immigration is the assistance to the training of national border guards (Léonard 2010a: 241). Frontex runs regular “Rapid Border Intervention Team” (RABIT) training events (ibid). These RABIT teams consist of border guards from different European countries and they are deployed in situation when member states face “urgent and exceptional situation such as the arrival of a large number of third-country nationals trying to enter their territory illegally” (Frontex 2012c). The European Union does not further define the “large number of third-country nationals” and therefore it is not predictable when exactly the RABIT teams come into force. The training activities, especially concerning the detection of false documents and air naval cooperation in surveillance operations, lead to the impression that the European member states are under constant threat of irregular immigration and the external
borders need to be protected from them (Léonard 2010a: 241). Frontex also invests into research and development (R&D) that concerns modern technologies that might be used for future border surveillance. Measurements also include military inventions. Workshops are organised the deal with the use of unmanned aircraft systems (Drones) to protect the external borders (ibid: 243–244). The agency communicates the impression that military technologies are an adequate tool to prevent immigrants and asylum seekers from entering EU territory.

The Director of Frontex, the Finn Ilkka Laitinen, stated in an interview that the goal of the agency is not to close the European external border but to provide additional security and “to filter illegal activities” (Suikohnen 2013). He also admits that refugees and possible asylum seekers do not reach their destination country and therefore will never be able to hand in an asylum application because they will be sent back to their home countries by the European border guards (ibid). In order to enhance external border guarding efficiency, Finland introduced the police, customs, and border guard (PCB) approach in 2010. The three units perform their tasks alternately, for example the customs officials can take over tasks from the border guard and vice versa (Hannola & Myller 2012: 26).

Regarding return policy, Finland displays a strong profile as pointed out by Sivula (2013), with 80% of the asylum seekers receiving a negative answer. He argues that Finland spends a considerable high amount of money to send irregular immigrants back into their destination countries once the asylum application is rejected. According to the Finnish immigration service, the majority of asylum seekers originate from Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and former Soviet Union countries (Finnish Immigration Service 2011). The security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are still critical and the same is valid for the region of Chechnya.

To sum up, Finnish border management is heavily influenced by European legislations. According to the law, they need to implement for example Schengen regulations, such as the collection of biometric data of third country nationals crossing the border. Therefore, although the Finnish policy discourse differs from the European one, Finland has the obligation to comply with EU regulations that might be in conflict with national policy goals.

Prokkola (2012: 3) argues that the meaning of borders changed during the last decades. Globalisation requires relatively open borders for economic and political exchange but sovereign states need clear boundaries to mark their territory. In her article, she points out that neoliberal mechanisms demand free markets and minimal state interference to achieve social and economic wellbeing within a society (ibid). However, she also claims that neoliberalism does not exist in a pure form. The author quotes Margaret Thatcher who stated in 1988:

“I did not join the European Communities to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and rabies, and illegal immigrants.”

(Prokkola 2012: 5)

With the introduction of the Schengen area, European policies developed towards “soft” internal and “hard” external borders by claiming that the free movement of capital, goods, and people needs to be restricted to a certain extent. The EU claims that stricter external border controls must be implemented and the Finnish-Russian border is one of them. As explained above, Finland seeks to achieve security and economic stability by supporting underdeveloped regions in the border areas. However, the neoliberal approach of free market and competition requires a certain amount of penetrability through the Finnish-Russian border.

Regional development is a very important part of Finland’s policy framework. Finland and Russia, two distinct economic zones, share boundaries where the living conditions of the people display evident levels of economic and social inequality. After the Cold War, many Finns who lived in the former Soviet Union regions re-immigrated into Finland hoping to find better jobs. As stated in the Terrorism report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, economic development is necessary to promote peace and to create stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). The Ministry of Employment and the Economy concentrates its efforts on regional economic development, for example in the Republic of Karelia and in the region of St. Petersburg (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012). In 1992, Finland and Russia set up an agreement that ensures cooperation in the border areas and focuses on the improvement of the environment and the economy (Nevalainen 1996: 67). However, Russian inflation, bureaucracy
and competition brought insecurity and uncertainty in the economic cooperation efforts with Finland (ibid). By the end of the 1990s, close economic ties between these two countries were re-established. From 2007 onwards, economic cooperation is based on three programmes that cover the Kolarctic area, Karelia, and the South-East Finland and Russia region which replace the Finnish-Russian agreement of 1992. The total funding reaches an amount of € 190 million and aims at supporting economic, social and civic development, and common challenges related to border crossings (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012). Laine (2007: 53) argues in his article that the Finnish-Russian border poses a barrier for cross-national economic development. Within the framework of the EXLINEA project that researches and identifies barriers of interaction and cross-border cooperation (CBC), the author states that the respondents acknowledge the Finnish-Russian border as an intermediate barrier of interaction, especially when it comes to investment and trade (ibid).

