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# Muuttoliikesymposiumi 2000

## Muuttoliikkeen monet kasvot

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**S**iirtolaisuusinstituutti on vuodesta 1975 lähtien järjestänyt viiden vuoden välein Muuttoliikesymposiumin. Aluksi lähtökohtana oli valtakunnan sisäinen muuttoliike, mutta maailman muuttumisen myötä näkökulma on laajentunut. Vuonna 1995 teemana oli yhdentyvän Euroopan haasteet muuttoliikelle, ja nyt järjestetty symposiumi pohti muuttoliikkeitä vuosituhannen vaihtuessa kysyen: ”Halutaanko niitä ohjata?”

Symposiumille antoi historiallista perspektiiviä akateemikko *Eino Jutikkalan* esitys muuttoliikkeiden historiasta. Kehittämispäällikkö *Mauri Nieminen* Tilastokeskuksesta totesi, että vuodet 1995–2000 ovat olleet Suomessa kiihkeän muuton kautta. Tänä aikana asuinkuntaa on vaihtanut 1,2 miljoonaa ihmistä. Peräti 15 prosenttia Suomen väestöstä muuttaa vuoden aikana. Vuoden 1974 ennätystä, 276 000 kunnasta toiseen muuttoa, ei ole sentään ylitetty.

Sodan jälkeen syntyneiden suurten ikäluokkien tultua työikään 1960-luvun lopulla ja seuraavan vuosikymmenen alussa, alkoi voimakas muuttoliike toisaalta kaupunkeihin ja toisaalta Ruotsin teollisuuden palvelukseen. 1980-luvulla muuttoliike rauhoittui, ja tuolloin muutettiin usein oman maakunnan kaupunkeihin ja kaupungista toiseen.

Mutta 1990-luvulla monen kaupungin vetovoima alkoi ehtyä, ja muuttoliike kohdistua vain muutamaaan valtakunnalliseen korkean teknologian kasvukeskukseen, erityisesti korkeakoulukaupunkeihin. Tällä hetkellä maaseudulla ei enää opiskelijoita lukuun ottamatta ole paljonkaan lähtijöitä, ja muuttoliikkeissä suurimmat virrat kulkevat jo suurten kaupunkien välillä – ja ennen kaikkea pääkaupunkiseudulle.

Onko tämä kehitys ”luonnonlaki”, vai voidaanko ja halutaanko siihen vaikuttaa? Tampereen yliopiston aluetieteen professori *Olli Kultalahti* korosti, että työmarkkinoiden erikoistuminen lisää muuton valikoivaa luonnetta ja väestön keskittymistä. Eurooppa on maailman alhaisimman väestönkasvun alue, ja muuttopainetta tänne esiintyy erityisesti Afrikassa. Johtaja *Anssi Paasivirta* työministeriöstä korosti, että työllisyysnäkökulmat ovat ratkaiseva syy muuttoliikkeeseen. Suomessa muuttavat lähinnä nuoret ikäluokat. Muuttoliike olisi vielä voimakkaampaa, ellei asutopolitiikan hallitseman mekanismin jarruttaisi sitä. 1990-luvun aluepolitiikka on ollut tehotonta. Uuden aluepolitiikan ydin on osaamiseen perustuva kasvu. On varauduttava siihen, että suurten ikäluokkien poistuminen työmarkkinoilta vuosina 2005–2015 mullistaa työmarkkinatilanteen.

Professori *Hannu Tervo* Jyväskylän yliopistosta totesi muuttoliikkeen volyymin kasvaneen ja suuntien yksipuolistuneen. Kehittyvä kansantalous tarvitsee muuttoliikkeitä, ja työvoimaa tulee olla siellä, missä syntyy uusia työpaikkoja ja missä tuottavuus on korkea. Toiselta puolelta muuttoliike johtaa vinoutuneeseen aluekehitykseen, jolloin monet alueet autioituvat. Sekä ihmisille että yrityksille tulisi saada lisää valinnan vaihtoehtoja asutuksen ja työpaikkarakenteen kehityksen tasapainottamiseksi.

Symposiumissa pohdittiin myös ennustettua työvoimapulaa, johon yhtenä ratkaisuna nähtiin ulkomailta tuleva työvoima. Suomelta puuttuu erityisesti työvoimaperusteinen maahanmuuttopolitiikka. Sen tulisi luoda rauhallista, hyvin harkittua ja pitkäjänteistä toimintaa. On myös muistettava, että kysymys ei ole vain työvoimasta, vaan ihmisestä ja hänen perheestään kokonaisuudessaan. Maahanmuuttajia tulee kohdella samalla tavalla kuin muitakin työnhakijoita ja Suomen asukkaita. Tarvittaisiin selkeää kokonaisnäkemystä maahanmuutosta ja olisi pohdittava, mikä on valtion, maakuntien ja kuntien vastuu. Tarvitaan aktiivista maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa. Hyvä esimerkki aloitteellisuudesta on Itä-Suomen viiden maakunnan liiton käynnistämä projekti tästä aiheesta. Puute



ei ole niinkään työvoimasta, vaan osaajista. Suomessa tarvitaan ulkomailta tulevaa osaavaa työvoimaa – tai teknologiaa on nykyistä enemmän vietävä sinne, missä on työvoimaa. Suomeen muuttavien työllistymisen ongelmina ovat puutteellinen suomen- tai ruotsinkielen taito, sekä työnantajien enakkoluulot koskien mm. ulko-

mailla suoritettuja tutkintoja. Tällä hetkellä Suomen ulkomaalaisväestö on polarisoitunut: toisaalta on hyvin koulutettuja osaajia ja toisaalta heikosti palkattuihin siivous- ym. töihin hakeutuneita maahanmuuttajia, joista monilla on pakolaistausta.

Symposiumin työryhmien raporteissa korostettiin näitä asioita

sekä sitä, että osaajat hakeutuvat osaamisen luokse. Yritysten hyvä maine ja suomalainen työelämä voivat houkutella ihmisiä muuttamaan Suomeen. Alueen infrastruktuurilla, ympäristöllä ja ilmastollakin on vaikutusta. Ihmissuhdeverkostot ovat tärkeitä maahanmuuttajan pyrkiessä työelämään. Suomi tarvitsee pitkäjänteisen aktiivisen ja työvoimapanotteisen maahanmuuttopolitiikan. Sille tulisi saada myös kansan tuki.

Kuntien välisen muuttoliikkeen arvioitiin olevan hyvin vilkasta jatkossakin, jopa noin 250 000 kunnasta toiseen muuttoa vuodessa. Muuton suuntiin tulisi pyrkiä vaikuttamaan. Muuttaminen on positiivista, mutta se ei saisi olla liiaksi yksisuuntaista. Työkaluja aluerakenteen kehittämiseen on, jos niitä käytetään oikein. Tarvitaan laajaa seutuyhteistyötä palveluissa. Maaseudun ja kaupungin vuorovaikutus on tärkeä. Sitä pitäisi kehittää esim. etätyönä sekä työn ja toimintojen siirtoina haja-asutusalueille. Myös kakkosasunnoista saadaan elinvoimaa maaseudulle. Liian pitkistä ja kalliista työmatkoista olisi päästävä. Lähtömuuton ongelmiin tulisi kiinnittää nykyistä enemmän huomiota. Kun nuoret lähtevät, vanhat ja työttömät jäävät, jolloin seudun palvelut huononevat. Elinkeinotoiminnan kehittäminen lähtöalueilla on avainasemassa.

Symposiumin yhteenvedossa rakennusneuvos *Raimo Narjus* Turusta totesi, että aikaisempiin kertoihin verrattuna alustajilla oli nyt yleensä selvät teesit ja väittämät, mikä antoi hyvän lähtökohdan pohdinnoille. Muuttoliike

suuntautuu muutamaasi kasvukeskuksiin, ja niistä oikeastaan vain Uusimaa on varsinainen kasvualaue. Muuttaminen tapahtuu pääasiassa suurten väestökeskusten välillä. Työpaikka on edelleenkin tärkein muuton motiivi. Muuttoliikkeitä tarvitaan, mutta ongelmana on jatkuva nettomuuttotappio. Pohdittava asia olisi se, miksi tietotekniikka johtaa keskittymiseen, vaikka sen pitäisi edesauttaa hajasijoittumista. Tarvitaan aluekehityksen ohjausta, mutta paluuta vanhaan kehitysaluepolitiikkaan ei EU-Suomessa ole. Ohjausvälineinä voisivat olla yritysten sijoittuminen, infrastruktuuri, koulutettu työvoima ja tietoverkot.

Kuudennen Muuttoliikesymposiumin tärkeimmät loppupäätelmät olivat mielestäni seuraavat:

1. Suomen väestön ikärakenteeseen on tulossa suuria muutoksia. Suurten ikäluokkien siirtyessä lähivuosina pois työelämästä Suomi tarvitsee aktiivista ja työvoimainotteista maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa. Näillä näkymin edessä on työvoimapula, johon maan sisäinen muutto ei pysty vastaamaan. Työvoimaa on saatava maan rajojen ulkopuolelta.

2. Maaseutu on imetty lähes tyhjiin, ja muuttoa tapahtuu etupäässä suurista asutuskeskuksista. Valtakunnan sisäisiin muuttovirtoihin tulee vaikuttaa, ja niihin kyettäisiin vaikuttamaan sekä



lähtö- että tuloalueille kohdistuvilla toimenpiteillä. Mitkä nämä keinot voisivat olla, vaatisi oman seminaarinsa. Muuttoliiketutki-

joille riittää töitä myös tulevaisuudessa. Seuraava muuttoliikesymposiumi järjestetään viiden vuoden kuluttua.

*Olavi Koivukangas*

# Multicultural Citizenship: Towards a European Policy



Rainer Bauböck

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## Multicultural citizenship

As we enter the new millennium, multiculturalism seems hardly a novelty but more like a baggage we carry over from the final three decades of the last century. Without causing much protest the American sociologist and educationalist Nathan Glazer could claim in 1997 that "we are all multiculturalists now" (Glazer 1997). Indeed, this consensus appears to bridge the ideological divides. Multiculturalism is a broad church. Its mainstream version has been associated with the democratic left. However, far right parties like the Front National in France or the Freedom Party in

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Austria defend their own version of a "right to difference" for all nations and cultures. In its broadest sense multiculturalism merely implies recognizing the value that their cultural identities might have for others. This excludes a claim that my culture is the best and all should adopt it for their own sake, but it does not prevent me from maintaining that my culture is best for my group and ought to be protected against foreign elements that might infiltrate and dilute it. The core idea of multiculturalism is that there is an irreducible plurality of culturally defined communities that cannot be ranked within a hierarchy of human civilization. This allows for widely different views how these cultures relate to each other. Should they be separate with regard to membership and territory or can they freely intermix? Are cultural traditions intranslatable or is there a potential for intercultural understanding? Questions like these cannot be answered in general; answers vary not only across the ideological spectrum, but depend also on the kind of cultural communities we have in mind and on the context for their encounters. We ought to distinguish between religious, linguis-

tic, racially stigmatised or life style groups, between national, immigrant or aboriginal minorities as well as between the contexts of family life, the market place, civil society and the political community.

The broad consensus on multiculturalism rapidly breaks down once we focus on the latter context, i.e. the relation between membership in cultural and political communities. 'Multicultural citizenship' is a rather controversial idea even within liberal democratic theories. It suggests that although we are all equal as individual members of a democratic polity, our affiliations to different cultural communities may still be relevant for our status, rights and practices as citizens.

Many liberal theorists disagree strongly. Liberal republicans insist that in the political sphere the demands of citizenship always override affiliations to cultural groups. The task of the liberal state is to hold cultural difference at bay. It must guarantee equal rights for individuals against the claims of cultural communities for special treatment and collective powers. The liberal fear is that a multicultural differentiation of citizenship will undermine soli-

parity and respect across group boundaries and may lead to internal fragmentation or even a territorial partitioning of the polity.

Another critique of multicultural citizenship takes the opposite view. From a libertarian perspective the danger lies in the state becoming too powerful. Cultural communities are regarded as voluntary associations and the liberal state is itself a voluntary association of such associations. It should neither hand out special rights and material benefits to cultural communities nor impose laws that constrain their freedom. In this view liberalism is a regime of radical toleration that prohibits interference with the internal affairs of communities as long as their members are free to leave (see Kukathas 1992, 1997). The rights and duties of citizenship depend on a spontaneous consensus between different cultural communities, which makes it likely that they will be reduced to negative liberties protected by a minimal state.

For both these views citizenship in a culturally diverse society can only be equal if the state is neutral and disregards the cultural affiliations of its citizens. In contrast, theories of multicultural citizenship acknowledge that cultural and political membership are both important and cannot be neatly separated into different realms. Liberal democracies have to take cultural identities of their citizens into account in order to treat them with equal respect and concern.

There are at least four partly overlapping arguments for this view, which focus on the values of

autonomy, equality, diversity and peace respectively. The first one has been stated by the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995). Individual autonomy requires a range of meaningful options for one's life. These options can only be fully interpreted from within a 'societal culture'. Such cultures are territorially concentrated and based on a shared language. They encompass a wide range of human activities but allow for a plurality of religious and moral views. Secure membership in a societal culture is a primary good for everybody. Minorities are frequently disadvantaged in reproducing their culture and liberal states ought to provide them with some external protection against the pressure exercised by national majorities. This protection does not, however, extend to illiberal cultural traditions, which restrict the range of options for individuals. For the sake of individual autonomy liberal democracies can impose constraints on how such groups may treat their own members.

The second argument is about equality of citizenship. It starts from the historical fact that all present liberal democracies are not culturally neutral. They establish certain languages for government business and public education and their national symbols refer to historic traditions that are not shared by all groups of their population. Moreover, as the American theorist Iris Young (1990) has maintained, equal membership in the polity is undermined by unequal opportunities in society for members of oppressed groups. An apparently

neutral citizenship will merely serve to reinforce entrenched privileges of dominant groups. In order to achieve equality citizenship must be differentiated. Disadvantaged minorities need special forms of representation that give them a voice in the political process.

The third argument is stated most clearly by the British-Indian philosopher Bhikhu Parekh (1995, 2000). Liberal states ought to protect minority cultures not only because these are valuable for their members and because a devaluation of their origins translates into a status of second-class citizenship, but also because cultural diversity is a public good. A role for cultural communities in public life will help to overcome their segregation, will enrich their perspectives by teaching them to see their own traditions through the eyes of others and will contribute to the overall quality of democracy. Every community of citizenship has, however, its own operative public values that set limits for the toleration of controversial practices.

The fourth argument is less sanguine about cultural diversity and regards it rather as a potential source of conflict that may undermine common citizenship. The American theorist Jacob Levy (1996, 2000) defends a "multiculturalism of fear". In this view, liberals should be equally afraid of cultural oppression by majority nationalism and of internal restrictions of liberty within minority communities. The primary task is not to preserve cultural identities or to achieve justice for minorities, but to protect citizens

from violence, cruelty and humiliation. Escalating national, ethnic or religious conflicts have a strong potential to unleash these evils. The difficulty is that attempts to assimilate minorities or to ban cultural difference from the public realm will often contribute to such escalation. Liberal democracies must therefore find ways how to accommodate cultural claims in order to create a space for common citizenship.

For my present purposes it is not necessary to discuss the flaws and merits of these arguments. My ambition is not to offer a philosophical justification for multicultural citizenship, but rather to discuss how this idea could be applied in the context of the European Union. For this task the four perspectives I have outlined cover sufficient common ground: Each of them will justify a certain range of group-differentiated rights, but all of them set limits to the claims of cultural communities for the sake of membership in a liberal democratic polity.

There is, however, one other aspect of multicultural citizenship that emerges more clearly in the European context than in the American and British debates I have referred to. Multicultural citizenship is not only a *policy* question, which asks how the institutions of liberal democracies ought to deal with cultural difference and minorities, but also a *polity* question about the future identity and boundaries of the political community. This is most obvious with regard to conflicts over self-determination for national minorities. Some strive for full independence attempting thus to cre-

ate a new polity; others want to join a neighbouring state changing thereby international borders. Even those who are satisfied with territorial autonomy still modify the internal borders and division of powers within the polity. In contrast, the demands of immigrant minorities normally do not upset the territorial structure. They affect instead its rules of membership and historic identity. A political community defines and controls its own character through its regulations for new admissions. Restricting or opening up access to its territory and to its citizenship shapes the future composition of the polity. Liberal democracies control and limit immigration, but selecting it according to national origins and creating high obstacles for naturalization is generally regarded as unacceptable. This means that immigrants from diverse origins will become new citizens who may use the cultural liberties and political powers granted to them to challenge historic identities that exclude their own traditions.

Two features that characterise the European context make these polity questions of multicultural citizenship especially pertinent. The first is the inertia of prevailing national identities that strongly resist the idea of a continuous self-transformation through population movements and the accommodation of minority claims; the second is the historically unique attempt to construct a supranational polity out of sovereign nation-states. Both are obviously in tension with each other. It is my argument that they can only be solved together. European na-

tions must become internally more pluralistic in order to integrate into a larger supranational polity.

## **Towards a European federation**

When thinking about the future of the European Union many shy away from the word 'federalism'. Yet there are hardly any other concepts that we could use to describe the coming together and integration of several independent states into a new political entity. The important question is not whether the goal of European integration is federation but what kind of federation this going to be.

The first contrast that springs to one's mind is between confederation and federation. The Union is rightly seen as moving from the former to the latter. Historical analogies, especially with the second US constitution in 1787, often lead to the assumption that federation implies a pooling of all external sovereignty and a strong central government. However, this need not be the case. A federation involves by definition a vertical sharing of sovereignty between constitutive units and a federal government. Which kinds of political powers are concentrated at which level is, in principle, an open question. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer suggested in a speech given at Berlin's Humboldt University on 12 May this year that in a future European federation there would be a "division of sovereignty" between national and European governments, with a strong principle of



subsidiarity guaranteeing the former control over all political agendas that they are better equipped to deal with and have not transferred to the federal level.<sup>1</sup> The important difference between confederation and federation does not lie in the concentration of power at the level of member states or of the union, but in the structure of membership. In a confederation, only states or governments are represented in the common political institution, whereas in federations citizens are directly represented both in constitutive units (the provinces, regions or states) and at the federal level. A democratic federation is thus not only a multilevel government but also a multilevel community of citizens towards whom all governments are accountable. Direct election of EP members since 1979 and the formal introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 were the first timid steps towards federation; a Charter of Fundamental Rights will be a much larger one. However, in order to establish the crucial direct relation between citizens and the federation, a modernized catalogue of basic human rights will not suffice. What ties individual citizens to a democratic community is not only the rights and liberties that they enjoy, but the relation of representation that makes political authorities directly accountable to them. A European federation must establish democratic accountability of the Commission and the Council and legislative powers for the European Parliament.

The second contrast, which is the more important one for my

present purposes, is between regional and multinational federalism. Federations vary not only with regard to a vertical division of powers, but also with regard to the horizontal relations between their constitutive parts (see Lijphart 1984: 179–183). In the US, Australia, Germany and Austria all states, provinces or *Länder* are considered as regional subdivisions of a homogeneous nation. By contrast, in Canada, Belgium or Switzerland some provincial borders separate linguistic groups. Spain and the UK are not formally federal states, but devolution in these countries follows a similar pattern. The effect is that some national identity groups gain territorial autonomy and often also guaranteed representation in central government institutions.

For a future European federation there is no doubt that it will be multinational in this sense, i.e. composed of states with different languages and distinct national identities. This still leaves open the question how to imagine a common European identity and its relation to the various national and ethnic identities within member states. I will discuss three answers to this question.

### Postnational Federation

The first model suggests that a European identity ought to be disconnected from national ones and should be based instead on shared political values and constitutional principles. The contrast between such civic patriotism and ethnic nationalism has been often overstated.<sup>2</sup> A notorious difficul-

ty with the former is that it fails to identify the particular political community one ought to be loyal with. If my loyalty to my country is grounded in its constitution, which guarantees me fundamental rights, why should I not be loyal to another democratic state whose constitution is as good or even better in this respect? In my answer to this question it will be impossible to avoid any reference to the historical accident that I happen to be born and raised in this country rather than another one. Constitutional patriotism is thus always parasitic on a communitarian idea of unchosen belonging. It is also parasitic on cultural particularities. Without a shared public culture the polity cannot be imagined as a community that deserves loyalty. A society of individuals who coincidentally reside in a given state territory at a given point in time cannot be imagined as a community of that sort.<sup>3</sup> Without public narratives about a common history one cannot think of this society in terms of the first person plural.

In the old nation-states of Europe there is no shortage of such narratives. In European history their very abundance is the problem: they have too often raised competing claims to the same populations and territories. In this context constitutional patriotism is a noble idea: it cannot unravel all these communities but tries to push them to a background. Liberal constitutional principles cannot determine our membership in a particular community, but they may provide us with better reasons for loyalty and can help us to peacefully resolve our conflicts,



including those about national identities.

The project of a European constitutional patriotism is different precisely because one cannot take its background for granted. Europe is divided not only by its various national languages and cultures, but also by its past. Historically, the idea of European unity has been always associated with that of empire, never with that of a federal republic. This difficulty is exacerbated by the problem of variable geography. Empires have moving borders. They are not imagined as political communities of citizens, but of subjects who are loyal towards a dynasty. In contrast with an empire, a democratic polity needs a stable territory within which self-government can be established.

In search for historical analogies, we might look west across the Atlantic. The most successful example of creating a civic identity in an expanding federal state is the USA. Yet the American model was certainly not a pure case of constitutional patriotism. It started out from a dominant WASP identity that was sharply separated from indigenous peoples and African slaves and only gradually expanded to include other groups of immigrants. Moreover, the settlers and migrants who built the American nation had before been uprooted from their national homelands. Europe, however, can never become a melting pot nation – its citizens are invited to join the federation while residing in their traditional homelands and retaining their national languages and affiliations. This is different only for the small number of peo-

ple who travel regularly to Brussels for EU meetings. Their life world and their career patterns provide a solid material base for an emerging European identity.<sup>4</sup> The great mass of European citizens does not share this experience. Levels of mobility within the Union are so low that they hardly contribute to a geographic fusion of national identities.

To sum up this point: The European federal project lacks three prerequisites for a civic form of patriotism: there is no self-evident background of historical narrative and public culture, there is no stable territorial frame of reference, and there is no melting pot of uprooted peoples. Paradoxically, this lack of preconditions need not mean that the project is doomed to failure. Constitutional principles might become a focus of identity by default rather than by design, because there is nothing else that could unite these populations *politically*. A European civic patriotism must be *postnational*, not so much because it exemplifies a new cosmopolitan identity, but because it is cut off from the sources of national identity that support all existing manifestations of civic patriotism. For this very reason, a European civic identity will, however, also remain rather thin.

A European constitution that can actually be read by the citizens and taught in the classrooms of European schools would certainly help. But citizens are less likely to be enthusiastic about the beauty of such a text than legal scholars and political philosophers. The difficulty is also greater than that of writing and adopt-

ing such a document. In the European case one cannot first introduce a constitution and then wait patiently until political support for it grows among the citizenry. Federalization will not be a single event but a long process. This process of democratising the Union must itself be democratic; it must enjoy widespread support among citizens and will be put to occasional tests in elections and referenda. The prospect of trading in national identities for a future postnational one will hardly mobilize European citizens to endorse this project.

## Multinational Federation

The alternative is to conceive of Europe as a multinational federation not only in the composition of its parts, but also with regard to a common identity. The Union would then not merely "respect the national identities of its member states" (Article 6.3 TEU) but also *affirm* them.

This second model must avoid the pitfalls of a confederal "Europe of fatherlands", on the one hand, and of a European "nested nation", on the other hand. A Europe of fatherlands is diametrically opposed to building a community of citizens at the European level. In this view national loyalties are supreme and ultimate. They are also the only kind of attachment that can ground substantive forms of democracy. Nations may closely cooperate in alliances for limited purposes or in all-purpose confederations, but the supranational decision-making bodies must be exclusively accountable to national govern-

ments that are themselves accountable to their respective citizenry.

The opposite danger is a view of Europe as a nested nation that contains within itself the national identities of its member states much like Britishness contains Scottish, Welsh, English (and, more controversially, Ulster) identities. The British political philosopher David Miller suggests that stable democratic rule needs a common national identity (Miller 1995). In his view, nations can themselves be internally multinational, or to put it the other way round, multinational federations must develop a sense of common nationhood in order to remain well integrated. Miller is sceptical towards European political integration because he correctly assumes that it is not a nation-building project. I would, however, disagree with the diagnosis itself. Most Québécois, Catalans or Scots feel rather uncomfortable with the idea that they are parts of a larger Canadian, Spanish or British *nation* because this is opposed to their conception of multinational *federation* of equal partners. Attempts to create or strengthen a federation-wide sense of nationhood may actually contribute to disintegrate multinational federations.<sup>5</sup> The reason why nested nationhood is so difficult to achieve is an endemic problem of asymmetry in most multinational federations. A majority population identifies with the larger state while a minority puts its regional identity first.

In the context of the European Union such asymmetric multinationalism may not seem a likely

scenario. Imperial notions of a French or German Europe have been defeated at Waterloo and Stalingrad. There is no hegemonic nation in Europe that could imagine itself as the core of a nascent European nation. Yet the danger of asymmetry arises also if member states of the Union move towards federation at different speeds with some forming a "centre of gravitation" (Joschka Fischer). Even if that centre remains open for others to join, it will presumably determine the rules that these others will have to accept. One should be cautious when drawing the obvious parallel with the expanding Schengen area and Euro zone. A common currency and national border guards are certainly powerful symbols of sovereignty. But building a federal polity is not the same thing as creating an area of free movement and common currency. It involves much more than giving up cherished symbols of this kind. In order to cope with such asymmetry of the integration process itself, the citizens of the Union would have to accept what the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has called "deep diversity": a mutual recognition of different ways of belonging to the Union (Taylor 1993: 155–186).

Shifting external borders are a second difficulty for European integration, which normally does not arise in federal states. I have suggested that this variable geography might make a postnational mode of integration more plausible, but it creates additional problems for a multinational conception. A multinational federation is like a compact between a limited

number of potentially or formerly independent communities. If more and more communities join this makes the federation not only more difficult to administer, but upsets also a carefully crafted balance between the founding members. The official language regime in the EU is a good example. With further enlargement the present rules will become ever more costly to maintain, but all reform options are likely to offend some national sensibilities (see Kraus 1998).

A third problem for a multinational European citizenship is democratisation. I have argued above that building a federal citizenship requires democratising the institutions of the Union. However, democratisation is also likely to exacerbate national conflicts. This is a lesson to be learned from the transition to democracy in postcommunist states. Supranational government in the EU operates so far in a rather undemocratic manner. Federalisation means that conflicts that had previously been negotiated in the sheltered environments of Commission and Council meetings or intergovernmental conferences will be much more exposed to public disputes and citizens' choices. In this process national identities will not simply fade away but will more likely be politically mobilised. The question is whether a sense of supranational political community can emerge at the same time and promote the integration of national identities into an expanding multinational conception.

It would be wrong to see the difficulties of asymmetry, enlargement and democratisation as

reasons to abandon a multinational approach. These problems cannot be simply wished away by adopting a postnational conception that ignores their deep roots in the real world. Multinationalism is, on the one hand, a realistic approach that accepts the diversity and strength of national identities in Europe and considers the dynamic of the integration process in this light. On the other hand, it is also a normative perspective that defends federal integration on the basis of mutual recognition. It is therefore necessarily opposed to any nationalism that puts the interests of one's own nation above all others.

### **Multicultural Federation**

A European federation would not merely involve an attempt to forge a political community from the national communities of member states. All of these states are themselves internally heterogeneous. Many have traditional linguistic minorities and all host substantial immigrant populations. The postnational and multinational models for European integration ignore these subnational and transnational identities. A pluralistic conception would include them by establishing common guidelines for the treatment of minorities within all member states and at the level of the federation itself.

At the beginning of this paper I have outlined general arguments for multicultural citizenship in liberal democracies, which apply to each European state taken separately. They converge on the insight that assimilation is no long-

er an answer to cultural diversity. Coercive assimilation is incompatible with a modern understanding of cultural liberties and is more likely to trigger resistance than compliance. Liberal democracy with its freedoms of speech and association offers minorities resources to organize and articulate their grievances; and modern communication technologies allow them daily contact with external homelands and transnational diaspora communities.

This does not imply that minority identities are immutable. Within a liberal framework the very proliferation of such identities means that they will also increasingly overlap. Geographic mobility and intermarriage create fuzzy boundaries and hybrid identities. Yet they do not necessarily resolve intercultural conflicts and may even exacerbate them compared to the situation in premodern or non-liberal societies where cultural communities have lived segregated alongside each other with their own separate territories or life worlds.

Cultural change occurs also over time within groups. Indigenous and national minorities that achieve territorial autonomy have to develop their own political institutions and economic policies that often undermine traditional identities and ways of life. Nation-building involves modernization efforts that make ethnic communities generally much more like each other with regard to their values and ways of life. However, the same process creates political boundaries between groups that are more durable than many of the cultural differences themselves.

This is different for immigrant minorities. First generation immigrants generally want to maintain their links with the national communities from where they have come, but they demand fair terms of integration rather than collective autonomy within the host society (see Kymlicka 1995, chapter 2). Over two or three generations integration normally goes together with spontaneous assimilation into dominant languages and life styles. Yet successfully established immigrant communities attract chain migration from the same origin. Even if the descendants of immigrants retain only a 'symbolic ethnicity' (Gans 1979), the migration dynamic may sustain a long-lasting ethnic pluralisation of the receiving society.

You may ask: What is the relevance of these questions for European integration? Let me suggest four reasons:

- 1 There are unresolved minority conflicts in many present member states, some of which involve terrorist violence or secession threats and some of which reach across state borders and affect other member states.
- 2 The Union is well aware that enlargement might lead to importing new conflicts.<sup>6</sup> There is a telling discrepancy between the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for the admission of new member states, which include respect for and the protection of minorities, and the principles the Union maintains for its current members, from which this item is absent.
- 3 National linguistic minorities in the EU often put high hopes

into political integration. They regard it as an opportunity to bypass their national governments and achieve direct recognition or representation at supranational level.

- 4 Migrant minorities also hope that their legal status and rights in the countries of the Union may be improved through harmonization. Free movement within the territory of the Union, combined with a harmonization of asylum and immigration policies, will create political pressure for common standards for the integration of immigrants.<sup>7</sup>

The Union has so far left the initiative in this field of rights of migrants and minorities to the Council of Europe and the OSCE. While a confederation may regard such matters as an internal affair of the states affected, this is certainly not possible for a federation in which minority conflicts naturally become a common concern.

A pluralistic conception faces two major difficulties: First, on these issues member states have their peculiar national approaches and dominant philosophies (see Favell 1998). It is very difficult to imagine what a common policy on linguistic and ethnic minorities would be like that France, Britain and Belgium could agree upon and that would not merely replicate minimal human rights standards. Second, critics of multicultural identity politics have emphasized the twin dangers of fragmentation of the larger political community and of internal repression within cultural minorities. The former results from esca-

lating and proliferating demands for group rights; the latter from tolerating illiberal practices and granting special powers to community leaders. These dangers are sometimes real but more frequently exaggerated. And to repeat the point I have already made: they can no longer be avoided through assimilation policies that produce homogenous and presumably liberal national identities. Liberal democracies must accommodate multinational and multicultural conflicts because they cannot suppress them without abandoning their basic principles.

Accommodation is, however, necessarily contextual and must take into account local and national circumstances. In a future European federation the constitution will have to guarantee general national and ethnic minority rights; the political institutions must address nationality conflicts that affect the internal security or territorial integrity of member states; but otherwise subsidiarity should prevail and specific arrangements ought to be worked out regionally, bilaterally or at the national level.

### **Combining the Three Approaches**

I have pointed out that each of the three approaches has its merits and its specific difficulties. The task is not to choose between them, but to combine them in intelligent ways. As an example let me consider how a multicultural conception of European citizenship might change the rules governing the acquisition of member

state nationality and Union citizenship.

Under present regulations all nationals of member states and only these are citizens of the Union. The member states are thus the gatekeepers for access to Union citizenship, which results automatically from acquisition of a member state nationality through naturalization, descent or birth in the territory. The fifteen members have very different rules for these modes of admission and the Union still regards nationality laws as a purely domestic matter of the member states. Yet those immigrants who have obtained a European nationality are free to move to another member state where they can exercise their rights as citizens of the Union (including the local franchise), while immigrants who have lived there much longer may be denied such privileges. From a postnational perspective a substantive status of Union citizenship cannot be a mere appendix to national membership and conditions of access must be more or less the same throughout the federation. Any long-term exclusion of a part of the resident adult population from citizenship conflicts with liberal democratic norms (see Carens 1989, Bauböck 1994). Rules for admission should therefore be harmonized towards the most liberal standards, e.g. a waiting period for naturalization of no more than five years and an automatic acquisition of nationality at birth for children whose parents have been long term residents in the country. To this should be added a uniform legal status for third country nationals, a European

"denizenship" (Hammar 1990) that disconnects many present rights of European citizens, such as free movement and access to employment or the local franchise, from nationality and ties them instead to legal permanent residence.

Once we have agreed on the need for harmonizing nationality laws, the multinational approach comes into play. It would favour retaining the formal link that derives citizenship of the federation from member state nationality. All present federations with the exception of Switzerland reverse this model and derive instead membership in the subunit from federal citizenship. However, in the EU this could only signal a problematic move towards a nested nation model. The present regulations, on the other hand, correspond to the idea of a "Europe of fatherlands" each of which has its own separate regimes for reproducing its membership and national identities. The specific multinational character of the EU could be well expressed by harmonizing admission to Union citizenship while making it still conditional upon acquisition of member state nationality.