Although Russia is not a member of the European Neighbourhood Programme, the EU built up a close cooperation that is regulated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. According to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (2009), the amount of EU funded projects in the Finnish-Russian region reaches an amount up to € 87.6 million in the period of 2007–2013. However, Scott (2013: 33) criticises that cross-border cooperation support “has become mundane, technocratic, underfunded, and bereft of the historical symbolism of earlier cooperation”. The author argues that the securitisation framework of border management is impeding cross-border cooperation, especially in the Finnish-Russian case. As defined in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU pursues policies that increase economic, social, and territorial cohesion and thus automatically intensifies the meaning of European territory as a unitary and integrated space. The process is reflected by the Europeanisation of border management that reduces the influence of European countries located at the peripheral areas of the Union entity and thus decreases the importance of regional development co-operation with countries at the external borders (ibid).

The analysis of the respective European and Finnish policy documents shows a discrepancy concerning the favourable approaches. As Scott underlines, the Finnish-Russian European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) on cross-border cooperation does not

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properly reflect the requirements that are necessary to be applied in the Finnish and Russian case. Security policies are still in the focus of the EU, also after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As argued above, the Finnish-Russian border is still to be perceived as a security border and, given its different characteristics in comparison to the Mediterranean countries, the Europeanisation approach does not reach the desired results in the northern border regions. In fact, European integration in border management is counterproductive towards regional development that aims to enhance economic progress. European concerns about irregular immigration, cross-border crimes, and terrorism form new obstacles for further regional cross-border cooperation (ibid: 34).

Scott presents that the EU’s cohesion and regional policy programme (2007–2013) are funded by a total amount of € 321 billion. This money is targeted at the EU member states to give aid to poorer European regions. The European Neighbourhood Programme’s budget amounts up to € 11 billion but Scott argues that only a very few amount is used on cross-border cooperation with neighbouring states. In addition, € 1 billion is spent on border security and technology research programmes that reach a higher amount than the whole budget planned on cross-border cooperation in the European neighbourhood countries. Although Finland established three programmes that are funded with the help of the EU, the entire focus on border management still concerns border surveillance with military means and technological innovations. Rather than allowing economic transactions that also include the fast and smooth movement of people over the Finnish-Russian border, the EU chooses the same approach for the entire external border management.

Furthermore, Scott (2013) argues that local and regional actors and organisations lose their influence on regional development policies that results in decreased funding for projects. Within the ENP, the EU and Russia rather concentrate on a general approach that includes large scale investment, for example on telecommunications and energy supply. However, before the European regional development programme of 2007, civil society organisations in Finland and Russia have been the main actors during the establishment of intercultural dialogue, a social welfare policy, and the strengthening of community institutions. Civil society organisations were partially supported by the EU in 1992 but a large amount came from the Finnish government which implemented its own “Neighbouring Area Co-Operation Programme”. Since 2007, this programme has been replaced by the ENPI CBC and funding is organised by the EU, resulting thus in fewer amounts of money for overall regional cooperation (ibid: 36). He provides the
example of the Finnish-Russian Network of Social and Health NGO’s that consists of approximately 50 Finnish and 100 Russian NGO’s. Since the implementation of the ENPI CBC and the European responsibility to allocate the funding, money is only provided to short-term and project-based proposals. The result was the termination of the network in October 2007 as an official centralised umbrella association (ibid: 36). The author concludes that in the future, the Finnish government will spend less money on regional development projects initiated by civil society organisation and instead will be more dependent on EU funding in the framework of the ENPI CBC (ibid).

When comparing the budget of the EU that is used for border surveillance and regional development and cooperation, it becomes clear that the focus is still directed at border protection mechanisms that aim to close and track third country nationals. However, as it is analysed by Guild et al. (2008) these measurements increase the perception that the European Union and the Schengen area turn into a “Fortress of Europe”.
7. Conclusion

This thesis has explored the Europeanisation process of external border management and identified its influencing factors. Since the 1980s with the beginning of neoliberal politics and economic upheavals in the European countries, reluctance and hostility among the populations towards third country nationals increased. Using two alternative approaches of the securitisation theory, particularly the terror attacks in New York and in Madrid can be acknowledged as a turning point in the actual approach towards immigration and external border protection. As shown in the analysis, the European discourse shows a clear securitisation of immigration according to the Copenhagen school of security that suggests identifying securitising acts by analysing the rhetoric of policy documents. From 2001 onwards, the European Commission and European Council negotiated on the introduction of stricter external border controls in order to monitor third country nationals who enter the European Union. Furthermore, institutional alterations, such as the establishment of Frontex, testify the interconnection between immigration policies and internal European security (Léonard 2010b). However, the analysis of Finnish policy documents shows no relevant securitising language in the traditional sense. Policy makers rather focus on the eradication of economic imbalances in the border regions than at demanding strict external border controls.