The pluralistic model, finally, would support recognition of multiple citizenships as long as they reflect genuine social ties to several countries. Multiple citizenship gives a legal expression to overlapping national identities that do not fit neatly into the nested patterns of federal communities but cut across their internal and external borders. All EU member states accept multiple nationality when it results from mixed

birth, but some of them still require the renunciation of a present nationality as a precondition for naturalization. This is a major obstacle for some groups of immigrants who are afraid of losing rights in their home countries (such as the right to inherit or own land and, most importantly, the right to enter and live in this territory). Multiple citizenship between a member state and a third country presents no particular problems for a federal conception of Europe. Standard models of federation exclude, however, simultaneous membership in several constitutive units. As a provincial citizen of Lower Austria I have no franchise in the federal province of Vienna. If I took up residence in Vienna I would automatically lose my right to vote in Lower Austria and would become a full citizen of the capital without any declaration of intent. This amounts to a latent multiple membership in all units with an active membership only in the unit of current residence. This rule is not merely designed to prevent multiple voting or cashing in of other benefits of provincial citizenship, it prevents also provincial authorities from discriminating against citizens of other parts of the federation. Still, the multinational conception of a federal Europe that I have advocated would make such automatic acquisition through residence alone (without any declaration of intent) rather problematic.<sup>8</sup> A mutual recognition of national identities would be better served if citizens of the Union who settle in another member state are treated much like immigrants from third countries who

should have easy access to the host state's nationality but on whom it cannot be imposed against their will.<sup>9</sup>

Rules of admission are a particularly important element of multicultural citizenship because they provide a direct link between minority policies and a transformation of the wider political community itself. Yet these two questions must also be addressed separately and in their own terms. As the European Union moves closer to federation it will have to adopt policies concerning the status and rights of national, ethnic, racial and religious minorities and it must develop a coherent vision of a common political identity that could integrate the various political communities of which it is composed.

## Conclusions

Transforming a union of democratic states into a supranational federation is a unique endeavour. All historical precedents have involved nation-building efforts at the federal level. This route is blocked for the European Union. Political integration must not be misunderstood as an attempt to build a European nation. One should not even aim at creating hyphenated identities of the American sort (Austro-, Italo-, Greco-Europeans...) that would turn present national identities into ethnic prefixes of a European one. What we need instead is the opposite kind of transformation: a pluralisation of our national identities so that they include a European element alongside many other ones.

Building a federal polity is necessarily an exercise in identity politics. The challenge is how to combine postnational, multinational and transnational identities so that all can see themselves as belonging to a larger European community. This task is not like constructing a European house from building blocks of various national colours. Existing national identities must also be transformed to become compatible with the integration project. In order to fit together in a supranational federation European nations have to become internally more pluralistic. They must learn to understand and accept their own heterogeneity that results from recent immigration and old minorities.

A European federation must be postnational in the sense of creat-

ing a political community where citizenship is a relevant identity but is no longer associated with a particular national territory, history and culture. Creating this new type of polity will require more than institutional reform and even more than a federal constitution. Democratic representation at federal level involves the citizens more directly in far-reaching collective decisions. The price for democratising the Union is that we will see much more political polarisation on European issues. Given the multinational structure of the federation it is not difficult to predict that a lot of this polarisation will be along national lines rather than along lines of economic interest that cut across these internal borders. It would be an illusion to believe that fostering constitutional patriotism in a federal

Europe could overcome this danger of nationalist mobilisation. In such a federation the antidote to nationalism is multinationalism, i.e. a mutual public affirmation of national identities that undercuts the tendency to put one's own nation above all others. However, such multinationalism also preserves the potential for the disease that it is meant to cure. It creates the image of a Europe that is perpetually divided into national communities that have been independent before and could become so again when the federation no longer satisfies their particular aspirations. Multinationalism needs to be complemented with a pluralistic approach that recognizes the overlapping and cross-cutting identities of sub-national and transnational communities.

## Notes

- 1 For the full text of the speech see [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6\\_archiv/index.htm](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/index.htm). Proponents of cosmopolitan federation at the global level make a similar argument. See for example Höffe (1999).
- 2 For a critique of this distinction see Yack (1996) and Levy (2000).
- 3 Canovan (1996) shows how theories of democracy have tacitly presupposed stable boundaries and collective identities that cannot themselves be decided by democratic procedures but are the outcome of historic processes of nation-building.
- 4 There is a parallel here with Benedict Anderson's analysis how the career patterns and travel itineraries of colonial administrators in Latin America shaped their national consciousness. The artificial borders of the colony determined the range of their travels and were thus endowed with meaning. And if they were Creoles born in the colony the geographic end-point of their career paths was the capital of the colony rather than the metropolis of the Empire (Anderson 1983: 55–60).
- 5 In the 1970s Canada's premier Pierre Trudeau attempted to forge an all-Canadian sense of nationhood based on multiculturalism and bilingualism "from coast to coast". Québécois perceived this as an attack on the special status of their language and province (see Laforest (1995).
- 6 Unresolved minority conflicts among the twelve present candidates for enlargement include the division of Cyprus between its Greek and Turkish community, the position of Hungarian minorities in Rumania and Slovakia, of the large Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia, of Turkish and Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and of Roma communities in most Eastern and Central Eastern European states.
- 7 The Tampere European Council of 15–16 October 1999 has quite explicitly established this link.

- 8 In multinational or multilingual states autonomous regions sometimes impose longer residence requirements before internal migrants from other regions acquire regional citizenship. For example, Italian citizens who move to South Tyrol must wait for four years before acquiring the regional franchise.
- 9 I think that this conception would also allow for multiple active memberships so that, for example, an Italian citizen who has acquired French nationality could vote in elections in both countries.

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# Kodin ja koulun kohtaaminen monikulttuurisessa koulussa



Siru Javanainen

Artikkeli perustuu kyselytutkimukseen, joka toteutettiin Lohjan kaupungin Tytyrin koulussa lukuvuoden 1999–2000 aikana. Kyselyaineisto on osa laajempaa tutkimushanketta, jossa tarkastellaan maanlaajuisesti kodin ja koulun vuorovaikutusta monikulttuurisessa koulussa. Lohjan kaupungissa toteutettu kartoitus toimii tutkimushankkeessa pilottihankkeena. Tytyrin koulu valittiin tutkimuskohteeksi, koska Lohjan kaupungin maahanmuuttajalapsat ovat keskittyneet kyseiseen kouluun. Kyseessä on ala-asteen koulu, jossa on neljästä eri kansallisuudesta peräisin olevia maahanmuuttajaoppilaita: somalialaisia, albaaneja, venäläisiä ja virolaisia. Tutkimus oli kaksiosainen. Syksyllä 1999 kartoitettiin koulun suomalaisten oppilaiden vanhempien ja opettajien mielipiteitä. Keväällä 2000 kysely kohdistettiin maahanmuuttajaperheille. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena oli vertailla kodin ja koulun vuorovaikutusta toisaalta suomalaisten perheiden ja toisaalta maa-

hanmuuttajaperheiden näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna.

Syksyllä 1999 suoritettu kartoitus toteutettiin kyselyinä, joka lähetettiin Tytyrin koulun kaikkien suomalaisten lasten koteihin eli 250 perheeseen. Käytännössä jakelu tapahtui siten, että oppilaat toimittivat lomakkeet vanhemmilleen ja palauttivat täytetyt lomakkeet omalle opettajalleen. Opettajien kysely jaettiin koulun kaikille 26 opettajalle. Täytetyn kyselyn palautti 154 perhettä ja 13 opettajaa. Käytännössä perheiden vastausprosentti oli lähes sata koska monessa perheessä enemmän kuin yksi lapsi kävi kyselyajankohtana Tytyrin koulua ja perheitä pyydettiin vastaamaan vain yhteen kyselylomakkeeseen.


Vanhemmille kohdistuva kysely kartoitti perheiden mielikuvia Tytyrin koulusta yleisesti sekä kodin ja koulun kasvatustietelmien ja arvomaailman kohtaamista. Lomakkeessa kartoitettiin myös tiedonkulkua kodin ja koulun välillä sekä vanhempien mielipiteitä monikulttuurisesta koulusta. Opettajien kyselylomake sisälsi lähes samat kysymykset kuin vanhempien lomake. Näin tulokset pyrittiin saamaan vertailukelpoisiksi. Koska suoritettu tutkimus oli ensimmäinen osa laajempaa kokonaisuutta, se on luonteeltaan enemmänkin kartoittava ja empiirisiä tuloksia esittelevä kuin teoreettiseen viitekehukseen nojaava. Tuloksia tarkasteltiin suorilla prosentuaalisilla jakaumilla ja muuttajien välisiä yhteyksiä mittaavalla ristiintaulukoinnilla. Käsitellen tässä artikkelissa kuitenkin enemmän vanhempien ja opettajien mielipiteitä koulun monikulttuurisuudesta kuin varsinaista kodin ja koulun vuorovaikutusta.

## Suomalaisten vanhempien ja opettajien käsityksiä kodin ja koulun vuorovaikutuksesta

Kartoituksen pohjana ollut hypoteesi kodin ja koulun välisen vuorovaikutuksen toimimattomuudesta jäi enimmäkseen todentamatta. Mitään suuria ristiriitoja tai mielipiteiden poikkeamia ei Tytyrin koulun opettajien ja oppilaiden vanhempien välillä esiintynyt. Kyselyn perusteella sekä opettajat että oppilaiden vanhemmat vaikuttavat suhteellisen tyytyväisiltä Tytyrin kouluun. Eri-mielisyyksiä on tietysti silloin tällöin esiintynyt ja mielipide-

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### Koulun ja kodin tehtävät lapsen kasvatuksessa tulee pitää erillään/vanhemmat



erot johtuvat yleensä kasvatusnäkökulmien eroista. Sekä opettajat että vanhemmat kohdistavat ensisijaisen kasvatusvastuun kodille. Vanhemmista noin 30 prosenttia haluaa kodin huolehtivan pääasiallisesti lasten kasvatuksesta. Vanhemmat kuitenkin odottavat myös koululta vahvaa kasvatuksellista otetta. Yksimielisyyttä kasvatustavoitteista pidetään molempien vastaajaryhmien keskuudessa tärkeänä.

Soinisen (1986) tutkimuksessa ”Kodin ja koulun yhteistyöstä peruskoulun ala-asteella” todetaan, että kodin tulee olla tietoinen koulun kasvatustavoitteista. Tämä on helpommin toteutettavissa kuin se, että koulun tulee olla tietoinen kodin kasvatustavoitteista. Ongelmalliseksi asian tekee se, että kotien kasvatustavoitteet saattavat poiketa toisistaan paljonkin. Vanhemmat kuitenkin usein odottavat koululta samanlaista kasvatusotetta kuin heillä itsellään on. (Soininen 1986, 40.)

Vaikka asiat vaikuttavat päällisin puolin olevan Tytyrin koulussa hyvin, löytyi vastausjakaumista kuitenkin myös eroja. Opettajat arvioivat kodin ja koulun välisen tiedonkulun toimivammaksi kuin vanhemmat. Kyselystä jäi vaikutelma, että opettajat odottavat vanhempien ottavan omatoimisesti yhteyttä koululle tietoa kaivatesaan ja vanhemmat taas puolestaan odottavat koululta aktiivista tiedottamista. Noin kolmasosa vanhemmista ei myöskään tiedä, onko heillä vaikutusvaltaa lastensa koskeviin asioihin koulussa. Kuitenkin lähes kaikki vastanneet opettajat ilmoittavat huomioivansa vanhempien mielipiteitä. Ristiintaulukoinnin mukaan vaikutusmahdollisuksiinsa tyytymättömät vanhemmat myös antavat harvemmin palautetta lastensa koulunkäynnistä. Odotetusti vanhempien aktiivinen vuorovaikutus koulun kanssa lisää heidän yleistä tyytyväisyyttään koulun toimintaan.

Myös osallistumisesta vanhempainiltoihin on opettajilla ja

vanhemmilla eri näkemys. Vanhemmat ilmoittavat osallistuvansa suhteellisen aktiivisesti vanhempainiltoihin, kun taas opettajien arvion mukaan osallistuminen ei ole kovinkaan aktiivista. Lisäksi vanhempien kiinnostus lastensa koulunkäyntiä kohtaan arvioidaan opettajien keskuudessa huomattavasti alhaisemmaksi kuin millaiseksi vanhemmat itse sen ilmoittavat.

Niin oppilaiden vanhemmat kuin opettajatkin kannattavat opettajien selvän auktoriteettiaseman säilyttämistä luokassa. Opettajien ja oppilaiden yhteistyö koulun toimintaa suunniteltaessa sai kuitenkin kaikkien vastaajien keskuudessa laajaa kannatusta. Yleisesti voidaan siis todeta, että opettajien ja vanhempien käsitykset koulun ja kodin vuorovaikutuksesta ja vastuunjaosta kohtaavat Tytyrin koulussa suhteellisen hyvin. Kehittämistä kuitenkin on. Selvityksestä nousee esiin mm. kysymys: Miten aktiivoida vanhempia omatoimiseen yhteydenpitoon lastensa opettajien kanssa. Nykyajan koulunkäynti on aikatauluihin ja opetussuunnitelmiin sidottua, joten sopivan ajan löytäminen hedelmälliselle yhteistyölle tuottaa ongelmia.

### Suomalaisten vanhempien ja opettajien mielipiteitä koulun monikulttuurisuudesta

Monikulttuuriseen kouluun suhtauduttiin kyselyyn vastanneiden vanhempien keskuudessa enimmäkseen myönteisesti. Vastaajista 67 prosenttia pitää monikulttuurista koulua rikkautena paik-

kakunnalla ja 76 prosentin mielestä on hyvä, että koulussa on eri kulttuureista peräisin olevia oppilaita. Molempiin väittämiin kielteisen kannan otti noin 15 prosenttia vastanneista vanhemmista. 18 prosenttia vastanneista ei osannut arvioida, pitääkö monikulttuurista koulua hyvänä vai huonona asiana. Selvä enemmistö oppilaiden vanhemmista pitää kansainvälisyyttä ja suvaitsevaisuutta Tytyrin koulun perusarvoina.

Vanhemmista 65 prosenttia arvioi maahanmuuttajaoppilaan rikkastuttavan luokan ilmapiiriä ja 14 prosenttia oli asiasta eri mieltä. 83 prosenttia vastanneista vanhemmista kannattaa oppilaiden uskonto- ja kulttuuritaustan huomioimista opetuksessa. Samoin yli 80 prosenttia suomalaisten oppilaiden vanhemmista sallii oppilaiden pukeutuvan koulussa kulttuurinsa edellyttämällä tavalla. Kuitenkin 90 prosenttia vastanneista on sitä mieltä, että maahanmuuttajaperheiden on kunnioitettava koulun toimintatapoja kulttuuristaan huolimatta.

Eri kulttuureista peräisin olevia kavereita arvioi lapsellaan olevan 47 prosenttia kyselyyn vastanneiden vanhemmista. Useimmiten lapsilla on somalialaisia kavereita. Vastanneista vanhemmista vain 17 prosentilla on ollut itsellään kontakteja maahanmuuttajaperheisiin. Kysyttäessä millaisia kokemuksia perheillä on maahanmuuttajaperheistä, saatiin seuraavanlaisia vastauksia:

- *Hiukan huonoja – somalipoika kävi poikani kimppuun teräaseella. Onneksi poikani osa-*

*si puolustautua ja selvisi melko pienin kolhuin.*


- *Lapset ovat hyvin väkivaltaisia. Vanhemmat eivät hyväksy jos heitä syytetään se on heti rasismia. Kohteliaita muuten, puheliasta porukkaa helppo tutustua heihin.*
- *Hyviä.*
- *Positiivisia.*

Vastanneista vanhemmista 21 prosenttia arvioi, että maahanmuuttajalapsia ja suomalaisia lapsia kohdellaan koulussa eri tavalla. Vain harvat perustelivat väitettään, mutta perustelut olivat useimmiten negatiivisia:

- *Jos pakolaisperheen lapsi tekee koulussa jotakin niin asiaa hyssytellään, mutta jos se on suomalainen niin aikamoinen show siitä syntyy. Haluaisin että maahanmuuttajaperheiden lapset olisivat ensin omassa luokassa, että oppivat käyttäytymään. Tai Helsingissä voisi olla oma luokka/koulu heitä varten. Myöskin heidän vanhemmat pitäisi kouluttaa, eihän ne osaa kaikki edes lukea, heillä on kotona ihan eri säännöt kuin meillä. Eräskin somali-isä sanoi pojalleen, täällä kotona tottelet meidän sääntöjä, sitten kun menet ulos niin saat tehdä mitä haluat??? Jotain pitäisi tehdä. Onko se kulttuuririkkaus että venäläiset ja somalit riehuu täällä!!!*
- *Ulkomaalaisten tavat periaatteessa ok, olen kuitenkin sinisilmäistä joustoa vastaan.*
- *Maahanmuuttajalasten on annettu liikaa kiusata, koska heitä pitää ymmärtää.*
- *Kulttuurierot johtavat myös erilaiseen huomioimiseen.*

- *Esim. venäläisillä liian usein annetaan asiat mennä läpi sormien missä pitäis ottaa vakavasti.*
- *Esim. somalit saa mennä ja tulla miten haluaa, enkä ainaakaan ole kuullut, että mitään rangaistuksia saavat.*
- *Maahanmuuttajalapset saavat eri vapauksia, esim. käyttäytymisessä käyttävät paljon väkivaltaa ilman että oikein puututaan koulun taholta! Käyttäytymisessä ihmisten kanssa täytyisi olla samat säännöt kaikilla ihonväriin katsomatta.*
- *Jos meidän omat oppilaat tekisivät vastaavia asioita koulussa heidät siirrettäisiin tarkkailuluokille yms. Näillä ”maahanmuuttajilla” on selviä käytöshäiriöitä, sekä heillä on kotona eri säännöt. Olen kuullut että somalilapsilla on kotona tiukka kuri ja ulkopuolella kodin saa tehdä miten huvittaa??? Minulla on Tytyrin koulusta kymmeniä esimerkkejä. Somalivanhemmat sanovat täällä on hyvä olla. Kaikki saadaaan ilmaiseksi ei tarvitse tehdä mitään, niin he opettavat tämän saman lapsillensa. Suomessa on sen jälkeen mahtava joukko työttömiä maahanmuuttajia. Miksi nämä pakolaiset (somalit) ovat kaikki Tytyrin koulussa, niitä ei ole esim. Metsolan koulussa? (siellä on muuten vähemmän koulukiusaamista). Haluaisin tietää miksi rehtori ja opettajat vähättelevät asioita kun on kyse kiusaamisista. Itse en ole rasisti minulla on paljon ulkomaalaisia ystäviä ja työkavereita ja puhun sujuvasti englantia, olen myös lapseni opettanut suvaitsevik-*

### Maahanmuuttajakoteihin pidetään koulussa yhtä paljon yhteyttä kuin suomalaisiin koteihin/opettajat



si, mutta he ihmettelevät koulun reagointia pakolaisten suhteen, heitä pidetään kuin kukkaa kämmenellä. Muualla he elävät teltoissa??? Olen itsekin ollut ulkomailla asumassa, mutta työllistin itseni ja maksoin veroa. Tähän pakolaistilanteeseen ehdottaisin, että heillä olisi oma koulu esim. Helsingissä. Koska tänne on otettu niin paljon pakolaisia että Suomi ei pysty heitä hoitamaan. Koulutukseen ja töihin nämä vanhemmat. Ei raha puussa kasva!!!

- Heille annetaan paljon enemmän vapauksia kouluun tuloajoissa, häiriköinnissä jne. verrattuna suomalaisiin lapsiin.
- Ruuan suhteen meidän lapset saavat ihan eri ruokaa kuin esim. somalit (jotka saavat parempaa?).
- Kiusaamis- ja ilkivaltatapauksissa maahanmuuttajia ei välttämättä rangaista ollenkaan.
- Maahanmuuttajalapsia ei saa

”hyysätä” koska ovat muualta kotoisin.

- Somaleita ei koske esim. kouluuntulo- ja lähtöajat. Somalit ovat yleensä aina oikeassa riskitilanteissa.
- Kun maahanmuuttajat kiusaavat muita siihen ei puututa yhtä ankarasti kuin muiden tekemisiin.
- Myöhästymiset painetaan ”vilmaisella”. Saivat lintsata muiden mielestä.
- Samaa kuria ei pidetä maahanmuuttajille.
- Maahanmuuttajalapsia kohden on enemmän joustoa ja väärin tehtyjä asioita katsotaan hieman läpi sormien suomalaislapsiin nähden.

Kyselyn mukaan Tytyrin koulun opettajat suhtautuvat myönteisesti koulun monikulttuurisuuteen. Vastanneista opettajista vain kahdeksalla on luokassaan maahanmuuttajaoppilaita. Runsas puolet vastanneista kuitenkin haluaisi

luokalleen maahanmuuttajaoppilaita. Neljäsosa ei osannut ottaa asiaan kantaa. Maahanmuuttajalasten opettaminen koetaan kuitenkin hyvin erilaiseksi kuin suomalaisten lasten. Opetustyö on haastavampaa johtuen kieli- ja kulttuurieroista. Yli puolet kyselyyn vastanneista opettajista arvioi, ettei heillä ole riittävästi koulutusta maahanmuuttajien opettamiseen. Enemmistö opettajista, joilla on luokassaan maahanmuuttajaoppilaita kokee yhteydenpidon oppilaiden perheisiin suhteellisen helpoksi. Ongelmia kuitenkin aiheuttaa yhteisen kielen puuttuminen. Vastanneista opettajista enemmistö myös arvioi, että perheisiin pidetään koulussa yhtä paljon yhteyttä riippumatta perheen kansallisuudesta.

Opettajien mukaan koulun tulee ottaa opetuksessa huomioon oppilaiden uskonto- ja kulttuuritausta. Jokainen oppilas saa myös pukeutua koulussa kulttuurinsa edellyttämällä tavalla. Tästä huolimatta perheiden odotetaan kunnioittavan koulun toimintatapoja kulttuuristaan huolimatta.

Kyselyssä selvitettiin myös, onko koulussa ilmennyt jostain kansallisuudesta peräisin olevien oppilaiden syrjintää enemmän kuin toisten. Kukaan opettajista ei kuitenkaan ole huomannut, että eri kansallisuuksia kohdeltaisiin koulussa eri tavalla. Kuitenkin väittämän ”koulussamme on ilmennyt etniseen taustaan liittyvää syrjintää” kanssa samaa mieltä on noin kolmasosa vastanneista opettajista. Maahanmuuttajaoppilaita ei kyselyn mukaan myöskään kiusata sen enempää kuin suomalaisia oppilaita. Kaikki vastanneet ovat kuitenkin havain-

neet tapauksia, jossa maahanmuuttajaoppilas on kiusannut suomalaista oppilasta.

Selvä enemmistö vastanneista opettajista arvioi, että maahanmuuttajalapsia ja suomalaisia lapsia kohdellaan koulussa tasavertaisesti. Muutama opettaja kuitenkin arvioi, että suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajalapsiin on sallivampaa verrattuna suomalaisiin lapsiin. Koulun maahanmuuttajalapsia eivät ole muodostuneet omiksi ryhmikseen esim. välitunnilla, vaan he leikkivät yhdessä suomalaisten lasten kanssa. Maahanmuuttajalasten ja suomalaisten lasten välillä on havaittu risti-riitoja: Noin kolmasosa vastanneista arvioi lasten tulevan kuitenkin yleensä hyvin toimeen keskenään. Päinvastoin kuin suomalaisissa perheissä, maahanmuuttajaperheiden vanhemmista isät ovat yleensä äitejä useammin yhteydessä kouluun. Useimmiten vanhempien yhteydenotot kouluun johtuvat lasten käytöshäiriöistä tai vanhemmat tiedustelevat lapsen menestymistä koulussa. Lopuksi opettajia pyydettiin arvioimaan, miten suomalaisten oppilaiden vanhemmat suhtautuvat siihen, että koulussa on maahanmuuttajalapsia. Enemmistö vastanneista ilmoitti kuulleensa sekä negatiivisia että positiivisia mielipiteitä. Jotkut vanhemmat kokivat, että monikulttuurinen koulu opettaa lapsille suvaitsevaisuutta ja toisten kulttuurien ymmärrystä. Toiset kommentit taas saattavat olla avoimen rasistisia.

Merkittävin ero opettajien ja suomalaisten vanhempien mielipiteissä koski maahanmuuttajalasten osakseen saamaa kohtelua koulussa. Osalla vanhemmista on

käsitys, että maahanmuuttajalapsit saavat ikään kuin etuoikeuksia koulussa. Opettajat puolestaan ilmoittivat kohtelevansa kaikkia lapsia tasapuolisesti kansallisuutteen katsomatta.

### **Kysely maahanmuuttaja-vanhemmille**

Lohjalla toteutettuun kyselyyn vastasi vain 9 maahanmuuttajaperhettä. Kyselylomake oli lähes tulkoon samanlainen kuin suomalaisilla perheillä. Kolme perheistä oli venäläisiä ja kuusi somalialaista. Rahoituksen niukkuuden vuoksi tulkin palkkaaminen tai kyselylomakkeiden kääntäminen somalian kielelle ei ollut Lohjan tapauksessa mahdollista. Tytyrin koulussa työskentelevä somaliopettaja suoritti somalialaisten perheiden haastattelun, mutta tästä huolimatta tulokset jäivät pinnallisiksi. Suurin osa vastanneista perheistä valitsi en osaa sanoa – vastausvaihtoehdon tai sitten he ilmaisivat asioiden olevan koulussa hyvin. Avovastauksiin eivät perheet kirjanneet mitään. Venäläisille perheille suunnattu lomake oli käännetty venäjän kielelle. Lohjan tapaus osoittaa, että vastaushalukkuuden ja vastausten luotettavuuden varmistaminen vaatii suhteellisen suurta panostusta perheiden motivointiin. Pilotihankkeen rahoitus ei kuitenkaan mahdollistanut tämän suurempaa panostusta.

### **Lopuksi**

Vaikka Suomi on edelleen yksi maailman yksikulttuurisimpia valtioita, olemme joutuneet eten-

kin viimeisen kymmenen vuoden aikana kohtaamaan monikulttuurisuuden haasteet. Maahamme saapuneiden pakolaisten määrä kasvoi lähes samanaikaisesti taloudellisen laskusuhdanteen kanssa. Kansalaisten asenteet ulkomaalaisia ja erityisesti pakolaisia kohtaan jyrkkenivät huomattavasti laman aikana. Kuitenkin viime vuosien talouden elpyminen ja työttömyyden väheneminen ovat muuttaneet suomalaisten asenteita myönteisempään suuntaan (Jaakkola 1999, 3). Tästä huolimatta etninen syrjintä ja enakkoluulot elävät edelleen yhteiskunnassamme.

Maamme on väistämättömästi joutunut sen tosiasian eteen, että monokulttuurisuus on ohi ja yhteiskunnassamme tulee oleskelemaan myös pysyvästi yhä enemmän ulkomaalaistaustan omaavia ihmisiä. Monikulttuurisuus herättää kysymyksen eri kulttuurien välisestä vuorovaikutuksesta ja sen kehittämisestä. Sen sijaan, että ainoastaan yrittäisimme integroida muita kulttuureita edustavat henkilöt omaan kulttuuriimme, meidän tulisi oppia ymmärtämään, mikä rikkaus monikulttuurisuus on. Sen tosiasian tiedostaminen, että jokaisella kulttuurilla on jotain annettavaa, luo meille uusia mahdollisuuksia ymmärtää paremmin myös omaa kulttuuritaustaamme.

Koska asenteet ovat todistetusti erittäin hitaasti muutettavissa, voisi sanoa, että tämän päivän kouluikäiset lapset ja nuoret ovatkin avainasemassa, kun puhutaan kulttuurien välisen vuorovaikutuksen kehittämisestä. Tässä tehtävässä avainorganisaationa toimii koululaitos. Maahanmuuttajien työllisyys tilanteen ollessa erit-

täin heikko, missään muualla yhteiskunnassamme eivät eri kulttuurit ole niin läheisessä vuorovaikutuksessa kuin koulussa. Koska koulu on eräänlainen yhteiskunnan pienoismalli, sen tehtävä on opettaa lapsille, miten yhteiskunnassa toimitaan. Käsitteet sosiaalisesta tasa-arvosta muokkautuvat hyvin pitkälle kouluvuosien aikana. Asenteet, joita maahanmuuttajaoppilaat koulussa kohtaavat, heijastuvat heille ikään kuin yhteiskunnan asenteina. Oppilaiden vanhempien näkökulmasta katsottuna työtömille maahanmuuttajille – etenkin naisille – koulu on usein ainoa ”linkki” yhteiskuntaan. Jos tämä ”linkki” on pelkästään kielteistä palautettava antava, ei pidä ihmetellä, miksi maahanmuuttajien sopeutuminen yhteiskuntaamme on vaikeaa.

Suomalaisen koululaitoksen voidaan kuitenkin sanoa olevan ainakin peruseriaatteiltaan kansainvälinen, suvaitsevainen ja erilaisuutta hyväksyvä. Jos järjestelmäämme verrataan esim. brittiläiseen koululaitukseen, on meillä asiasta suhteellisen hyvin. Vaikka etnisten vähemmistöjen osuus maan väestöstä on Britanniassa huomattavasti suurempi kuin Suomessa, on rasismi koulussa huomattavasti näkyvämpää kuin meillä. Brittiläisessä opetussuunnitelmassa ei monikulttuurisuutta ole huomioitu. Suomessa sen sijaan esim. maahanmuuttajalasten oman äidinkielen opetusta pidetään tärkeänä jo valtakunnallisten opetussuunnitelmienkin perusteella.

Magdalena Jaakkolan (1999) tutkimuksessa ”Maahanmuutto ja etniset asenteet” tarkasteltiin suomalaisten mielipiteitä, jotka kos-

kevat maahanmuuttajien oikeutta omaan äidinkieleen ja kulttuuriin. Tutkimuksessa vähemmistöideologiat esiteltiin universalismina ja kulttuuripluralismina. Universalismia eli vähemmistöjen sulauttamista valtaväestöön kannatti vuonna 1998 runsas kolmasosa suomalaisista. Kulttuuripluralismia, joka painottaa omien kulttuuristen erityispiirteiden keskeistä merkitystä vähemmistöjen hyvinvoinnille kannatettiin melko yleisesti. Suomalaiset suhtautuvat siten suhteellisen myönteisesti maahanmuuttajien äidinkielen ja kulttuurin säilyttämiseen. (Jaakkola 1999, 116–119.)

Lohjalla tehty selvitys osoitti, ettei koulun ja kodin vuorovaikutus ole täysin mutkatonta edes samaa kulttuuria edustavien osapuolten kesken. Tällöin voidaan olettaa vuorovaikutuksen olevan vielä vaikeampaa, kun puhutaan eri kulttuuria edustavista osapuolista. Selvitys herättääkin kysymyksen siitä, millaista on tiedonkulku koulun ja maahanmuuttajaperheiden välillä ja kokevatko perheet, että heillä on mahdollisuus vaikuttaa lastensa koulunkäyntiin. Tavoitteena on myös jatkossa selvittää, mitä suomalainen koulukulttuuri ja kasvatusmenetelmät merkitsevät maahanmuuttajaperheille. Nämä asiat eivät selvinneet Lohjalla toteutetusta kyselystä maahanmuuttajaperheiden alhaisen vastaushalukkuuden vuoksi. Tasa-arvoinen vuorovaikutussuhde omien lastensa opettajiin on maahanmuuttajavanhemmille ensiarvoisen tärkeää yhteiskuntaan integroitumisen ja syrjäytymisen ehkäisemisen kannalta. Lisäksi maahanmuuttajalasten myönteiset koulu-

kokemukset rohkaisevat heitä haakeutumaan esimerkiksi ammatilliseen koulutukseen ja näin edistämään omaa työllistymistään.

Maahanmuuttajaperheillä on taustanaan oman maansa koulutuskulttuuri. Eri kansallisuudet suhtautunevat Suomessakin koulutukseen eri tavalla. Mielenkiintoinen kysymys on esimerkiksi se, kannustetaanko somaliperheissä tyttölapsia jatkamaan opintojaan peruskoulun jälkeen vai vaikuttavatko islamilaiset arvot edelleen perheissä. Perheiden antamalla tuella lienee vaikutusta siihen, kuinka moni maahanmuuttajaopiskelijoista keskeyttää peruskoulun jälkeiset opintonsa.

Tässä artikkelissa esitetyt suomalaisten oppilaiden vanhempien maahanmuuttaja-asenteet olivat suhteellisen positiivisia huolimatta joistain hyvin kärkkäistäkin avovastauksista. Enemmistö vanhemmista ja opettajat pitävät koulun monikulttuurisuutta koulunkäyntiä rikastuttavana tekijänä. Syytä näinkin positiiviseen tulokseen on vaikea suoraan arvioida. Yksi esille tullut syy on se, että monikulttuurisuuteen suvaitsevaisesti suhtautuvat perheet valitsevat tietoisesti lastensa kouluksi juuri Tytyrin koulun.

## Kirjallisuus

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# The Finnish Migrant Community in Post-war Melbourne<sup>1</sup>

”The only thing that spoke English was the radio”

Senja Baron



## Introduction

With the exception of a handful of historical and demographic studies, Finnish and Australian scholars have written little about Finnish immigrants in Australia.<sup>2</sup> All previous works have generally focussed on uncovering facts and figures but have not addressed the question of Finnish ethnicity in Australia. This article is an attempt to explore some of the questions studies of Finnish migration and typical writings on large ethnic groups have left unanswered. How did Finnish ethnic community develop in Melbourne despite Finns’ apparent absorption into Australian society? Why did they choose to maintain their cultural heritage after moving, from their perspective, to the end of the earth? How did they define their Finnishness? Or, put in more general terms, how does a person or a group become ethnic if not by their visible difference?

As the existence of the Finnish Church and Society indicates, Finnish immigrants in Melbourne have formed an ‘ethnic group’; i.e. a social group defined by its members’ shared descent, history, culture and experience.<sup>3</sup> Their ‘ethnicity’, or sense of common ori-

gins and history, has been unlike most others’, however, as it has not been manifested through conspicuous cultural or physical difference. Finns have had little impact on Australian culture, cuisine or politics, and as an ethnic group they have been virtually invisible to the rest of Australian society.