From this point it is necessary to acknowledge the Paris school approach which also considers policy practices. Since Bigo (2002) does not further define the operationalisation of securitising practices, the thesis sought to apply an approach that makes it possible to still identify them. Originating from Léonard (2010a) and her examination of Frontex practices, the method employed in this thesis follows her empirical analysis scheme to investigate the Finnish-Russian border case. It can be observed that the introduction of border surveillance measurements, for example the entry/exit Schengen system, is a signal of securitisation of immigration because it aims at tracking third country nationals within the Schengen area. Moreover, Finland’s police, customs, and border guard approach aims at decreasing costs of border surveillance and to enhance efficiency. Nevertheless, all three units are now involved in border guarding and controlling issues that require the inspection of third country nationals.

Therefore, the thesis carves out that not only security and military tools lead to securitising practices but another important factor concerns economic considerations. For the particular
Finnish-Russian case, the theory of securitisation is not sufficient to explain external border management. Having focused on Finnish official policy documents and practices, the thesis shows that Finland’s main approach is directed at supporting the Russian external border regions. Based on the historical diplomatic relations established during the Cold War era, Finland has a great interest in keeping a stable relationship with its geographically large neighbour. Securing the external border, particularly since it is a part of the Schengen acquis, became a main concern of Finnish and European politics. Finland focuses on secure its boundaries through regional development that builds up a stable economy, good relations, and a strong civil society. In spite of that, the European approach includes soft internal and hard external borders and the Finnish border guard is obliged to apply European legislation on border surveillance within the process of Europeanisation of external border management.

The Finnish-Russian border case is unique in the sense that the border is still perceived to be a security border and it separates two entirely different economic zones (Laine 2012: 51). The income disparity between both countries is often compared to the American-Mexican case and therefore, Finnish policy-makers aim at pursuing an approach of economic co-operation and regional development in order to secure the border areas especially by economic means. However, this strategy is undermined by the increasing Europeanisation process that focuses on traditional securitisation of border controls by military means (Léonard 2010a). The European Union spends more money on border surveillance and technological innovations than on regional development projects. Originally funded by the Finnish government and now in the hands of the EU, regional and local civil society organisations disappear because of a lack of financial support. European neighbourhood programmes rather focus on the national level that address environmental and economic issues and less money is spend on the particular border regions and the support of good relations.

Noticing the development of the EU towards stricter external border controls, the media often uses the term “Fortress of Europe” that allows no penetrability of labour immigration or possible asylum seekers (Guild et al. 2008). Even the touristic sector which is very important for the Finnish-Russian border regions since it promotes economic exchange is affected. Finns are usually interested in the more accessible prices for products sold in the Russian cities in the vicinity of the border. Although there are working groups in Finland trying to find ways of establishing more border crossing points to speed up the flowing of people, neoliberal aspects
force Finland to shut down fixed border stations and to decrease the number of personnel (Staalesen 2013). Instead, highly advanced technology is used to monitor immigrants and travellers including mobile border units. Moreover, the European Commission proposes new directives and regulations that pursue the use of fingerprinting, iris scanning, and biometric pictures which will indicate if third country nationals leave the country once their visa is expired. However, according to Guild et al. (2008) this strategy will not be able to prevent irregular immigration through overstaying because an immigrant might enter the Schengen area through one member state and leave it through another.

The EU needs to acknowledge the diversity of the regions and especially when it comes to the European external borders that extend from Lapland to the Mediterranean Sea. The EU must be careful when proposing policies because particular measurements might support the security situation at the external borders in Greece and Spain but impede economic transactions at the Finnish-Russian border that is acknowledged to be relatively stable. Economic development, as suggested by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, might be a better tool to increase security than increasing security measurements that include technological innovation and an increased number of military equipment (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012).

Future research might lead to investigations about how far immigrants, particularly asylum seekers, are affected by closing European external borders. This analysis clearly focused on a policy based perspective but the study can be extended to the people directly affected by the policies. An interesting starting point for further analysis is the fact that international laws might be not sufficiently acknowledged during Commission proposals. It is a matter of further research to examine the legal aspects of border management. Nevertheless, this study makes an important contribution to the academic discussion on securitising policies and practices towards border surveillance and specifically carved out the characteristics that define the Finnish-Russian border. In case the proposed regulation on the entry/exit Schengen system is accepted by the European Council, careful examinations are necessary in order to identify the economic impact. Either the European Union will conduct to an increased security mechanism or the EU will adjust its policies and will recognize the value of regional and local civil society organisations that have an immediate insight into the different border regions and their needs.
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