Because of this, typical studies ethnicity focussed on large and conspicuous migrants groups contribute little towards understanding the development of Finnish-Australian migrant ethnicity.<sup>4</sup> To explore Melbourne’s Finnish immigrants personal experiences of ethnicity, ten oral histories involving six men and eight women were collected for this study. The majority had migrated to Melbourne in the late-fifties, some in the early-seventies, and all were active participants in the Finnish ethnic organisations. It is important to note that as this study is based on the stories of this limited group, it refers only to a small minority of all Finns living in Melbourne. It is not concerned with immigrants that arrived at other times, or with second-generation Finns. Most importantly, the experiences discussed in the thesis are indicative only of the 10–15% of Finns in

Melbourne that participate in the Finnish ethnic organisations, not of the hundreds that never or seldom attend them.<sup>5</sup>

On the basis of the immigrants’ memories and the supporting evidence from written sources such as the Finnish-language newspaper *Suomi*, the defining factors of their Finnish ethnicity become clearer. To an extent these factors emerged in sequence as the immigrants settled into the new country. The following three sections of this article will explore the boundaries based on linguistic and social exclusion from the Australian society, Finnish ethnic organisations, and on perceived personality attributes that distinguished the immigrants’ from Finnish people in Finland. Overall, the Finnish post-war immigrants’ story indicates that ethnicity is not only about shared national origins, but also about shared experiences of migration, exclusion and difference.

## Model immigrants?

*We certainly are very popular (at least so far); it can be seen and heard everywhere. [...] The over twenty neatly dressed and restrainedly behaving Finns were an obvious contrast to the loud migrant*



*rabble dressed in shiny pointed shoes and red scarves that some Southern European countries seem to be able to produce without limit. [...] The customs officer had let his gaze rest on the group of Finns standing in front of him and said: "These... are the ones that we are hoping for!"*<sup>6</sup>

This Finnish priest's observation of a newly arrived group of Finns at Brisbane airport in 1958 illustrate the prejudiced ideas Finns, along with the Australian immigration officials, held of the superiority of northern European immigrants. The Government assumed British and Nordic settlers to be culturally similar to the Australian host population. Consequently, it was thought that they would assimilate quickly, i.e. to discard the cultural traits of their country of origin and acquire the Australian way of life.<sup>7</sup> The Finns were eager to meet Australians' expectations of their ability to blend in. But as many soon realised, succeeding in English-speaking workplaces, learning the new language, and making friends with Australians was easier said than done.

Protecting Australia's 'whiteness' against all non-white and most non-British peoples had been a key feature of the Australian Government's migration policy since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. After the Second World War the racist terminology lingered in public arguments promoting immigration from northern Europe.<sup>8</sup> One policy maker found migrants of 'Nordic stock' most agreeable on the grounds that they were 'akin to us in outlook and background', and

because they shared Protestant beliefs and 'a common fatherhood of centuries ago' with the British.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the renowned historian W. D. Borrie suggested that because Scandinavians did not have 'strong national traits' they assimilated easily, unlike Greek migrants whom he thought formed residential concentrations because they had 'a strong attachment to their country of origin'.<sup>10</sup>

So when post-war Australia needed loyal settlers to fill its empty spaces as a defence against feared Asian invasion and hard workers to man the developing industries, northern Europe in addition to Britain was the most preferred source of immigrants.<sup>11</sup> In order to attract more Scandinavians, Germans and Dutch, the Australian Government introduced assistance schemes to cover the costs of their journeys. While most southern Europeans had to finance their own voyage, from 1954 migrants from the north had 25–30% of the cost of their passage covered by the government's General Assisted Passage Scheme (GAPS).<sup>12</sup> From 1966 the Special Passage Assistance Programme (SPAP) offered entirely free passages to migrants from these countries. In return the migrants had to stay in Australia for two years and agree to take English lessons on arrival.

The assistance schemes were of course not the only reason why individual Finns decided to leave their homeland. Although the relatively high income levels in Scandinavia made fewer Finns than southern Europeans immigrate to Australia, the Finns who did migrate were still driven by

economic reasons.<sup>13</sup> Most interviewees involved in this study identified unemployment, high taxation, difficulty getting a home loan and finding housing as the main motivators for seeking better conditions overseas.<sup>14</sup> While the vast majority of Finns settled for nearby Sweden as a land of their hopes, those venturing to faraway Australia were after a greater adventure.<sup>15</sup> They were encouraged by expectations of warmer climate and desire to escape the political instability resulting from Finland's position between the Communist East and Capitalist West. A significant proportion of them originated from Karelia, the easternmost part of Finland surrendered to Soviet Union during the Second World War.<sup>16</sup> Karelian refugees seem to have been more prepared to seek their fortune far away from Finland when economic reasons compelled them to do so.<sup>17</sup>

But despite these reasons to migrate and the Australian Government's eagerness to attract Nordic immigrants, the size of the Australian Finnish community remained minuscule compared to most other migrant groups. During the first peak of Finnish arrivals in Australia in 1958–60 mere 4404 Finns arrived, and despite a second peak of 5433 Finnish immigrants in 1968–71, the number of Australia's Finnish-born residents never rose much above 10 000.<sup>18</sup> Finns formed 0.4% of the overall immigrant intake of over 4 million between 1945 and 1985, and their numbers were ten to twenty times smaller than those of the largest non-English speaking migrants groups from Italy, Greek,

Yugoslavia and the Netherlands.<sup>19</sup>

Because of their small numbers and similar complexions to white Australians, Finnish immigrants became invisible to the mainstream society and thus appeared to meet the Government's expectations. The interviewees involved in this study maintained the image of their superior ability to blend into Australian society. One interviewee considered Finns different from other migrants because 'we try to, more than many others, be like these [Australian] people.'<sup>20</sup> Finns despised Southern European migrants' distinctive attires and judged themselves superior on the basis of their "more Australian" looks.<sup>21</sup> The Finns thought of themselves as good immigrants also because of what they perceived to be their typically Finnish industriousness. Several interviewees emphasised how hard-working and peppy Finns were, and asserted that they had a very good reputation with employers.

While the Finns recalled their working lives with pride, it was clear that work was also a cause of frustration. Because of their poor English skills, many Finns could not get their trade skills recognised by Australian employers. Most Finnish immigrants found work in unskilled and semiskilled jobs in manufacturing and construction industries through introductions and recommendations by other Finns. Consequently, groups of Finnish workers emerged in the building industry, a Melbourne shirt factory and a carpet factory in Tottenham.<sup>22</sup> While most interviewees had advanced into skilled

trades or positions as leading hands over the years, only two had moved onto higher status clerical work away from heavy industry. In 1981, when most post-war immigrants were still in the workforce, 49% of Finns and 50% of Greeks were employed as tradesmen or labourers, in comparison to only 25% of Australians and 34% of Dutch.<sup>23</sup> In terms of their concentration into low-status industrial jobs, then, Finns were in fact more similar to the supposedly less-assimilable southern Europeans than the Dutch, whose occupational statistics resembled those of Australians.<sup>24</sup>

The greatest obstacle to Finns becoming assimilated into the Australian society was their poor command of English. Surprisingly, scholars of migration and ethnicity have rarely addressed the importance of language as the key factor preventing assimilation, but have instead focussed on notions of cultural difference.<sup>25</sup> The case of the Finnish immigrants demonstrates that without the ability to communicate, migrants sharing similar culture and appearance with the host society can remain excluded from it. Although the interviewees tended to downplay the impact their lack of language skills had had on their lives, most admitted their English was limited to essential work language and dealing with everyday situations. Most interviewees continued to be most comfortable with speaking Finnish, even after 40 years of living in the country.

Only two of the interviewees knew English before their arrival, in contrast to many Dutch migrants who could speak English

before they came and often learned it well enough to discard Dutch within a few years from arrival.<sup>26</sup> The Government acknowledged that most immigrants did not know English beforehand and made taking English lessons in Australia a condition for receiving travel assistance. The rule was rarely enforced, however, and none of the interviewees recalled being pressed to attend lessons.<sup>27</sup> The Finnish language newspaper *Suomi* tried to encourage Finns to learn English, but also recognised the fact that because Finnish was linguistically completely different from English, Finns found it more difficult to learn than those from Dutch or German background did.<sup>28</sup>

While most of the interviewees had taken some English lessons after their arrival, family and work commitments prevented many from continuing them for long. This interviewee's experience was typical:

*I tried to learn by correspondence, but I didn't have the time in the end because I had to work and I had the children and the whole family, had to carry all the groceries from the shops, to do the washing... How on earth was I supposed to have time?*

Discouraged by the difficulty and time-consuming nature of formal language study, many interviewees gave it up hoping that English would soon 'stick to their clothes'. Learning through immersion was often infeasible, however, as the environment in factories where most worked was too noisy for conversation. In any

case, once the migrant had learned the object names and commands relevant to his or her job on the machine or conveyor belt no one was interested in their linguistic abilities. Thus their poor occupational status contributed to many Finns' poor English skills and the two combined caused most of the interviewees to stay socially excluded from Australian society.

While many assimilation theorists implied that immigrants' disassociation with the host population was intentional,<sup>29</sup> the Finns, though willing to interact with Australians, were unable to do so because of their poor English. Most interviewees had become acquainted with other Australians through work, but none had become friendly enough to socialise with workmates outside work. Most of the men had belonged to trade unions, but rarely attended meetings, most likely because they could not follow the English proceedings. None had belonged to other Australian associations or clubs. In most cases neighbourly relations remained distant, and relationships with Australians did not develop through marriage either, because all but one of the interviewees were already married when they arrived. Thus the Finns that were unable to assimilate as expected because of their poor language skills and class became economically, linguistically and socially separated from the mainstream society.

### **Institutional boundaries of ethnicity**

In this situation of unintended social exclusion, the Finnish Socie-

ty of Melbourne and the Finnish Lutheran Church were established as formal settings for social interaction with fellow Finns. These ethnic institutions were the overt manifestation of Finnish ethnicity in Melbourne. While individual migrants could perceive their Finnishness on a private, subjective level, it was through interaction within the organisations that individuals identifying themselves as Finns came to develop and define a shared ethnic identity.<sup>30</sup> The Church and Society provided a Finnish cultural reference point even for those who seldom participated in ethnic activities. Each came to represent a distinctive model of being Finnish in Melbourne.<sup>31</sup>

Because ethnic organisations are the most obvious and easily examined demonstration of ethnicity, much sociological and historical research has concentrated on exploring their origins and function. While American research emphasises political motivations behind ethnic group formation,<sup>32</sup> many Australian scholars have tended to focus on social interests as the mobilising force.<sup>33</sup> The two most prominent Finnish ethnic organisations in Melbourne, the Finnish Church and the Finnish Society, share the general nature and pattern of development suggested by Australian scholars.

First, as suggested by Martin among others, ethnic organisations offered migrants practical assistance and social support with adjusting to the new environment.<sup>34</sup> Melbourne's Finnish organisations had their origins in the late-fifties immigrants' infor-

mal friendships based on mutual assistance with settling, and finding work and accommodation. Regular meetings in the Estonian church offered the newly arrived 'greenhorns' an opportunity to ask help with language and adjustment problems from the 'the elders', as the Finns who had lived in Melbourne for some time were commonly referred to.<sup>35</sup> Within a few months these helpful gatherings led to the establishment of the Finnish Society of Melbourne in May 1958. Its nature as a social club was ensured by the appointment of subcommittees responsible for organising entertainment, picnics, sports and a 'do-it-yourself' club for socialising and craftwork.<sup>36</sup> The rules printed in the official membership booklet asserted that 'the purpose of the Society is to gather Finns living in and around Melbourne to shared activities'. It was to 'assist Finns living and arriving in Australia by furthering their social and economic interests and by maintaining a happy, perky mood amongst them'.<sup>37</sup> The Society and later the Church provided migrants 'something of an extended family or tribe' in the absence of actual familial relationships.<sup>38</sup>

The Finnish Lutheran Congregation was also established along the lines of social support, and catered especially for those who disliked the vodka-fuelled 'perky' atmosphere of many Society functions.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, by the late-fifties the pastoral care and ceremonial needs of the over 1000 Finns in Melbourne could no longer be adequately serviced by the single travelling Finnish Seamen's missionary. The Finnish

Mikael Agricola Church and its manse and chapel was established in 1960.<sup>40</sup> In addition to servicing the ceremonial needs of the community, the new Church provided an active social environment through a sewing club, a choir, and a youth club, and by organising annual camping trips to the countryside.<sup>41</sup>

As suggested by Australian scholars, the Church and Finnish Society provided vital assistance for non-English-speaking Finns with settling into their new environment. They served as the first point of contact to new comers in need of practical help with language and other immediate needs, and became the arena for constructing close friendships and support networks. One of the interviewees, for instance, had been unhappy in Melbourne until she began to go to the Finnish Society's evening dances and became the folk dancing clubs' dance instructor. Another recognised the organisations' continuing importance in providing social services. He asserted that 'there is still a need for Finnish social and spiritual work because there are many elderly folks who haven't assimilated with the local community in any way but stay in their own circles'.

Since both organisations provided this social support through organising cultural activities, they also fulfilled the second function identified by Australian scholars, that of preserving and representing Finnish language and heritage. Indeed, a theatrical society and a choir, preserving classical forms of Finnish language and culture through plays and music, were among the first to

be established within the Society. The folk dancing group and the craft club maintained more tangible expressions of and skills relating to Finnish traditions. The creative talent of the immigrants had a regular airing in the social evenings organised by the Society. In one such night at the Temperance Hall in October 1962 the audience of over 100 people heard songs, poem recitals, accordion music and other instrumental pieces, and saw a play and a somewhat un-Finnish hula-dance presentation.<sup>42</sup> Dances were organised every month with the highlight being the biannual formal dinner dance at the lower hall of the Melbourne City Town Hall.<sup>43</sup> The Church ensured the continuance of Finnish religious traditions through its Finnish Lutheran sermons and children's Sunday school. Both organisations celebrated annual festivals such as Christmas, Finnish Independence Day, May Day, Midsummer and Mother's Day with speeches and Finnish foods and music. The Society also established a team to play Finnish baseball. Skills in baseball, volleyball and in selected cultural activities such as reciting were annually measured against teams of other Finnish organisations in the country in the Easter Games held by each club in turn. It was through these kinds of activities that the organisations provided an important avenue for preserving Finnish folk and sporting culture.

The second function many scholars have attributed to ethnic organisations, that of representing migrant cultures to other Australians, has been only of peripheral

importance to the Finnish community in Melbourne. Despite the Society's folk dancing club's occasional involvement in ethnic entertainment, the Finns never developed as prominent a cultural profile as the Italian, Greek, Vietnamese, and other larger migrant communities did. There are three reasons for this. First, because of their small numbers, residential dispersal, and lack of exotic appeal, the Finns like most other Northern European immigrants were not of interest to the mainstream society. Second, thanks to their invisibility and consequent lack of negative labelling by other Australians, Finns did not have to purposely assert a positive image through culture like many southern European immigrants did. Third, unlike many of the post-war refugee associations, the Finnish Church and Society were decidedly apolitical and therefore not aimed at influencing public opinion in Finland or in Australia.<sup>44</sup> The fact that Finns saw no reason to promote their culture to the wider public enforced their invisibility and apparent lack of ethnicity compared to many other immigrant groups.

The third role of ethnic institutions, as identified by scholars of ethnicity, is to serve as mediums for positive identity construction. Several scholars have pointed out that ethnic institutions are important particularly for those people who are unable to develop a positive sense of self and to receive respect through other means. For example, migrants who have lost status and self-esteem because of difficulties with language and getting their qualifications and



Market at the Finnish Lutheran Church in Melbourne in August. – *Senja Baron.*

skills recognised are more likely to seek support and positive identification within their ethnic group.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, most of the interviewees, all of whom were members of either the Finnish Church or the Society, had struggled with these problems. More importantly, none had made friends with Australians or gained social standing in associations within the wider community. Thus it could be argued that the 10–15% of Finns in Melbourne that participate in the community do so because they have not found other sources of positive identification.<sup>46</sup> This idea could also help to explain why Finns have developed more tight-knit communities than other Northern European migrants such as the Dutch. The

fact that only 1% of Dutch immigrants belong to ethnic associations suggests that they have not had as strong a need to identify with their compatriots as Finns have. This is most probably consequent to the Dutch good command of English and ability to find work and social standing in the mainstream society.<sup>47</sup>

The interviewees' accounts certainly indicated that membership in the ethnic community was an important aspect of their self-identities at present. They clearly derived a positive sense of identity from the solidarity within the organisations. As all of them had left their extended families behind, the Church or the Society offered them a sorely missed opportunity to interact in a community involving

their whole personalities in informal and intimate interaction. Frequent references to the organisations as 'family' and 'home' reflected their importance as a primary group, and in providing an environment where these migrants could feel understood and comfortable within a shared system of values and norms.<sup>48</sup> Thus immigrants that never gained proficiency in English, adjusted to the mainstream culture or became part of its social networks found solace in the familiarity offered by ethnic organisations.

Although the Church and the Society had these three roles of social support, cultural maintenance and identity construction in common, they represented two different types of Finnish ethnic identity in Melbourne. In fact, the Finnish community continues to be divided between the members of the two organisations. The pertinence of this division was revealed by the fact that only two of the households involved in this study actively participated in both organisations. While the division between the Church and the Society may be presently enforced by personality conflicts, it is likely that the rift originally emerged because of fundamental disagreements about the nature of Finnish ethnicity and the purpose of the organisations. By its very nature as a Christian organisation, the Church focussed on expressing and maintaining Finnishness in a respectable family environment of Sunday services, youth camps, the choir, and the more recent children's Finnish language classes. The Society on the other hand tended towards more bois-

terous evening entertainment and dances, which some thought indicated a dearth of 'real' and 'constructive' cultural content.<sup>49</sup> The Church and Society came to represent two different cultural frameworks of being Finnish in Melbourne, one being informal and folksy and the other more solemn and religious.

A third model of Finnishness, significantly different from both the Church and the Society, emerged after a split of the Finnish Society in 1962.<sup>50</sup> A section of the Society grew impatient with what it saw as the organisation's lack of commitment to sport and established Sisu -62, a club devoted to baseball, volleyball and other sports. This dispute over funding allocation and importance of sport over cultural activities developed into a deeper division within the community. Because Sisu's aim was simply 'to encourage Melbourne's youth in sports and physical recreation', it did not consider Finnish origins as a prerequisite for joining the club.<sup>51</sup> This was as odds with the rules and principles of all the other Finnish organisations and prevented Sisu from joining the Australasian Federation of Finnish Clubs and Societies and therefore from participating in the annual Easter Games.<sup>52</sup>

Although the clash seemed to be primarily due to personal strife between the Society's and Sisu's leaders, later attempts at uniting the two fell though on the grounds of this membership question. The former insisted on the importance of 'keeping the Society Finnish',<sup>53</sup> and thus emphasised its role in preserving Finnish lan-

guage and culture. It continued to maintain Finnish sporting culture through its baseball and volleyball teams and competed only with other Finnish ethnic teams. Sisu, on the other hand, developed into one of the top volleyball teams in the state with several of its members representing Victoria in state competitions until its quiet dissolution in the early 1980s.<sup>54</sup> Its involvement in Australian sporting associations and inclusion of players of any nationality reflected Sisu's radically different interpretation of migrant ethnicity and the purpose of ethnic organisations. While it organised Finnish-style dinner dances and continued to report to the Finnish-language *Suomi*, Sisu's members were obviously able and willing to interact with the English-speaking mainstream society. The organisation functioned as a vehicle of integration into Australian society, not as a secure mini-Finland providing social support and positive identification within a Finnish cultural framework.

Regardless of the conflicts and differences between the still existing Finnish Church and Society, these organisations together formed the tangible boundary enclosing the Finnish community, and provided the frameworks within which to explore and define what it means to be Finnish in Australia.

### **Covert boundaries of ethnicity**

Despite all the theorising about ethnicity, assimilation and ethnic group formation, people continue

to understand their identities in primordial terms. To the interviewees Finnishness seemed to be a natural and inherent a quality of their hearts, or a mindset acquired in birth and from mothers' milk. Ethnic identity is clearly experienced and defined on a level more profound than tangible exclusion from host society or membership in an ethnic organisation.<sup>55</sup> To better understand how ethnic identity is constructed and experienced, it is useful to recognise that identity is always constructed across difference, i.e. in comparison to others that are unlike the person in question.<sup>56</sup> Several anthropologists have suggested that because shared identities such as ethnicity are about a relation to something, examination should focus on the boundary distinguishing 'us' from 'them'.<sup>57</sup> For Finnish immigrants, the most significant boundary exists between their ethnic group and the host society, but other levels of boundaries become apparent when listening to Finnish immigrants' oral histories.

The interviews revealed that another significant boundary defining Finnish migrant identity was constructed in opposition to their old homeland, Finland. The Finnish immigrants did not consider themselves as simply Finns living in Australia, but as sort of hybrids, not entirely Australian but not quite Finnish either. Just as maintaining Finnish identity was determined by the impossibility of being Australian, being a migrant Finn was marked by not being like Finns living in Finland. The boundary distinguishing the immigrants from Finns in Finland

consisted of three separate factors. The first was based on distinctive form of Finnish language, the second on cultural comparisons between Finland and immigrant Finns, and the third on disinterest in present day Finland.

Finnish language was not only a barrier separating the immigrants from Australians, but also produced a distinct Finnish-Australian culture.<sup>58</sup> Surrounded by English but maintaining a Finnish base of communication, the interviewees had adopted expressions and words from the dominant language creating slang commonly referred to as *finlish*. Several interviewees also adopted and modified some English words to be more easily pronounced by Finns. The migrants' Finnish had changed also as a result of interacting with people from different parts of Finland. Most of the interviewees had lost their original dialects and had merged their various vernaculars into a new way of speech incorporating elements of their distinct Karelian, Southern and Western dialects. One had become painfully aware of the 'mixed up and confused' nature of his Australian-Finnish when visiting Finland after seventeen years in Australia. He had 'felt that bus drivers and everyone stared at me and wondered what language I spoke'. In effect then, language formed a two-way barrier distinguishing Finnish immigrants not only from English-speaking Australians but also from the Finns in Finland. Within that boundary a particular Finnish-Australian language emerged enforcing the shared identity of immigrant Finns.

The second factor of Finnish-Australian identity, based on cultural comparisons, became also evident though the interviewees' recollections of their visits back to Finland. Most had visited for the first time in the 1980s and found that after decades abroad they no longer fitted into the Finnish cultural and social environment and felt like strangers in their original home country. While all acknowledged that they had enjoyed seeing friends and relatives again, their reminiscences were characterised by comments negatively contrasting Finland to their current home in Australia. Two main points of cultural distinction between the Finns and the immigrants emerged. First, the interviewees noted that Finns were 'stiff and reserved' and 'not easy-going', and considered themselves as (new) Australians to be more 'relaxed', 'free', and 'open'. Several had been frustrated with having to always take coffee or flowers when visiting friends, and some considered Finns to be pretentious, as they were 'quick to mention titles'. Second, several interviewees considered themselves to be more cultured and worldly than ordinary Finns. One had found that her family was 'not interested in other countries' but 'only [thought] of what's right in front of their noses'. Another had noticed that Finnish 'people live in such small circles', and thought that immigrants 'look at life from a few more angles than Finns do'. Immigrants' interaction with Finns in Finland, then, enforced the cultural boundary between the two.

The third factor distinguishing the immigrants from Finns in Finland was based on their weak con-

nection to the present of their homeland. This was in blatant contrast to scholars' finding that, despite certain cultural boundaries, connections to the migrants' hometown and the present of their country of origin continued to influence their ethnicity.<sup>59</sup> None of the interviewees were particularly interested in Finnish news or politics, and while a few mentioned their pride in the success of the Finnish Formula I driver Mika Häkkinen and Nokia mobile phones, these did not seem central to their ethnic identity or the activities of the ethnic organisations. The comment 'what happens in Finland now doesn't really move me at all... I think of Finnishness here rather than in Finland' expressed a common sentiment.

Although the Finnish immigrants have clung to certain cultural practices and the language of their past, a solid boundary existed between the migrant community and present day Finland. This may be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, loyalty to one's hometown and family does not seem to be as central to Finnish culture as it is to many Southern European cultures.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, a significant proportion of Finnish post-war migrants lost their homes in the Karelia region after the Second World War and therefore did not have a strong emotional connection to existing parts of Finland to begin with. In addition, Finns did not migrate for political reasons, as Poles and other Eastern Europeans did, and therefore had little reason to be concerned with the political situation in present day Finland. Finally, none of the interviewees had been in the financial position to maintain a



close connection to their families and homeland by regular visits and lengthy phone calls. Overall then, Finnish immigrants did not base their identities on a relationship with present-day Finland, but seemed to perceive their Finnishness in reference to the homeland as it was before they left.

But ethnic boundaries seldom enclose a uniform and unanimous whole. Instead of being static or homogenous, ethnic identity is in fact a boundary-forming device within which divisions exist.<sup>61</sup> While most interviewees recognised the boundaries demarcating them from Australians and Finns in Finland, there were significant differences in their understanding of Finnish-Australian ethnicity in Melbourne. The distinctions between the various Finnish associations discussed earlier were a clear example of this. The oral histories of the immigrants also revealed other, more covert, boundaries based on class, gender and age.

Perhaps the most fundamental but also the most covert formative factor of the Finnish migrant ethnicity was based on class. In fact, it did not operate so much as a dividing boundary within the community but existed alongside the linguistic and cultural boundaries. This was because the ethnic organisations that embodied the Finnish community drew their members largely from the late-fifties and late-sixties immigrants who were characterised by their working-class background. An interviewee recognised the importance of the class bond:

*Those people that left Finland in the same decade... came from sim-*



Market at the Finnish Lutheran Church in Melbourne in August. – *Senja Baron.*

*ilar circumstances, they were all working-class families. So everyone was on sort of equal level then... and we were able to talk about our experiences.*

As many migrants also shared similar occupations in the manufacturing and construction industries in Melbourne, the feeling of common experience and group solidarity was further strengthened.<sup>62</sup> It is possible that Finns who were more socially mobile and financially established never felt the need to seek positive identification within ethnic organisations. The culture and customs practised within the Finnish Church and Society have certainly always been distinctively working-class. They emphasise sport, dancing, folk music, crafts and humorous plays instead of the concert music, art and literature associated with the middle and upper classes.

There were also several differences between men's and women's experiences of ethnicity, mostly due to the differences in their occupations. Because many women did not attend the workforce, they were more excluded from the Australian society. Consequently, their Finnish was less influenced by English than men's was. Homebound women were also able to maintain more informal ethnic networks based on home visits and mutual advice. Men tied to full-time jobs, by contrast, had to limit their socialising to the weekend events and the institutional networks of the Church and the Society. They held all the leading positions within the organisations with the exception of leadership of the subcommittees responsible for the more feminine craft, theatre and dance associations.<sup>63</sup> In communal efforts women demonstrated their ethnic loy-

alties in the kitchen while men engaged in constructing and administering the more visible side of the projects. One woman expressed her frustration with going unnoticed while her husband received praise for his contributions to the community. 'Although they say now that [he] has done all this and that, he couldn't have done any of it on his own. I've always been there behind him, baking pastries [for sale] and doing all sorts of things.' In summary it seems that Finnish women's ethnicity, just like their lives in general, was based more on domestic and informal associations than the men's, who focussed more on its institutional manifestations.

Although dissolved in the recent times, another boundary existed between the late-fifties and the late-sixties immigrant cohorts on the basis of their different experiences of immigration.<sup>64</sup> The older group that arrived in Australia with empty pockets after having spent all their money on the passage, were forced to take on low-skilled manufacturing jobs, and few managed to improve their financial situation as much as they had hoped even after decades of toil. Those who arrived in the late-1960s, however, received a virtually free passage and were able to invest their savings in starting businesses or buying homes in Australia. Many were also able to return to Finland once they had enough of the adventure or had cashed up over a few years hard work. Prior to the late-sixties, the Finnish community had been strongly shaped by the immigrants' uniform experiences of leaving, settling and living in

Australia; the arrival of the new immigrants was seen as an encroachment of its boundaries.<sup>65</sup>

One couple had experienced the difference within their family. They recalled, 'we didn't have anything, we had to start from scratch. When [his] brother came ten years later it didn't cost them anything... they could get set up so easily.'<sup>66</sup> Judging the new comers by the governmental travel and settling assistance they received, some fifties migrants deemed the 'freshmen' too weak, demanding and unprepared for facing the difficulties of migrant life.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, some new arrivals were surprised at the backwardness of the industries, the general dirtiness, and the poor social welfare in Australia compared to Finland.<sup>68</sup> The homeland had changed a lot since the late-fifties migrants had departed, and some were eager to point that out.

*We intend to absorb into the Australian society as migration officials have promised, and it is from this basis that we hope to begin, not with a hoe in hand. ... We'd rather work with our brain, not with our hands. ... All the respect for the pioneers, but we are living in 1967 now.*<sup>69</sup>

Suggestions that the new comers were somehow better or of higher class enraged some of the older migrants. In response to the above, one fifties migrant suggested, 'Go and try working in your high-class occupation, but you will end up becoming what all [Finns] have become – a builder.'<sup>70</sup>

The friction between the two migrant cohorts was mostly due to

the fact that during the ten years before the new migrant wave arrived, the fifties migrants had formed close friendships crystallised by their shared experiences. As many of them fondly reminisced, the acquaintances made already on the voyage over and during the first months in the new country had become like family to them. It was understandable then, that the established community felt threatened by a wave of new immigrants who did not share their experiences and held different expectations of what migrant life was going to be like. By the last decade, the real and perceived differences between the two waves waned and became largely inconsequential. Both the Society and Church councils are now manned predominantly by the younger migrants since many of the late-fifties migrants have become ill with age or passed away. At least for an outsider, the fifties and the sixties cohorts seem united behind the more prevalent language, class and cultural boundaries, and today share the stakes of maintaining and defining Finnish-Australian ethnicity.

## Conclusion

The Finnish post-war migrant experience demonstrates the specificity of ethnicity. The Finns' oral histories confirm that the boundaries defining identity emerge through interaction with 'the other', and that ethnicity is always established on the premise of the specific sociocultural circumstances within which this interaction occurs.<sup>71</sup> Ethnicity is also a phenomenon more profound than

its structural, political and social implications. It cannot be fully explained by theoretical generalisations or dissected into components applicable to all ethnic groups, but is best studied through oral histories that expose the experiential and subjective forces underlying its construction and maintenance.<sup>72</sup>

The boundaries that demarcate Finnish ethnicity in Melbourne are particular to their post-war migration experience. The Finns never arrived in as large numbers as other post-war immigrants, and were considered model immigrants because of their northern European looks and culture. Because they appeared similar to Australians they were not purposely excluded or negatively labelled as ethnics. The boundary forcing them to remain in the fringes of Australian society was founded upon their inability to communicate in English. Regardless of others' expectation and their own intention to blend in, this real and tangible barrier curbed their career opportunities and ability to become part of Australian social networks.

In response, the Finns established the Finnish Lutheran Church and the Finnish Society. These ethnic organisations formed another conceivable boundary enclosing Finns that needed support and interaction within a familiar cultural environment. The boundary was enforced by the exclusion of non-Finnish people and of Finns that were willing to integrate into the host society. The Finnish community then, was separated from other Australians by boundaries based on its members' poor English, concen-

tration into industrial occupations, and inability or reluctance to socialise with English-speaking Australians.

The migrants were also distinguished from Finns living in Finland by a set of more intangible boundaries. By adopting expressions from the language of the surrounding society and merging their various vernaculars, they created a dialect distinct to the migrant group. They also adopted new behavioural codes and attitudes distinguishing them from other Finns whom they considered to be uptight and narrow-minded. The migrants grew apart from their country of origin so that it was a reference point only in their memories, not in present-day interests or orientations. The Finnish post-war migrant community in Melbourne then, was demarcated not only from its Australian host society but also from the Finns' old homeland.

Within these boundaries, a number of understandings of Finnish ethnicity emerged. The most obvious internal boundaries were established by the ethnic organisations and based on their emphasis of particular aspects of Finnishness. Another level of boundaries intersected the institutional distinctions. The community was defined by the working-class status of its members and cultural practices. Also, men and women experienced and understood their ethnicity differently, with the former focussing on its formal expression through the institutions and the latter on domesticity and informal networks. The late-fifties and late-sixties immigrant cohorts were distinguished

by their different experience and understanding of migration. Overall, the Finns' experience confirms Harney's assertion that 'ethnic identity does not emerge from a monolithic, shared culture but through a complex, diverse social field'.<sup>73</sup>

These tangible and intangible, and external and internal boundaries have encapsulated a distinctive Finnish-Australian ethnic identity based on shared experience of migration, exclusion and difference.<sup>74</sup> Max Weber recognised that 'subjective belief in common descent because of ... memories of migration' can be just as potent a basis for shared ethnic identity as 'similarities of physical type or customs'.<sup>75</sup> Sharing memories and experience also means sharing core values, conduct, and understanding of the world that make communication more effective within the group than it is with those outside it.<sup>76</sup> In other words, the boundaries of the Finnish-Australian ethnic community have been enforced by their shared understanding of Finnish language and customs as well as of the social code of Australia. Having created their unique blend of these two cultures, the post-war immigrants are truly 'tied to two places and at home in neither',<sup>77</sup> and are therefore most at home with those with similar experience.

In sum, belonging to the Finnish ethnic community in Melbourne is not only about being from Finland. Because the community is so strongly defined by its members' experience of their particular circumstances, it effectively excludes Finns with differ-

ent backgrounds and understandings. Consequently, the Finnish community has struggled to attract recent immigrants and second generation Finns to ensure its continuity. To do so, a more flexible model of Finnish ethnicity not

bound to concrete and lived experience of exclusion due to Finnishness should be constructed. This has happened in America, where second and third generation Finns have continued to maintain their ethnicity as a

source of pride and nostalgia but have not incorporated Finnishness into their daily lives.<sup>78</sup> Whether Finnish ethnicity in Melbourne will evolve beyond its current experiential boundaries remains to be seen.

## Notes

- 1 This is an abstracted version of **Senja Baron's** study submitted as a *Forth Year Honours Thesis* for the Department of History, University of Melbourne in May 2000.
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- 3 **G. A. De Vos**, 'Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation', in **L. Romanucci-Ross & G. A. De Vos** (ed.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation*, third edition. Walnut Creek / London / New Delhi: Altamira Press, 1995, pp. 18; **J. R. Feagin & C. B. Feagin**, *Racial and Ethnic Relations*, sixth edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999, pp. 11–12.
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- 20 Despite frequent references to interviews, no references will be provided in this article in order to protect the identity of the interviewees. Details of all of the interviews withheld by author.
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- 24 **G. Bottomley**, *After the Odyssey*, 1979; **J. Jupp**, *Arrivals and Departures*, 1966, pp. 45–57.
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# Unkari ja Euroopan integraatiokehitys



Elli Heikkilä

**B**udapest FORUM järjesti kolmannen kansainvälisen konferenssin syyskuun lopussa 2000 Unkarissa. Teemana oli *Europe of Regions: Cohesion and Integration*. Unkarin kannalta aihepiiri on erityisen tärkeä, sillä maa on liittymässä seuraavien uusien maiden joukossa Euroopan Unioniin vuonna 2003. Budapestin varapormestari **János Schifferin** puheenvuorossa tuli esiin, että Unkari on kansainvälisten investointien kohdealue ja maa lukeutuu Keski-Euroopan keskeisiin kasvualueisiin.

Ruotsin Unkarin suurlähettiläs **Staffan Carlssonin** mielestä Unionin tulee hyväksyä uudet maat heti, kun ne ovat valmiit ja täyttävät vaadittavat standardit. Myös hänen mielestään Unkari on hyvin valmistautunut jäsenyyteen. Carlsson toi esiin, että Euroopan tulee taistella ongelmia vastaan ja yhtenä kysymyksenä hän näki maahanmuuton. Ranskan Unkarin suurlähetystön ensimmäinen sihteeri **Nicolas Suran** nosti esiin Euroopan kansalaisuuden ja laajemmin maahanmuuttopolitiikan.

**Antal Nikodemusz** talousministeriöstä painotti koheesiomaita malleina Unkarille. Aluekehitykseen voidaan vaikuttaa raken-

nerahastoilla ja rakennepolitiikalla. Makroekonomia on äärimmäisen tärkeä ja siinä lyhyen, keskipitkän ja pitkän aikavälin suunnittelu. Alueilla tulisi olla myös kehityssuunnitelmat.

**Andrea Székely** tarkasteli väitöskirjatyössään Unkarin raja-alueyhteistyötä. Itävallasta käydään merkittävässä määrin ostoksilla Unkarin puolella, ja Itävalta maana on Unkarille portti länteen. Unkarin erityiskysymyksenä ovat maan rajojen ulkopuolella asuvat unkarilaisvähemmistöt. Kun Unkari liittyy Euroopan Unioniin, ja Schengenin sopimuksen myötä ulkorajat ovat tiukasti vartioituid, kuinka esim. Romaniassa asuvat unkarilaiset voivat vierailta juurillaan? Tuleeko heillä olla erityisviisumi tms. järjestely?

Tämän tyypiset kysymykset ja Unkarin liittyminen Euroopan Unioniin nousivat esiin myös ”46<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA)”-konferenssissa loka/marraskuussa Budapestissä, jonka teemana oli ”Transition and Integration: Prospects for Partners and Candidates in Europe”. Unkarin presidentti **Ferenc Mádl** käsitteli puheessaan Euroopan poliittista, taloudellista ja sosiaalista muutos-

ta. Kun poliittiset muutokset tapahtuivat Keski- ja Itä-Euroopassa, useat ihmiset toivoivat demokraattisten arvojen systeemin toteutuvan alueella. Näin tapahtuikin, muttei samanaikaisesti eikä kaikissa maissa, kuten Balkan osoittaa. Askel askeleelta integroidaan Jugoslavia uudelleen yhtenäiseen, vapaaseen ja demokraattiseen Eurooppaan, kuten Mádl asian ilmaisi. Hän näki myös Unkarin vahvana ehdokkaana uudeksi Euroopan Unionin maaksi, ja hänen mukaansa Unkari tukee laajentumisprosessin jatkumista.

Professori ja entinen ulkoministeri **Denko Maleski** Makedoniasta toi puheessaan esiin Kaakkois-Euroopan sodan seuraukset: arvioiden mukaan 1.7 miljoonaa henkilöä on joutunut lähtemään kodeistaan. Bosnia-Herzegovinan väestöstä kolmannes on pakolaisia. Yli 300 000 serbiä Kroatiaasta on pakolaisina FRY:ssä ja Bosnia-Herzegovinassa. Maleskin mukaan Kaakkois-Euroopan maiden on työskenneltävä kovasti, jotta voidaan luoda vakaat kansalliset politiikat. Tähän sisältyvät asiakohtina etnisten jännitteiden vähentäminen, olemassa olevien rajojen hyväksyminen, pa-



kolaisongelmien ratkaiseminen, tehokkaiden demokraattisten instituutioiden kehittäminen, ihmisoikeustilanteen parantaminen, vähittäinen demilitarisointi jne.

Tämä on Maleskin mukaan osa toimintalistasta, jonka kautta saatisiin rauha ja tasapaino jokaiseen maahan ja alueelle kokonaisuutena. Myös kansainvälisen yh-

teisön tulee selkeästi sitoutua Keski-Euroopan maiden integroitumiseen Eurooppaan ja globaaleihin rakenteisiin, jotta näihin tavoitteisiin päästäisiin.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE

THE INSTITUTE OF MIGRATION  
TURKU, FINLAND


INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

AND


CENTRE FOR ESTONIAN DIASPORA STUDIES AT TARTU UNIVERSITY,  
TARTU, ESTONIA

In light of the fruitful cooperative relationship of the Institute of Migration, Turku, Finland, Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary, and Centre for Estonian Diaspora Studies at Tartu University, Tartu, Estonia, the three bodies agree in this Statement of Principle to give formal expression to the cooperative relationship which exists between them and to pledge continuation of that relationship in the future. Cooperation between the three will include courtesies and assistance to visiting scholars from each of the bodies to the other, the free flow of information between the bodies, joint research projects and conferences etc.


Turku, Finland, October 20, 2000



Olavi Koivukangas, Docent, Ph.D.  
Director of the Institute of Migration



László Guba  
Managing Director of Institute for Political  
Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences



Hill Kulu, Head of the Centre for Estonian  
Diaspora Studies, Tartu University

Yhteistyösopimus Siirtolaisuusinstituutin, Unkarin Tiedeakatemian ja Tarton yliopiston välillä.

## Vaeltajat-kirja julkaistiin 12.10.



Amerikansuomalaisten kohta-  
loita 1920- ja 1930-lukujen  
Neuvosto-Karjalassa kuvaava  
**Vaeltajat** julkaistiin Siirtolai-  
suusinstituutin kustantamana.  
Tutkija *Mayme Sevander* (vas.)  
tuli Wisconsinista USA:sta ker-  
tomaan kirjastaan.

Tilaisuudessa oli kuulta-  
vana myös petroskoilainen  
tutkija ja toimittaja *Eila Lah-  
ti-Argutina* (oik.), jonka laaja  
matrikkeli 1930–1950-lu-  
vuilla vankileireille tuomi-  
tuista ja ammutuista venäjän-  
suomalaisista valmistuu Siir-  
tolaisuusinstituutin julkaisu-  
sarjassa vuoden vaihteessa.

## Suomalaiset Ruotsissa -teos julkaistiin 30.11.



Suomen siirtolaisuuden histo-  
ria -kirjasarjan odotettu 3. osa  
on valmistunut. Erikoistutki-  
ja *Jouni Korkiasaaren* ja Kan-  
sallisarkiston pääjohtaja *Kari  
Tarkiaisen* yhdessä tekemä  
laaja tutkimustyö on tuotta-  
nut 546-sivuisen tuloksen.  
Kirjassa saa vivahderikkaan  
ilmaisunsa koko ruotsinsuo-  
malaisen elämäkirjo, jossa  
pääpaino on nykyajassa. Kir-  
jan monipuolinen kuvitus li-  
sää lukunautintoa. Jouluksi  
kirja olisi tervetullut lahja jo-  
kaiseen suomalaissukuun,  
josta naapurimaan on jos-  
kus muutettu.

## Kirjat • Books



**Anthias, Floya & Gabriella Lazaridis (toim.): Gender and Migration in Southern Europe – Women on the Move. Berg, Mediterranean Series, New York, 2000. 263 s.**

Sukupuolierojen on havaittu vaikuttavan muuttoliikettä käyttäytymiseen jo 1800-luvun jälkipuoliskolla, jolloin ensimmäisiä kertoja naiset kuvailtiin miehiä muuttoalttiimmiksi. Naisten osuus on 1990-luvun alun jälkeen kansainvälisessä muuttoliikkeessä entisestään voimistunut sekä määrältään että merkitykseltään, ja näin ollen kirja on aiheeltaan varsin mielenkiintoinen. Anthiaksen ja Lazaridin toimittama teos käsittelee naisten siirtolaisuuden syitä ja seurauksia perhe- ja työllisyysnäkökulmista lähtien lukijan maahanmuuttajanaisten marginalisoitumisen rakenteisiin eteläisen Euroopan esi-

merkkimaissa. Teos nostaa uudesta näkökulmasta keskusteltavaksi naisten aseman maailmanlaajuisessa ympäristössä tapaustutkimusten kautta.

Johdannossa toimittajat asettavat teoksen tavoitteeksi kytkeä muuttoliike osaksi kansainvälisiä prosesseja globaalin talouden ja ylikansallisten siirtolaisryhmien kautta. Lisäksi Anthias korostaa muuttoliikkeen kolmiulotteisuutta hahmottaen muuttajan asemaa suhteessa kotimaahan, kohde- maahan sekä siirtolaisryhmään. Eteläisen Euroopan maahanmuuton merkittävänä selittäjinä pidetään työmarkkinoiden voimakasta segmentoitumista, valtioiden ja etnisten ryhmien välisiä historiallisia ja kulttuurillisia suhteita sekä yksilön taloudellista asemaa.

Kirjassa käsiteltävät maat ovat perinteisesti olleet maastamuuttomaita, mutta 1990-luvun alussa Italia, Espanja, Kreikka, Portugali ja Kypros ovat kokeneet täyskään- noksen maahanmuuttomaiaksi, ja ne ottavat vastaan suhteellisen paljon laillisia ja laittomia maahanmuuttajia vuosittain. Italiassa on noin miljoona maahanmuuttajaa pääasiassa Maghrebin maista, Dominikaanisesta tasavallasta ja Filippiineiltä. Espanjassa on yli 850 000 ulkomaalaista, joista puolet on EU-maista ja puolet kolmansista maista. Kreikassa on arviolta puoli miljoonaa maahanmuuttajaa Albanian, itäisen Euroopan maista ja kolmansista maista. Kyproksella maahanmuuttajia on noin 40 000. Ulkomaalaisten tilastoinnit ovat kaikki arvioita, sillä laittomien tulijoiden määrät ovat huomattavan suuret.

Maahanmuuttajat ovat keskeisessä asemassa kohdemaiden yh-

teiskunnallisessa rakennemuutoksessa. Paikallisten naisten asema on koulutuksen myötä muuttunut, mutta lasten ja vanhusten huoltamiseen ei ole olemassa yhteiskunnan tarjoamia palveluita. Maahanmuuttajat tulevatkin tarpeeseen. Heidän sijoittuessaan työläisperheisiin kotiapulaisiksi he mahdollistavat paikallisten perheenäitien osallistumisen kotien ulkopuoliseen palkkatyöhön. Laitontakaan maahan tuloa ei haluta välttämättä kokonaan estää aputyövoiman tarpeen vuoksi. Tämä aiheuttaakin lainsäädännöllisiä ongelmia varsinkin EU:n tasolla. Chell-Robinson kuvaa artikkelissaan Italian lainsäädännön viimeaikaisia risti- riittaisuuksia.

Maahanmuuttajia halutaan, mutta ilman yhteiskunnallista tukea jäädessään naiset kohtaavat ongelmia sekä naisina, maahanmuuttajina että oman etnisen ryhmänsä edustajina. Maahanmuuton laillisuusasteen todetaan suoraan vaikuttavan yhteiskunnalliseen asemaan. Erityisesti albaani- naisten laittoman maahan tulon ja heidän perheasemansa koetaan vieraannuttavan heidät sosiaalisesta kanssakäymisestä, työn onnistumisesta ja paikallisista kontakteista. Maahantulon syyt vaikuttavat suoraan tulijan työhön motivoitumiseen ja yhteiskunnalliseen integroitumiseen.

Kirjassa selvitetään maahanmuuton järjestelmällisyyttä sekä maahanmuuttajien järjestäytyneisyyttä. Erityisen mielenkiintoiseksi teoksen tekee eri maahanmuuttajaryhmien välisten yhteiskunnallisten asemien vertailut ja niiden syiden pohdinnat. Filippiinilaisten asema on poikkeuksetta muita maahanmuuttajaryhmiä ar-

vostetumpi. Artikkeleiden mukaan se johtuu hyvästä työmoraaalista, luotettavuudesta sekä kristillisestä uskosta. Lisäksi tähän vaikuttaa filippiiniläisten maahanmuuton ja työhön sijoittumisen järjestäytyneisyys sekä työntekijöiden kontaktiverkostot.

Perheenjäsenten kokemukset tai ystävilta kuullut tarinat saattavat usein muuttajan matkaan. Maastamuutto on suuri haaste, josta halutaan selviytyä perheen edun vuoksi ja taloudellisen aseman parantamiseksi. Muuttoon ovat vaikuttaneet ennen kaikkea sosiaaliset siteet ja elämäntilanne. Kolmansien maiden muuttajien kohdevalinnoissa näkyy myös saadun tiedon merkitys.


Kehityksissä on yleistä lähettää yksi perheenjäsen tienaamaan ulkomaille ja sitä kautta parantaa kotimaahansa jääneen suvun taloudellista asemaa. Yleisimmin perheen pää muuttaa ensin ja valmistelee lopun perheen muuttoa ennalta käsin. Filippiiniläisten kohdalla nainen katsotaan usein kannattavimmaksi muuttajaksi. Mies jää kotimaahan huolehtimaan perheestä naisen lähtiessä tienaamaan esimerkiksi vanhimman lapsen kouluttamiseen tarvittavaa pääomaa. Muuton kannustimena toimii ennen kaikkea parempi palkkataso. Filippiineillä myös hyvin koulutetun on taloudellisesti kannattavampaa lähteä maasta siivoojaksi tai kodinhoitajaksi kuin jäädä kotimaahansa esimerkiksi virkamieheksi. Perheen yhdistyminen kohdemaahan ei filippiiniläisten kohdalla ole ollut yleistä, sen sijaan maahanmuuttajien kesken on havaittavissa sukupolven vaihdoksia. Filippiiniläisen maahanmuuttajanai-

sen tienattua tarpeeksi tulee usein hänen tilalleen koulutettu lapsensa tai sukulainen. Toisen polven maahanmuuttajavaihdokkaiden motiiveina ovat esimerkiksi vanhempien vanhuudenturvasta huolehtiminen ja perheen taloudellisen aseman kohentaminen. Muiden väestöryhmien muuton tavoitteet eroavat huomattavasti filippiiniläisten naisten tavoitteista.

Kirjan ongelmavyöhyte koskettaa paitsi EU:n lainsäädännön kehittelyä myös uusiin elämänmuutoksiin totuttelevia Euroopan kansalaisia. Kirjaa olisi vielä täydentänyt artikkeli yhdistysten ja kirkkojen järjestämästä kotouttamistoiminnasta. Tällä erää asia mainittiin vain ohimennen, mutta kokemusten vaihto aihepiiristä olisi ollut tärkeää. Kaiken kaikkiaan kirja antaa hyvin analysoitua tietoa maahanmuuttajien yhteiskunnallisesta asemasta. Aihetta käsitellään mielenkiintoisesti, vaikkakin teoriapohjaa vältellen. Kirja tarjoaa vertailupohjaa ja ajatuksia Suomeen tulevien maahanmuuttajien kotoutumisesta kiinnostuneille sekä globaaleja rakenteita kokonaisuuksina ajatteleville, mutta ennen kaikkea tietopaketin Euroopan aluekehityksestä ja muuttoliikkeistä. Artikkelit ovat selkeitä ja lukijan mielenkiinnon vangitsevia.

Taru Järvinen

**Pentti Lempiäinen: Nuortuu vanhetessaan. Merimieskirkon muutosten puhureissa. Gummers Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä 2000. 403 s.**



Historiansa aikana – jota nyt on kestänyt 125 vuotta – Suomen Merimieskirkko r.y. on muutaman kerran ajanmukaistanut nimeään toimintaansa vastaamaan. Viimeisintä nimenmuutosta professori Pentti Lempiäinen luonnehtii näin: Jos seura oli alkuaan *Suomalaisien merimiesten ulkomaan satamissa sielunhoitoyhtiö*, nykyisin voisi pikemminkin puhua ”suomalaisten maanaisten ulkomailta sielunhoitoyhtiöstä”. Suomen satamissa tapahtuvaan toimintaan tämä luonnehdinta sen sijaan ei sovi alkuunkaan.

Seuran johtokunnan puheenjohtaja piispa Erkki Kansanaho mainitsi jo kesäjuhlien avajaispuheessaan 1981 yhtyvänään niihin, joiden mielestä nimi, jossa esiintyisi sana *merimieskirkko*, ilmaisi paremmin toiminnan tavoitteet kuin *Merimieslähetykseura*. Merimies-sanan hänkin siis toivoi nimessä säilyvän. Tähän nimeen päädyttiinkin kolmetoista vuotta myöhemmin.

Esiteltävänä oleva kirja on neljäs historiateos. Ensimmäinen oli merimiespastori Toivo Waltarin

vuonna 1910 kirjoittama Suomen Merimieslähetystoimi. Kun seura täytti 50 vuotta, sen sihteeriksi noussut Waltari teki teoksestaan uuden laajennetun laitoksen Suomen Merimieslähetystoimi 1875–1925.

Seuraava historiikki ilmestyi vasta 1983. Sen kirjoittaja oli johtokunnan pitkäaikainen puheenjohtaja piispa Erkki Kansanaho. Hänen laajan ja perusteellisen tutkimuksensa nimi oli Kirkko ja merenkulkijat. Sata vuotta Suomen Merimieslähetyseuran työtä. Professori Pentti Lempiäisen teos valmistui Suomen Merimieskirkon 125-vuotisjuhliin Turkuun syksyllä 2000.

Lempiäinen keskittyy teokseensa viimeisiin 25 vuoteen kuvaten seuran toiminnan voimakasta muuttumista ja merimieskirkkojen arkisen toiminnan sisältöjä. Hänellä on ollut käytettävissään aikaisempien historiateosten lisäksi merimieskirkkojen arkistot. Hän on myös käynyt kaikilla tällä hetkellä toiminnassa olevilla ulkomaisilla ja kotimaisilla merimieskirkkoilla. Hän on myös haastatellut keskustuomiston työntekijöitä ja eräitä entisiä merimiespappeja. Jostain syystä joukkoon ei ole mahtunut yhtään Buenos Airesissa ja Rouenissa toiminutta merimiespappia.

Arvostelijan objektiivisuutta luonnollisesti hämärtää se tosiseikka, että hän on itse ollut merimieskirkon lähihistoriassa mukana vuodesta 1967 välillä lähempänä, välillä kauempana. Kokonaisvaikutelma kirjasta on luotettava, tiedot pitävät paikkansa ja kirjoittaja ottaa myös reippaasti kantaa lähihistorian tapahtumiin tehden niistä myös reippaita tulkintoja.

Tarkastellessani kirjoitettua Antwerpenin ja Lontoon osuutta totean niissä muutamia pieniä asia- virheitä. Sivulla 158 tekijä väittää Antwerpenin assistentin ajotaidon joutuneen koetukselle tammikuussa 1979. Kirjan lopussa kirjoittaja kuitenkin aivan oikein toteaa, että Antwerpeniin saatiin assistentti 1988. Seuraavalla sivulla kirjoittaja kertoo Lontoon pappien Seppo Heikkilän ja Paavo Rasimuksen sekä Antwerpenin papin Kauko Purasen seilauksista laivojen mukana. Todellisuudessa Kauko Puranen kolmen kuukauden yhtäjaksoista seilausta suorittaessaan oli vielä Konnunsuon keskusvankilan virkavapaalla oleva pappi. Lontoon kohdalla on jäänyt mainitsematta sivulla 187, että arkkipiispa Mikko Juva kävi Lontoossa myös 1980, jolloin hän osallistui Canterburyn arkkipiispan Ronald Runcien arkkipiispan virkaan asettamiseen. Arvostelija oli tällä matkalla autonkulkijana mukana.


Kirja on kiinnostavaa luettavaa ja se kertoo järjestöstä, joka on kyennyt muuttamaan toimintaansa ja vastaamaan nykyisen ajan ja kasvavan kansainvälistymisen asettamiin haasteisiin. Samalla se kertoo myös siitä kuinka merimieskirkko ja kirkon ulkosuomalaisyö ovat entistä paremmin löytäneet toisensa pystyen keskenään myös jakamaan vastuualueet.

Mielenkiintoinen ja piristävä lukukokemus!

*Kauko Puranen*

(Arvostelun tekijä on toiminut aiemmin Suomen merimieslähetyseuran palveluksessa matkapappina kotimaassa ja ulkomailla 1968–1972, merimiespappina Antwerpenissä 1975–1979, 2. merimiespappina Lontoossa 1979–1982,

johtokunnan jäsenenä 1983–1986, ulkosuomalaisyössä vankilapappina Strängnäsän hiippakunnassa, Ruotsissa 1986–1990 ja Kirkkohallituksessa ulkoasiainosastossa ulkosuomalaisyötyön vs. apulaissihteerinä 1991–1994.)



**Asylum and Migration Policies in the European Union, edited by Steffen Angenendt. Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs. Europa Union Verlag, Berlin, 1999. 345 p.**

This study undertaken under the editorial control of Steffen Angenendt is an ambitious one in the extreme. The areas of asylum and migration policy are at present as highly politicised and contentious in every European jurisdiction as the questions they raise are diverse. Thus, to attempt a pan-European compilation or comparative study is a major undertaking.

Indeed, it is on this very point that the only possible misgivings in relation to this well-conceived




project arise. For although the work continually emphasises the dearth of proper analysis of European-wide trends and policies in the areas of asylum and migration, the reader is ultimately left somewhat unsatisfied by the absence of any significant comparative endeavour in the text itself.

Participating authors, in their separate analysis of each European member-state, utilise common structures and themes, a simple organisational detail which renders the study incalculably more accessible to the reader with comparative interests. The quality of information provided on individual states is also quite high, although a certain amount of depth may necessarily be absent in relation to states such as Ireland and Spain, states which are newly faced by questions of migration and asylum which traditionally have not been of significant consequence.

The central importance of mutual understanding and harmonisation of law and policy in these times of common European developments in relation to migration and asylum is never far from the mind of the reader of this text. This publication, highly informative on the level of understanding the backgrounds to and legal frameworks of individual states, is therefore undoubtedly of value in that context. While, as noted, a gap remains in the text in the context of a final analysis or statement of conclusion, the reader remains free to engage in such an exercise his or herself. As such, this study is perhaps of most utility to the individual wishing to identify a starting point or devel-

op a base of knowledge from which to progress to an individual or comparative analysis of one or more European states. The lack of data and information on which to build comparative study (a shortage identified by the text itself) is thus to an extent alleviated. And so, although the actual goal of an analytical study of law across Europe is ultimately here not reached, one of the motivating purposes of the editor – that of providing the concrete information for such comparative studies – is effectively realized.

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**Varpu Lindström. From Heroes to Enemies: Finns in Canada, 1937–1947. Beaverton, Ont.: Aspasia Books, 2000. 265 p.**

Over the past three decades much has been written about the history

of Finns in Canada, but most of the published record has concerned the period from the 1880s up to 1940. Now in a major way Varpu Lindström has rectified this imbalance by writing a book published by a new press on the experience of Finnish-Canadians during World War II. The author is best known for *Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada* (Toronto, 1988) and her comprehensive entry on "Finns" in the recent *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples* (Toronto, 1999). The book under review, Lindström tells us, consumed her attention over the past ten years although some of her subjects were interviewed before 1990.

The theme of the story and the reason for the title is quite simple. In the early stages, 1939–40, Canadian Finns were heroes because their compatriots in Finland were struggling valiantly in the Winter War against the invading armies of the Soviet Union. In the later stages, specifically after December 7, 1941 till 1944, the so-called Continuation War, Canadian Finns were considered enemies, in fact quite literally being officially designated as "enemy aliens." This abrupt turn of events arose from Canada's declaring war on Finland in the wake of its becoming a co-belligerent with Germany against the Soviet Union from June 1941. Thereafter all aid to Finland ceased, Finnish consulates were closed, and Finnish citizens – even Canadian wives of Finns – had to be registered and fingerprinted. This situation came as a great shock and humiliation to most Finnish-Canadians even

though, if deemed loyal by the RCMP, registrants were issued with an exemption certificate renewable once a year which rendered the holder "inimune from interference" provided he/she did not change residence. In fact only two Finns were actually interned during World War II and that was because they were Communists not because they were Finns. Basically as enemy aliens Finnish-Canadians experienced minor disruptions (loss of hunting rifles), periodic surveillance (RCMP visits), short-term arrests and some intimidation. Granted not very pleasant but not wholesale relocation as 21,000 Japanese-Canadians on the West Coast experienced after Pearl Harbor, nor the intemment suffered by hundreds of Italian and German-Canadians suspected of being supporters of Hitler and Mussolini. Even the RCMP was forced to admit: "The majority of the Finns [even the leftists] appear to be loyal both to Finland and to the British Empire" (p. 164).

One group of Finns were singled out for special treatment during the war, namely the left-wing Finns because of their membership in or support of the Communist Party of Canada. The Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC) founded in 1911 was declared illegal in 1940 and its properties confiscated. FOC halls were closed right across Canada and their newspaper *Vapaus* (Freedom) was forced to shut down. These government actions were prompted for reasons of ideology rather than ethnicity or any putative connection with Finland. The irony of all this as pointed out

twenty years ago by historian Edward W. Laine was that "the conservative Finns [represented by the Loyal Finns in Canada] were outwardly conformist but inwardly Finnish nationalists; on the other hand, the radical Finns [represented by the FOCI were outwardly nonconformist but Canadian in their loyalties (even if partly directed toward ... the U.S.S.R.)" As a result, the FOC suffered a severe loss of membership during the banned period. Only fifty locals remained in operation after World War II; twenty locals had become inactive. Membership declined by one-third. Of course these developments were not entirely a result of the banning.

The book begins with a discussion of Finnish-Canadian participation in the Canadian army in World War I and in the Spanish Civil War. During the Winter War, Lindström suggests, about 250 men mostly Finnish-Canadians went to Finland to fight as part of the Finnish American Legion beside the regular Finnish army. Finnish-Canadian women weren't so lucky. Those who wanted to volunteer their services in aid of the Finnish war effort were prevented from joining the women's auxiliary *Lotta Svärd* unless they had belonged to the organization before emigrating to Canada. But Lindström offers no explanation for this discriminatory exclusion. There is much information on Canadian material aid to Finland during and after the Winter War. Attention is also paid to the provincial and federal schemes to resettle Finnish refugees after the Winter War, mainly from Karelia,

in Northern Ontario, Saskatchewan and the Peace River country. Nothing came of these schemes.

The course and effects of the Continuation War (1941–44) are recounted in Chapters 5 and 6. Being declared enemy aliens had the effect, for example, of prompting Finns to reach out more to their Canadian neighbours. Finnish-Canadians began to contribute in money and men to the Canadian war effort whereas previously they had contributed to the Finnish war effort. About 1,500 Finnish Canadians served in the Canadian armed forces. Lindström includes a list of forty-six Finnish-Canadians killed during World War II (p. 180), although she admits the list is incomplete. One of the strengths of these chapters is the author's balanced treatment of the forces and circumstances surrounding the predominant Red and White factions of the Finnish-Canadian political spectrum.

To round out the wartime experiences, there is a chapter devoted to the detention of about 100 Finnish merchant seamen who found themselves in Canadian ports after this country's declaration of war against Finland. In fact, two Finnish ships were seized by the Canadian government in the port of Halifax and subsequently pressed into service by the Canadian merchant marine while manned by Finnish seamen who served "voluntarily" (that is, rather than spend the duration in detention centres). One of these ships was in fact torpedoed a few months later. This is an interesting episode, but the story is not that

well told. Much of the first-person testimony is dependent upon one informant.

The book ends on an upbeat note in a chapter entitled "Return to Friendly Relations." As Finland sought to cope with the destruction of Lapland, the loss of Vyborg and the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR, and a crippling war debt, the Finns themselves cynically concluded: "The East took our men, the Germans took our women, the Swedes took our children, but at least we are left with our war debt (p. 230). The last wartime internees returned to Finland in March 1948. A Canada Finland Aid Society Fund was established composed of both Red and White factions. Aid was extended to Karelian evacuees and war orphans, many of whom had spent the war years in Sweden." "America parcels" to friends and relatives

continued for some years, mainly to addresses in Ostrobothnia. Finally, after 1947 about 14,000 Finns migrated to Canada in the space of a decade forming one of three major waves of migration from Finland to this country. This marked in a concrete way the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries.

In a work of this sort, a few errors or omissions are bound to creep in. Harry Nixon was acting premier of Ontario not "prime minister of Ontario" (p. 31). Canada declared war on Germany on September 10 not September 7, 1939 (p. 43). F.C. Blair is only named on page 119 and not identified as director of the Immigration Branch until the following page. The 21,000 Japanese Canadians who were relocated from the British Columbia coast were not interned in the Fraser Valley (p.

148) which would have been too close to the coast for security reasons. There is no caption or English translation for the death notice of Vesa Sirén on page 70 although there is a long passage about the man on page 105. Similarly, the very effective cover illustration "Var orphan Christmas" is not identified in a prominent place and thus its effectiveness in depicting a Finnish war orphan crying while his village is burning is lost on the reader. Finally, the book lacks a proper stand-alone conclusion; the "Epilogue" serves as an inadequate summary.

Nonetheless, these are minor points when one considers the important contribution this book makes to the history of Finns in Canada.

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
**Hyvää Uutta Vuotta!  
Gott Nytt År!  
Happy New Year!**

**Siirtolaisuus-Migration**



# Tietoa Neuvostoliiton suomalaisista 1930-1950-luvuilta

Tuhansia Neuvostoliittoon siirtolaisiksi muuttaneita ja sinne loikanneita suomalaisia siirrettiin Siperian pakkotyöleireille ja teloitettiin 1930-luvun vainovuosina. USA:ssa syntynyt Mayme Sevander ja petroskoilainen Eila Lahti-Argutina ovat kumpikin tutkineet näiden suomalaisten kohtaloita. Siirtolaisuusinstituutti julkaisee heidän kirjansa julkaisusarjassaan tämän syksyn ja talven aikana.



## **Mayme Sevander: Vaeltajat**

Noin 6 000 amerikansuomalaista muutti Yhdysvalloista ja Kanadasta Neuvosto-Karjalaan 1920- ja 1930-luvuilla. Suuri osa heistä ja heidän lapsistaan tuhottiin ns. Stalinin puhdistuksissa 1930-luvun lopulla ja toisen maailmansodan aikana.

Sevander on koonnut kirjan loppuun laajan henkilöhakemiston vaino- ja sotauhreiksi joutuneista Neuvosto-Karjalan amerikansuomalaisista.

Kirjassa on 249 sivua ja se on runsaasti kuvitettu. Hinta 100,- (+ postikulut).

## **Eila Lahti-Argutina: Olimme joukko vieras vaan**

Petroskoissa asuva toimittaja ja tutkija *Eila Lahti-Argutina* on laatinut laajan matrikkelin, josta löytyy tietoja lähes 8 000 venäjänsuomalaisesta, jotka ammuttiin tai tuomittiin vankileireille Neuvostoliitossa 1930–1950-luvuilla. Kirja pitää sisällään nimilistojen lisäksi historiallisia katsauksia ja yksittäisten suoma-

laisten tarkempia henkilöhistorioita. Kirja on jatkoa Lahti-Argutinan vuonna 1997 ilmestyneelle tutkimukselle suomalaisten loikkarien joukkotuhosta Uralilla vuonna 1938.

Kirja ilmestyy vuoden 2001 alkupuolella. Kirja on kuvitettu ja siinä on noin 650 sivua. Hinta 150,- (+ postikulut).



**Tilaukset:** Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, Piispankatu 3, 20500 Turku, puh. 02-2317 536  
fax: 02-2333 460, email: hanna.palovuori@utu.fi, www.migrationinstitute.fi



Jouni Korkiasaari  
ja Kari Tarkiainen

# Suomalaiset Ruotsissa

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■ Siirtolaisuusinstituutissa on tekeillä kuusiosainen kirjasarja suomalaisten siirtolaisuudesta kautta aikain. Sarjassa ovat jo ilmestyneet Pohjois-Amerikkaan ja Kanadaan sekä eteläiselle pallonpuoliskolle suuntautuneesta muutosta kertovat osat. Vuoden 2001 aikana ilmestyvissä kirjoissa keskitytään suomalaisiin Euroopassa, Venäjällä ja Aasiassa.

*Suomalaiset Ruotsissa* (546 s.) on ensimmäinen laaja suomeksi julkaistu kokonais-

esitys Suomen ja Ruotsin välisestä siirtolaisuudesta ja ruotsinsuomalaisten historiasta.

Kirjassa tarkastellaan mm. ruotsinsuomalaisten työelämää, yhdistyksiä, kulttuuriharrastuksia, kieli-, koulu- ja vähemmistökysymyksiä, julkaisu- ja tiedotustoimintaa, urheilua, uskonnollista ja poliittista elämää sekä elinoloja. Myös Ruotsiin muuton syyt ja paluumuutto tulevat kirjasarjassa esille. Tekstiä elävöittävät monet aikalauskertomukset ja henkilöhistoriat. Pääpaino on uudemman ajan historiassa.



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fax: 02-233 3460, email: hanna.palovuori@utu.fi, internet: www.migrationinstitute.fi